Weitz v. Green Clerk\u27s Record v. 1 Dckt. 33696 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-18-2008
Weitz v. Green Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 33696
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Weitz v. Green Clerk's Record v. 1 Dckt. 33696" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1905.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1905

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife and 1 Supreme Court Case No. 33696 
WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an Idaho 
Limited liability company, 
1 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants, ) 
Appellants, Cross Respondents, ) 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHREINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants/Counter-plaintiffs 
Respondents/Cross Appellants. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Latah 
HONORABLE JOHN R. STEGNER 
District Judge 
CHARLES A. BROWN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
324 MAIN STREET 
LEWISTON, ID 83501 
ROBERT M. MAYGAR 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
201 NORTH MAIN STREET 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
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A t t o r n e y s  f o r  P l a i n t i f f s  
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT O F  THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE O F  IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY O F  L A T m  
GERALD E.  WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and w i f e ,  ) C a s e  No .  CV2004-0000  
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho l i m i t e d  l i a b i l i t y  ) 
c o m p a n y ,  1 
) 
P l a i n t i f f s ,  ) COMPLAINT 
) 
vs . ) Fee C a t e g o r y  A .  1.: $ 7 7 . 0 0  
) 
TODD A .  GREEN and TONIA L .  ) , 
GREEN, husband and w i f e ,  ) 
STEVEN R.SHOOK and MARY E .  ) 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T.  1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. ) 
CASTLE, and U.S.  BANK N.A., 1 
) 
D e f e n d a n t s .  ) 
P l a i n t i f f s  G e r a l d  E .  Wei tz  and C o n s u e l o  J. W e i t z  ( 'Weitzes"), 
husband and w i f e ,  and W e i t z  & S o n s ,  LLC ( a l l  p l a i n t i f f s  a re  
co l lec t ive ly  referred t o  as " P l a i n t i f f s " ) ,  by and through t h e i r  
a t torneys,  L a n d e c k ,  Westberg, Judge & G r a h a m ,  P .A. ,  f o r  c l a i m s  
against  D e f e n d a n t s ,  a l lege  as f o l l o w s :  
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"I 
Lec 
JURISDICTION 
. . 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this 
action pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1-705 and jurisdiction over 
the parties pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-514. Venue is proper 
in Latah County pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401. 
2. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdiction of the 
Magistrate Division. 
PARTIES, CLAIMS, AND GENERAL FACTS 
3. Weitzes are husband and wife and hold title in fee simple 
absolute, founded upon a recorded written instrument, to the East 
1/2 of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 
West Boise Meridian in Latah County, Idaho ("E 1/2 NE 1/4" or 
"Weitz property"). Weitz & Sons, LLC, is an Idaho limited 
liability company and holds title in fee simple absolute to the 
West 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 8, Township 40 North, 
5 West Boise Meridian in Latah County, Idaho ('W 1/2 NE 1/4" 
,LC property"). (The Weitz property and LLC property are 
ztively referred to as "Plaintiffs' property.") 
Defendants and their claims to real estate situate in the 
of Idaho, County of Latah, affected by this action, are as 
IS : 
1.1 Defendants Todd Green and Tonia Green are husband and 
wife ("Greens") and claim title to the real property 
more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached to 
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this Complaint ("Tract 4"). 
4.2 Greens granted a deed of trust on real property they 
claim, including Tract 4, recorded December 16, 2002, as 
instrument No. 471571, records of Latah County, Idaho, 
to U.S. Bank Trust Company, N.A., as trustee, in favor 
of Defendant U.S. Bank N.A., as beneficiary. 
4.3 Defendants Danial T. Castle and Catherine C. Castle 
("Castles") are husband and wife and claim title to the 
real property more particularly described in Exhibit B 
I 
attached to this Complaint ("Tract 1") . 
4.4 Defendants Steven R. Shook and Mary E. Silvernale Shook 
("Shooks") are husband and wife and claim title to the 
real property more particularly described in Exhibit C 
attached to this Complaint ("Tract 2") . 
4.5 Plaintiffs have made a diligent search for all others 
having an interest in this action and have found none. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs allege a claim to quiet title 
against all unknown owners and/or interest holders. 
5. Tract 1, Tract 2, and Tract 4 (collectively 'Defendants' 
property") lie adjacent to and south of Plaintiffs' property. The 
location of the shared boundary between Plaintiffs' property and 
Defendants' property is at issue in this case. 
6. Plaintiffs are successors in interest to Consuelo Weitz's 
grandfather, Fred J. Schoepflin, who acquired the NE 1/4 of said 
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Section 8 by Warranty Deed recorded December 13, 1929, under 
Instrument No. 113310, records of Latah County, Idaho. 
7. Fred J. Schoepflin deeded the NE 1/4 of said Section 8 to 
Consuelo Weitz' s parents, Howard and Constance Schoepf lin, in 
1967. 
8. Constance Schoepflin subsequently passed away, and Howard 
Schoepflin re-married. Howard Schoepflin and his then wife, 
Sylvia Schoepflin, deeded the E 1/2 NE 1/4 to Weitzes in 1977. 
Howard Schoepflin and Sylvia Schoepflin deeded the W 1/2 NE 1/4 to 
Sylvia Schoepflin's children ('Yeatts") in 2002. Yeatts deeded 
the W l/2 NE 1/4 to Weitz & Sons, LLC, in February, 2003. 
9. All Schoepflin deeds referenced above, conveying the E 1/2 
NE 1/4 and W 1/2 NE 1/4, contained legal descriptions by division 
of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. The Yeatts 
deed referenced above, conveying the W 1/2 NE 1/4, contained a 
legal description by division of quarter section rather than by 
metes and bounds. 
10. A fence and fenceline were constructed no later than 1929 
and have existed in the same place since that time in the vicinity 
and running easterly and westerly over the entire length of the 
quarter-section line between the NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of said 
Section 8 (the "fence and fenceline"). 
11. Greens employed Ronald P. Monson, professional land 
surveyor, who performed a survey in 2002 of the SE 1/4 of said 
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Section 8 (the "Monson survey"). The Monson survey determined 
that said fence and fenceline are located as little as 
approximately 75 feet, and as much as approximately 150 feet, 
south of the quarter-section line and running easterly and 
westerly over the entire length of the quarter-section line 
between the NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of said Section 8. 
12. Weitzes claim ownership of the property lying between said 
quarter-section line and said fence and fenceline adjacent to the 
W 1/2 NE 1/4, and Weitz & Sons, LLC, claims ownership of the 
property lying between said quarter-section line and said fence 
and fenceline adjacent to the E 1/2 NE 1/4. According to the 
Monson survey, the property claimed by Plaintiffs collectively 
totals approximately 8.57 acres (collectively the "Disputed 
Property" ) . 
13. Fred J. Schoepflin and Howard Schoepflin (collectively 
"Schoepflins") consistently pastured cattle on the NE 1/4 of said 
Section 8 and the Disputed Property from 1929 through 1972. 
14. By 1967, a road had been constructed by Schoepflins within 
the Disputed Property and north of the fence and fenceline running 
easterly and westerly for the entire length of the Disputed 
Property (the "road") . 
15. The road has been continuously used and maintained by the 
Plaintiffs and Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking, 
motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging and vehicular access to areas 
within Plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property. 
16. Weitzes have harvested firewood from the Disputed Property 
on a frequent and continuing basis since 1977. 
17. The Rogers family ("Rogers"), predecessors in interest to 
Defendants in the SE 1/4 of said Section 8, never objected to any 
of the above-described activities undertaken by the Schoepflins 
and Plaintiffs on the Disputed Property. 
18. In the 1950rs, Fred Schoepflin selectively logged a 
portion of the NE 1/4 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property, 
to the fence and fenceline and not southerly of the fence and 
fenceline. In 1991, Weitzes selectively logged a portion of the 
NE 1/4 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property to the fence 
and fenceline and not southerly of the fence and fenceline. 
Neither the Rogers nor any predecessor in interest to the Rogers, 
ever protested or disputed the Schoepflins' or Weitzes' selective 
logging operations within the Disputed Property. 
19. The SE 1/4 of said Section 8 was heavily logged at least 
twice since 1929 by Rogers or their predecessor in interest to the 
fence and fenceline and not northerly of the fence and fenceline. 
20. In November, 1963, Fred Schoepflin and his wife leased a 
site within the Disputed Property to Merrill Hart for a "radio 
receiving and sending" station, for ten years, pursuant to a Lease 
Agreement recorded in Book 14, Page 389, Instrument No. 223359, 
records of Latah County, Idaho. Mr. Hart concurrently thereto 
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for operation by the Latah County Sheriff's Office and the 
Moscow Police Department, which Agreement was recorded in Book 
14, Page 391, Instrument No. 223360, records of Latah County, 
Idaho. A structure was then constructed within the Disputed 
Property, north of the road, to house and operate the 'radio 
receiving and sending" station. Remains of that structure are 
still visible within the Disputed Property and north of the 
road. The Rogers never disputed the Schoepflins' said Lease 
activity or the construction of said "radio receiving and 
sending" station within the Disputed Property. 
21. In 1994, Weitzes installed a blue gate on the eastern 
boundary of Plaintiffsr property and a connecting hogwire fence 
that extended southerly along the eastern boundary of the 
Disputed Property to its intersection with the fence and 
fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing on the NE 1/4 of 
said Section 8 and the Disputed Property. The Rogers never 
disputed the Weitzesr installation of the hogwire fence along 
the eastern boundary of the Disputed Property. 
22. The "true," actual boundary between the NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 
of said Section 8 was unknown to any owners of the NE 1/4 and SE 
1/4 until the Monson survey was completed. 
23. On information and belief, some Defendants or their 
agents, at some time during the month of July, 2003, damaged a 
significant portion of the fence and fenceline by cutting the 
fence wire approximately every twenty feet of its length, by 
destroying some fence posts, and by destroying rock piles that 
helped stabilize some of the fence posts. 
24. On information and belief, on or about July 28, 2003, 
Defendant Todd Green trespassed on said NE 1/4 and the Disputed 
Property, while armed with a handgun, and acted in an aggressive 
and threatening manner toward an agent of the Weitzes. 
25. Defendants have asserted claims of ownership to the 
Disputed Property and demanded that Plaintiffs not enter upon the 
Disputed Property. 
26. Defendants' conduct has hindered Plaintiff's planned 
forestry, agricultural, and other operations and uses on the 
Disputed Property and continues to do so. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quiet Title - Boundary by Agreement and/or Acquiescence 
27. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set 
forth here. 
28. The true, actual boundary line between the NE 1/4 and SE 
1/4 of said Section 8 was unknown from at least 1929 until the 
Monson survey was completed in 2002. 
29. Said fence and fenceline were constructed in approximately 
1929. On information and belief, there is no evidence as to the 
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manner or circumstances of the original location of the fence and 
fenceline. 
30. The fence and fenceline have long existed and been 
recognized by the respective property owners as the boundary 
between Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' property. 
31. Since 1929, the respective property owners have treated 
the fence and fenceline as the property line or boundary between 
Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' property. 
32. Since 1929, Plaintiffs and their predecessors have 
exercised dominion and control over the entirety of the real 
property north of the fence and fenceline consistent with 
ownership. 
33. The Disputed Property belongs to Plaintiffs by virtue of 
the doctrine of boundary by agreement, and the Court should quiet 
title in Plaintiffs against all other interests. 
SECOND CAUSE O F  ACTION 
Q u i e t  T i t l e  - E s t o p p e l  and Latches 
3 4 .  Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set 
forth here. 
35. For approximately 7 0  years, Defendants and their 
predecessors sat idly by and allowed Plaintiffs and their 
predecessors to use the Disputed Property as their own and to 
maintain stewardship of the Disputed Property at the expense of 
Plaintiffs and their predecessors. 
36. For approximately 70 years, Defendants and their 
predecessors treated the fence and fenceline as the boundary 
between the NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of said Section 8. 
37. For approximately 70 years, Defendants and their 
predecessors took the position that the Disputed Property belonged 
to the Plaintiffs and their predecessors. 
38. At the time Greens, Castles, and Shooks purchased their 
respective parcels, they had actual, constructive, or inquiry 
notice that the Disputed Property did not belong to them, 
regardless of their respective deed language. 
39. It would now be unconscionable and inequitable for the 
Defendants to take a contrary position to that previously taken by 
them and their predecessors and to act inconsistently with such 
prior conduct. 
40. The doctrines of estoppel, including but not limited to 
quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel, and latches apply to 
prevent Defendants from asserting ownership over, or any interest 
in, the Disputed Property. 
41. The Court should quiet title to the Disputed Property in 
Plaintiffs against all other interests. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTIOi 
Prescriptive Easement 
42. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations. as if fully set 
forth here. 
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43. Plaintiffs and their predecessors have made open, 
notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the road within 
the Disputed Property as described above and have consistently 
logged and harvested firewood within the Disputed Property, for 
a period of more than five years. 
44. Plaintiffs and their predecessors have made such uses 
within the Disputed Property under a claim of right, with the 
knowledge of the Defendants and their predecessors. 
45. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment confirming in their 
favor a prescriptive easement for continued use of the road and 
for logging and harvesting firewood within the Disputed 
Property. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Trespass 
46. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fully set 
forth here. 
47. As described above, on information and belief, Todd Green 
and/or some other Defendant (s) and/or their agent (s) entered upon 
Plaintiffs' property and, among other damages, damaged Plaintiffs' 
fence and fence improvements. 
48. Plaintiffs did not consent to such entry. 
49. Plaintiffs were harmed by such entry. 
50. Plaintiffs suffered damages by such entry in amounts to be 
proven at trial. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
51. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' 
conduct, Plaintiffs retained the services of Landeck, Westberg, 
Judge & Graham, P.A. to prosecute this action on their behalf, and 
Plaintiffs have agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable fee for 
their services. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney 
fees against Defendants, some or all of them, pursuant to Idaho 
law, including but not limited to Idaho Code section 12-121. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
52. Plaintiffs hereby demand trial of all issues in this 
matter triable by jury, and Plaintiffs will not stipulate to a 
jury of less than twelve. 
RIGHT TO AMEND 
53. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint as 
this matter proceeds. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and demand judgment 
against the Defendants, some or all of them, individually and/or 
jointly and severally, as follows: 
a. Quieting title to the Disputed Property in Plaintiffs against 
all other interests; 
b. Awarding compensatory and special damages, in amounts 
exceeding the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division, to be 
3roven at trial; 
c. Ordering restitution of the Disputed Property to Plaintiffs. 
d. Declaring an easement by prescription in the Disputed 
Property in favor of Plaintiffs. 
e. Enjoining Defendants from entering the Disputed Property 
and/or damaging Plaintiffs' fence or fenceposts. 
f. Awarding reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho law, 
including but not limited to Idaho Code section 12-121; 
g. Awarding costs as allowed by Idaho law; 
Granting such other relief as the Court deems just under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this day of February, 2004 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
~onbld J. Landeck 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SEX of Section 8, T40N, 
R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest comer of SEX of Section 8; thence S 8S051'56" E, 
181 1.61 feet, along the north line of said SE% of Section 8, to the MW comer of 
Tract 4 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Thence, continuing along said north line, S 8Q051'56" E, 825.00 feet to the 
NE comer of said Tract 4 and the NE comer of the SE% of said Section 8; 
Thence S 1°09'40" W, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said SE% of 
Section 8, to a point of intersection with a fence from the west; 
Thence. S 8Q027'56" W, 832.31 feet, along said fence, to a point on the 
west line of said Trad 4; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 3O41'52 E, 160.00 feet, along said west 
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL CESCRIPTION) 
total area in Tract 4 North of fence -2.95-acres. 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SE% of Section 8, T40N, R5W BM 
and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest corner of SEX of Section 8 and the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Thence S 8g051'56" E, 800.00 feet, along the north line of said SE% of Section 8, 
to the NE comer of Tract 1; 
Thence S 4O45'00" E, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 1, to a point of 
intersection with a fence from the west; 
Thence N 84O38'17" W, 817.31 feet, along said fence, to a point of intersection 
with the west line of said SEX of Section 8; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 1°00'27" E, 75.00 feet, along said west line of SE% 
of Section 8, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
Total area in Tract 1 North of fence 2.07-acres. 
C EXHIBIT .-
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SEX of Section 8, T40N, 
R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest corner of SEX of Section 8; thence S 89'51'56" E, 
800.00 feet, along the north line of said SEX of Section 8, to the MW comer of 
Tract 2 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Thence S 8g051'56" E, I01 1.61 feet, along the north line of said SE% of 
Section 8, to the NE corner of said Tract 2; 
Thence S 3'41'52" W, 160.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 2, to a 
point of intersection with an east-west fence; 
Thence N 89°16'21" W, 988.95 feet, along said fence, to a point on the 
west line of said Tract 2; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 4O45'00" W, 150.00 feet, along said west 
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
Total area in Tract 2 North of fence = 3.55 acres. 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICW DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
) ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiffs, 1 OF DEFENDANTS GREENS, SHOOKS 
v. 1 AND CASTLES 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONLA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) Fee Category: I (1) (a) Fee: $47.00 
D m  T. CASTLE and CATNERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) Fee Category: J (8) (b) Fee: $ 8.00 
1 
Defendants. ) 
) 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TOMA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) L. ' 
and MARY E. SEVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANTAL T. ) 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 1 
1 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM -1 
v. 1 
) 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
COME NOW Defendants Greens, Shoolcs and Castles, by and through their attorneys of 
record, ROBERT M. MAGYAR and ANDREW SCHWAM, and in response to the COMPLAINT 
filed in the above entitled action by Plaintiffs, admit, deny, defend and allege as follows: 
ANSWER 
1. As to Paragraph 1 of the Complaint, Defendants admit the same. 
2. As to Paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendants admit the same. 
3. As to Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendants have insufficient information to admit or 
deny the status of the Plaintiffs as alleged in said Paragraph, and therefore deny same. Defendants 
admit that the land described in this Paragraph is collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs' property". 
4. As to Paragraph 4 of the Complaint, Defendants: 
4.1 admit Greens are husband and wife; admit Greens claim title to the real property 
described in Exhibit A attached to the Complaint; deny that any survey line in the 
description runs along any fence; deny the described tract is "north of a fence"; deny 
the existence of the fence described as "a fence from the west"; and deny the 
existence of a fence comprising the southerly boundary as described in said legal 
description. Since the description repeatedly refers to a fence that does not exist, 
Greens deny the accuracy of the description. 
4.2 admit the same. 
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4.3 admit Castles are husband and wife; admit Castles claim title to the real property 
described in Exhibit B attached to the Complaint; deny that any survey line in the 
description m s  along any fence; deny the described tract is "north of a fence"; deny 
the existei~ce of the fence described as "a fence  om the west"; and deny the 
existence of a fence comprising the southerly boundary as described in said legal 
description. Since the description repeatedly refers to a fence that does not exist, 
Castles deny the accuracy of the description. 
4.4 admit Shooks are husband and wife; admit Shoolis claim title to the real property 
described in Exhibit C attached to the Complaint; deny that any s w e y  line in the 
description runs along any fence; deny the described tract is "north of a fence"; deny 
the existence of the fence described as "an east-west fence"; and deny the existence 
of a fence comprising the southerly boundary as described in said legal description. 
Since the description repeatedly refers to a fence that does not exist, Shooks deny the 
accuracy of the description. 
4.5 As to Paragraph 4.5 of the Complaint, Defendants have insufficient information to 
admit or deny said Paragraph, and therefore deny same. 
5. As to Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Defendants' property lies 
adjacent to and south of Plaintiffs' property. Defendants deny that the location of the boundary 
between Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' property can be at issue in this case because the 
boundary is exactly as described in all the recorded deeds of both Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
6. As to Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Defendants have insufficient information to admit or 
deny said Paragraph, and therefore deny same. 
7. As to Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants have insufficient information to admit or 
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deny said Paragraph, and therefore deny same. 
8. As to Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendants have insufficient information to admit or 
deny said Paragraph, and therefore deny same. 
9. As to Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that the deeds speak for 
themselves, and otherwise deny. 
10. As to Paragraph 10 ofthe Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
11. As to Paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Derendants admit Greens employed Ronald P. 
Monson, professional land surveyor, who perfonned a survey in 2002. Defendants deny the 
remainder of said paragraph. 
12. As to Paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Defendants admit Plaintiffs claim ownership of 
land belonging to Defendants. Defendants deny the existence of either a "fence" or a "fenceline" as 
alleged in said paragraph. Defendants deny that a "fence" or a "fenceline" somehow encloses 
approximately 8.57 acres of Defendants' property. As to the remainder of Paragraph 12, Defendants 
have insufficient information to admit or deny said Paragraph, and therefore deny same. 
13. As to Paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendants deny and further assert that the land 
owned by Defendants and claimed by Plaintiffs is not and was not pasture at any timematerial to this 
case. 
14. As to Paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
15. As to Paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
16. As to Paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
17. As to Paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that the activities took place as 
described and further assert that to the extent that any activities took place, these were not adverse in 
nature and were accommodated as a neighborly accommodation. 
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18. As to Paragraph 18 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
19. As to Paragraph 19 of the Conlplaint, Defendants deny same. 
20. As to Paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. Defendants believe and 
therefore state that Schoepflins may have leased property for the construction of such a structure on 
property owned by Schoepflins, not on property owned by Rogers. 
21. As to Paragraph 21 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
22. As to Paragraph 22 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
23. As to Paragraph 23 of the Complairrt, Defendants deny same. Defendants further deny 
the existence of a "fence" or a "fenceIine" as alleged by Plaintiffs. 
24. As to Paragraph 24 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
25. As to paragraph 25 of the Complaint, Defendants have asserted claims of ownership to 
land deeded to Defendants, and Defendants have demanded that Plaintiffs not trespass upon land 
deeded to Defendants. 
26. As to Paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. However, Defendants have 
demanded that Plaintiffs not trespass upon land deeded to Defendants. 
27. Defendants respond to the restated dlegatiolls as set out above. 
28. As to Paragraph 28 of the Complaint, Defendants deny sane. 
29. As to Paragraph 29 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that there is a fence or fenceline. 
In addition, if a fence ever existed on Defendants' property, Defendants deny that the reason for its 
construction is wdmown. 
30. As to Paragraph 30 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. Further, Defendants deny 
the existence ofany boundary fence between Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' property, and deny 
that any fence ever existed that was substantial enough to serve as a boundary fence; and deny that 
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any fence ever existed that would satisfy the laws of the State of Idaho that establish legal fences. 
31. As to Paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. Further, Defendants deny 
the existence of any boundary fence between Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' property, and deny 
that any fence ever existed that was substantial enough to serve as a boundary fence; and deny that 
any fence ever existed that would satisfy the laws of the State of Idaho that establish legal fences. 
32. As to Paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. Further Defendants deny 
the existence of any "fence" or "fenceline". 
33. As to Paragraph 33 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
34. Defendants respond to the restated allegations as set out above. 
35. As to Paragraph 35 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
36. As to Paragraph 36 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. Further, Defendants deny 
the existence of any boundary fence between Plaintiffs' property and Defendants' property, and deny 
that any fence ever existed that was substantial enough to serve as a boundary fence; and deny that 
any fence ever existed that would satisfy the laws of the State of Idaho that establish legal fences. 
37. As to Paragraph 37 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
38. As to Paragraph 38 ofthe Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
39. As to Paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
40. As to Paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
41. As to Paragraph 41 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
42. Defendants respond to the restated allegations as set out above. 
43. As to Paragraph 43 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
44. As to Paragraph 44 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
45. As to Paragraph 45 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
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46. Defendants respond to the restated allegations as set out above. 
47. As to Paragraph 47 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
48. As to Paragraph 48 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
49. As to Paragraph 49 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
50. As to Paragraph 50 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
51. As to Paragraph 51 of the Complaint, Defendants deny same. 
52. As to Paragraph 52 of the Complaint, the demand speaks for itself, and cannot be 
admitted or denied. 
53. AS to Paragraph 53 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that any amendment of the 
complaint must be with the permission of the Court. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
54. For further answer, Defendants allege the following affirmative defenses: waiver; 
laches; statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and, estoppel. 
CQUNTERCLAIM OF DEPENDANTS 
By way of Counterclaim, Defendants Greens, Shooks and Castles hereby allege against the 
Plaintiffs as foIlows: 
55. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of this Counterclaim, and 
venue is proper in Latah County. 
56. Plaintiffs Counter-Defendants (Weitz) have trespassed upon land deeded to and owned 
by Defendants Counter-Plaintiffs (Defendants). Weitz and their predecessors, by admission in the 
Complaint filed herein, have trespassed upon land deeded to and owned by Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest. 
57. The trespasses by Weitz have caused damages to Defendants, such damages to be proven 
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at trial. 
58. Sometime during the summer of 2003, Weitz and/or agents of Weitz began building a 
fence upon land deeded to and owned by Defendants. During the construction of said fence, Weitz 
and/or their agents damaged aid cut down many trees owned by and on Defendants' property, and 
left slash and debris on Defendants' property, all of which has caused damages to Defendants. 
59. The Idaho timber trespass statute, Idaho Code § 6-202, provides for treble damages and 
attorney fees for a violation of said statute. Defendants are entitled to treble damages and attorney 
fees pursuant to said Idaho Code Section as a result of Weitz damaging and cutting down trees 
owned by and on the property of Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial. 
60. Defendants allege that the northern boundary of Defendants' property that borders Weitz 
property to the north was lcnown and established for many years. 
61. Defendants allege that the North East comer of Defendants' property that borders Weitz 
property to the north was known and established for many years. 
62. Defendants have been required to appear in and defend this action filed by Plaintiffs. 
Defendants have retained the services of Magyar Law Firm, and Andrew Schwam, Attorney at Law, 
and have agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable attorney's fee for such defense, and to prosecute 
this Counterclaim. 
63. Defendants should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees and costs to defend the 
Complaint filed by Plaintiff, and to prosecute this Counterclaim, all pursuant to Idaho law, Idaho 
Code 5 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Code 5 6-202, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendants prays as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs take nothing by their Complaint, and that the same be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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2. That Defendants be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs in having to defend against 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3. That Defendants recover their actual costs and attorneys' fees necessarily incurred to 
prosecute their claims herein. 
4. That Defendants recover all damages against Plaintiffs for Plaintiffs' trespass upon 
Defendants' properly, such damages to be proven at trial. 
5. That Defendants recover from Plaintiffs damages for Plaintiffs damaging and cutting 
down trees owned by and on the property of Defendants, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
6. That Defendants are entitled to treble damages and attorney feespursuant to Idaho Codc 
§ 6-202 as a result of Plaintiffs damaging and cutting down trees owned by and on the property of 
Defendants, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
@ DATED this day of March, 2004. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Todd A. GTeen, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is a Defendant in the above-entitled matter, that he has read the foregoing Answer 
and Counterclaim, knows the contents thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true to his best 
knowledge, information and belief. 
Todd A. Green 
6 
Subscribed,&a~pp to before me this day of March, 2004. 
.*\"%,t% .. -....... w ,pa 
..9@"* 
7 -.q ,l:. A s, 57' : ;xJ 
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: .. e of 
e -  
C I '  
i . +-... "a; , S  I- 2 Idaho, residing at Moscow, IdaI~o. 
.$ 92.. *.....*-.. ,' ,,. *,, 6 ,Dp+'\,. Commission Expires: 05-05-09 
'l~4,'k,,\\'~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
t.h I hereby certify that on this 30 day of h arch, 2004,I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM to be served on the following in themanner indicated 
below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Hand Delivery 
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RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck IS8 No. 3001; Stewart ISB No. 6369 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiffs, ( 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R.SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants 
) 
) Case No. CV2004-000080 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) REPLY 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. ) 
GREEN, husband and wife, 1 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 1 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, husband and ) 
wife, and DANIAL T. CASTLE and ) 
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, husband ) 
wife, ) 
) 
Countesplaintiffs, ) 
REPLY - 1 
) 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, ) 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, and ) 
Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
1 
Counterdefendants Gerald E. Weitz and Consuelo J. Weitz, 
husband and wife, and Weitz & Sons, LLC ("Counterdefendants"), by 
and through their attorneys, Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, 
P.A., in reply to Counterclaim of Counterplaintiffs Greens, Shooks 
and Castles allege and respond as follows: 
REPLY 
1. As to Paragraph 55 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
admit the same. 
2. As to Paragraph 56 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
deny the same. 
3. As to Paragraph 57 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
deny the same. 
4. As to Paragraph 58 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
admit they were repairing a fence during the s m e r  of 2003 and 
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
5. As to paragraph 59 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
affirmatively allege that Idaho Code §6-202 speaks for itself and 
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
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6. As to paragraph 60 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
affirmatively allege that the boundary between Counterplaintiffs' 
property and Counterdefendants' property is as established by a 
fence and/or fenceline as alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint and 
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
7. As to paragraph 61 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
affirmatively allege that the Northeast corner of 
Counterplaintiffs' property is as established by a fence and/or 
fenceline as alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint and deny the 
remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
8. As to paragraph 62 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
admit Counterplaintiffs have appeared in this action and retained 
their attorneys and are without information as to the remaining 
allegations of said paragraph and therefore deny the same. 
9. As to paragraph 63 of the Counterclaim, Counterdefendants 
deny the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
10. Counterdefendants allege affirmative defenses, as follows: 
waiver; estoppel; statute of limitations under Idaho Code Sections 
5-203, 204, 205, 206 and/or 207; laches; and acquiescence. 
WHEREFORE, Counterdefendants pray as follows: 
1. That Counterplaintiffs take nothing by their Counterclaim 
and that the same be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. That Counterdefendants be awarded their reasonable attorney 
fees and costs in having to defend against Counterplaintiffs' 
Counterclaim as allowed by Idaho law. 
3. That such other relief be granted as the Court deems just 
and proper. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2004. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAHAM, P.A. 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of April, 2004, I 
caused a true and correct copy of this document to be served on 
the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ X 1 U.S. Mail 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM [ ] Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ 1 FAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET # 6  
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[ X 1 U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ I FAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Ron d 5. Landeck < 
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MAGYAR LAW FIRM ' 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
5 14 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
5. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. ) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SlLVERNALE SI-IOOIC, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATBRINE ) 
C, CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
1 
Defendants. ) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 
) 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
v. 
Case No. CV-04-000080 
MOTION TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIM 
OF DEFENDANTS GREENS, SHOOKS 
AND CASTLES 
MOTION TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIM - 1 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUBLO ) 
J. W I T Z ,  husband and wife, and W I T Z  ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLATNTIFFS, by and through their attorneys, 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR and ANDREW SCEIWAM, and move the Court to allow then1 to Amend 
their Counterclaim filed herein to add a claim for Slander of Title. 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs move to add the following paragraphs to their Counterclaim: 
64. Having the state of mind required by Idaho law, the PlaintiffCounterdefendants, by 
their actions, including theJiling of their Complaint against Defendants/Counterplaintz~s, have 
slandered the titles of Defendants/Counterplaint5ffs. 
65. The Defendants/CounielplaintiSfs have sufered special damages, including attorney fees 
and costs incurred by them to defend their titles. 
66. The Defendants/Counterplaint$s will prove the ainount of their special damages at 
trial, or at such other time as the Court demands. 
DefendantslCounterplaintiffs further move that no additional pleadings be required to 
Amend their Counterclaim, other than the filing of the proposed Order permitting them to Amend, 
which Order is attached hereto, because this new claim for Slander of Title does not in any way 
affect other claims of DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs, and it is appropriate not to require a responsive 
pleading from PIaintiffsiCounterdefendants because their claim of ownership constitutes a denial of 
this claim for Slander of Title. 
This Motion is supported by the record, and by the supportiug Memorandum filed with 
DefendantslCounterplaintiffs' Motion. 
Leave of Court is requested to permit Defendants/Cou~lterplaintiffs to argue at the Hearing of 
I 
this Motion. 
MOTION TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIM - 2 
Dated this 28& day of September, 2004. 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28" day of September, 2004, I caused atme and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION lo be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
WArla, 
Robert M. Magyar 
MOTION TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIM - 3 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
:ga%%ivery 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1 908 Facsimile 
SCENJAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
5 14 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TISE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTFFS ' 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) MOTION TO AMEND 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
) 
Defendants. 1 
1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
1 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
v. 1 
MEMORANDUM - 1 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
1. Rule 15 (a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permits amendment of Pleadings by 
leave of Court. Leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. See Rule 15 (a), 
IRCP, copy attached hereto. 
2. The Motion to Amend filed by DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs satisfies the requirements of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Attached hereto is a copy of Weaver v. Stafford, 134 idaho 691, 8 P.3d 1234, which 
supports the Claim for Slander of Title by DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs. 
Dated this 28" day of September, 2004. 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for DefendantsiCounterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of September, 2004, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
mfifi77r 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U:S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( h a n d  Delivery 
Rule 15(a). Amended and supplemental pleadings - Amendments. 
A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and 
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party 
may so amend it at any time within twenty (20) days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall' 
be freely given when justice so requires, and the court may make 
such order for the payment of costs as it deems proper. A party 
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within ten (10) 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be 
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
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Max WEAVER, an individual, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, v. Frank D. STAFFORD, Sr., 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, and Owybee Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant- 
Respondent. Owyhee Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Cross-Claimant, v. Frank D. Stafford, Sr., 
Cross-Defendant. 
[Cite as Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 6911 
No. 25238. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 2000 Term. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22,2000. 
Landowner brought action against neighbor and against holder of deed of trust on landowner's property, 
- alleging trespass, breach of warranty of title, negligent interference with appropriative water rights and 
slander of title, and seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney fees and 
costs. Neighbor counter-claimed for negligent and/or intentional interference with appropriative water 
rights and alleged that he had acquired easement by prescription to maintain irrigation ditch on 
landowner's property. Holder of deed of tmst cross-claimed against neighbor, alleging that neighbor's 
assertions that he had interest in landowner's property constituted slander of title. The District Court, 
Canyon County, James C. Morfitt, J., awarded landowner $5,000 in punitive damages on trespass claim, 
and awarded holder of deed of trust $7,832.35 in attorney fees and costs. Neighbor appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Trout, C.J., held that: (1) use of metes and bounds description to determine boundary 
between landowner's property and that of his neighbor was warranted; (2) subdivision plat map was 
insufficient to support neighbor's argument that he entered landowner's property under color of title; (3) 
neighbor failed to establish prescriptive easement along boundary of landowner's property; (4) 
neighbor's actions in filling in original dirt irrigation ditch running along boundary of landowner's 
property constituted abandonment of any prescriptive easement neighbor may have acquired in ditch; (5) 
no irrigation right-of-way by agreement existed which would have allowed neighbor to relocate 
irrigation ditch onto landowner's property; (6) neighbor could not bring cause of action against 
landowner under statute which prohibits alteration of irrigation ditch so as to impede flow of water; (7) 
landowner's modifications to irrigation lateral did not constitute negligent or intentional interference 
with neighbor's appropriative water rights; (8) neighbor's action warranted punitive damages award; and 
(9) holder of deed of trust established that neighbor committed slander of title. 
Affirmed. 
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Lawrence G. Sirhall, Jr., Boise, for appellant, argued. 
Uranga & Uranga, Boise, for respondent Max Weaver. Louis L. Uranga argued. 
Randolph E. Farber, Nampa, for respondent Owyhee Village, Inc., argued. 
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TROUT, Chief Justice. 
This case involves an action for trespass, breach of warranty of title, negligent interference with 
appropriative water rights and slander of title. Frank Stafford (Stafford) appeals from the district judge's 
decision that he trespassed upon Max Weaver's (Weaver) property and slandered the title of Owyhee 
Village, Inc. 
FACTUAT, AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Three parcels of real property are involved in this dispute. Stafford purchased the parcel at 4912 
Laster Lane (the Stafford property) consisting of 1.39 acres on October 11, 1994. At the time Stafford 
purchased the Stafford property, Max Weaver (Weaver) owned the parcel at 4920 Laster Lane (the 
Weaver Laster Lane property). The Weaver Laster Lane property is southeast of the Stafford property 
and is approximately 4.26 acres in size. On October 1, 1996, Weaver acquired the parcel referred to as 
Lot 16, located southwest of the Stafford property, by a warranty deed subject to a deed of trust in favor 
of Owyhee Village, Inc. Lot 16 is approximately 5.25 acres in size. 
A cement inigation ditch (the cement irrigation ditch) runs along the northeast side of Lot 16 and 
parallel to the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. The cement irrigation ditch has been 
in place for many years and was previously used to irrigate the beet field which existed on Lot 16 prior 
to 1969. 
Before Stafford and Weaver acquired their respective parcels, there was both a fence and a dirt 
inigation ditch (the original dirt ditch) running northeast of the cement ditch. While Stafford believed 
the original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, there was never any 
conversation or agreement with anyone from Owyhee Village to that effect. Stafford removed the 
original fence and filled in the original dirt ditch sometime in the fall of 1994 or the spring of 1995. 
During the summer of 1995, Stafford filled in all the irrigation laterals d n g  from the original dirt 
ditch that serviced his property. Stafford testified at trial that the original dirt ditch was located ten feet 
northeast of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16 and ten feet southwest of the boundary line between 
Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
David Wilson, who resided at 4920 Laster Lane for approximately twenty-five years prior to 
Weaver's acquisition of the property, testified that he regarded the original dirt ditch as the boundary line 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. PJilson stated that there was an infoimal agreement among 
neighbors, but no recorded easement, concerning a ten foot right-of-way to maintain the original dirt 
ditch. Dorothy Bright (Bright), owner of the parcel directly east of the Stafford property, also testified 
that she regarded the original dirt ditch as the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Bright 
testified that the former owners of the Stafford property used the original dirt ditch for irrigation. Greg 
Skinner (Skin- 
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ner), a licensed surveyor, testified that the original dirt ditch approximately followed the surveyed 
boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
In the fall of 1995, Stafford erected a new fence northeast of and parallel to the cement irrigation 
ditch on Lot 16. Stafford's testimony about the location of the new fence was not consistent. While on 
I_ 
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one occasion he testified that he placed the new fence in the location of the original fence, he also 
testified at trial that he was unsure where he had placed the new fence in relation to the location of the 
original fence. Stafford also testified that he did not measure the distance from the original fence to the 
cement irrigation ditch. Weaver regarded Stafford's new fence as an encroachment upon Lot 16 and 
demanded its removal. Stafford complied in the spring of 1997. 
In March 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch which approximately followed the line of the 
new fence. Stafibrd admitted at trial that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's 
permission. Stafford never used the new ditch. 
Stafford's warranty deed contains the following relevant metes and bounds description of the 
boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property: 
South 7" 0' East 366 feet to the center of an inigation lateral; thence meandering 
North 29' 50' West 23 feet: 
North 43' 20' West 168.5 feet; 
North 71" 20' West 92 feet; and 
North 35" 20' West 228.4 feet along the center of an irrigation lateral to a point 36 feet 
South of the North boundary of the aforesaid Southeast Quarter; thence ... 
In April 1995, licensed surveyor Skinner performed a boundary survey on behalf of Stafford and 
Weaver. Skinner established the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property based on existing 
monurnenls. Skinner performed a second survey in November of 1996 for Weaver and established that 
Stafford's new fence encroached upon Lot 16 £ram a minimum of 2.17 feet to a maximum of 10.2 feet. 
On April 13, 1997, Skinner determined that Stafford's new ditch encroached upon Lot 16 by 
approximately five to ten feet. 
Weaver hired Chris Wildt (Wildt) to conduct an archaeological cross-section of the boundary area 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Stafford hired Dr. Mark Plew (Dr. Plew), a professor of 
anthropology to evaluate Wildt's report and to perform his own cross-sectional analysis. Dr. PIew dug 
three cross-sectional trenches starting approximately five feet from the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16 
and extending northeast across the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Dr. Plew 
discovered two features which were likely ditches. Feature 1 was discovered three meters north of the 
cement irrigation ditch, which did not appear to have drawn water for any extensive period and may 
have been used for two years or less. Dr. Plew concluded the second ditch, Feature 2, had been in use for 
a very long time, was the larger of the two ditches and was older than Feature 1. Dr. Plew testified that 
Feature 2 was close to the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
Licensed surveyor John T. Eddy (Eddy) also performed a survey of the Stafford property at 
Stafford's request. Eddy's October 1, 1997 survey established the boundary between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property along a meandering dirt ditch, the same as Skinner's November 7, 1996 survey. Eddy 
testified that Feature 2, as identified in Dr. Plew's report, coincided with the meandering ditch 
referenced in Stafford's deed. 
Water is provided to the Stafford property and the Weaver Laster Lane property by the Pioneer 
Irrigation District via Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 15.0, Gate 24. Water is provided to Lot 16 via 
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Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 15.6, Gate 23A. Water for the Stafford property and Weaver Laster Lane 
property historically flowed from Gate 24 in a northwesterly direction to a T-box located near the point 
where the northwestern comer of the Weaver Laster Lane property meets the southeastern comer of the 
Stafford property. At the T-box, irrigation water flowed to the Stafford property via the original dirt 
ditch between the Stafford property and Lot 16 or could be directed to the 
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northeast to irrigate a parcel directly east of the Stafford property. Water from the South Branch Lateral 
15.6, Gate 23A flows through the cement ditch in the opposite direction. 
Weaver made several changes to the irrigation lateral which began at Gate 24 and continued across 
the Weaver Laster Lane property. At the end of the lateral, Weaver installed a concrete collection box to 
replace the T-box, and also installed a concrete slab in the collection box to block the outlet to the 
Stafford property. That action lead to. Stafford filing a misdemeanor criminal charge against Weaver 
which was dismissed. A condition of the dismissal was that Weaver remove the concrete slab and install 
a pipe from the collection box to the edge of Stafford's property. Weaver removed the concrete slab and 
installed a pipe, but Stafford did not excavate a ditch to the pipe. 
Tom Eddy testified as an expert in hydrology and stated that changing the grade of the pipe from the 
collection box lo the Stafford property would improve the flow of water to the Stafford property. Tom 
Eddy also stated that without any change to the elevation of the collection box, water would travel from 
the collection box to the end of the Stafford property. 
During the 1995 and 1996 irrigation seasons, Stafford diverted water from the cement irrigation 
ditch to irrigate the Stafford property. Stafford had no authorization nor permission to draw water from 
the cement irrigation ditch or to divert water from that ditch onto his land. Weaver demanded that 
Stafford cease diverting water from the cement irrigation ditch after purchasing Lot 16 and Stafford 
complied. 
Weaver filed a complaint against Stafford and Owyhee Village, Inc. alleging that Stafford had 
committed trespass by erecting a fence and subsequently excavating a ditch on Weaver's property. 
Weaver sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney fees and costs. 
Stafford denied Weaver's allegation and asserted affmative defenses, alleging that he was entitled by 
prescription or boundary by agreement to maintain a fence between the adjoining properties and that a 
prescriptive irrigation right-of-way existed. Stafford counterclaimed that Weaver had negligently and/or 
intentionally interfered with Stafford's appropriative water rights and that he had acquired an easement 
by prescription to maintain an irrigation ditch on Weaver's property. Owyhee Village cross-claimed that 
Stafford committed slander of title by alleging that he had an interest in Weaver's Lot 16. The district 
judge entered an Amended Judgment on January 29, 1999, finding that Stafford had trespassed upon 
Weaver's Lot 16 and awarding Weaver $5,000 in punitive damages. The district judge also determined 
that Stafford slandered the title of Owyhee Village and awarded Owyhee Village $7,832.35 in attorney 
fees and costs. Stafford has now appealed that decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[I, 21 Stafford challenges the district judge's detailed fmdings of fact which were set forth in his . . 
fifty-two page Memorandum Decision and Order. This Court does not set aside findings of fact unless 
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they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 
(1997). We will not disturb findings of fact which are supported by substantial and competent, although 
conflicting evidence. Id. 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LOT 16 AND THE STAFFORD PROPERTY 
Stafford argues the district judge should have detennined the irrigation lateral, referred to in 
Stafford's deed, was a monument and should have used this monument to determine the boundary line 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, rather than utilizing the metes and bounds call in the deed. 
The district judge clearly referenced the lateral and determined that "Feature 2" as identified by Dr. Pfew 
was basically in the same location as the lateral. The district judge noted the metes and bounds 
description in Stafford's deed was consistent with an earlier conveyance involving the properties 
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and the Skinner surveys of 1995 and 1996 which also placed the boundary line along the imgation 
lateral described in Stafford's deed. The district judge further found that Feature 2 "follows the line of 
the surveyed boundary to a rather remarkable degree." He therefore concluded there was no ambiguity 
concerning the location of the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property and that the line 
could be clearly identified using the metes and bounds description, incorporating the reference to the 
lateral (Feature 2). 
[3,4] Stafford asserts Feature 2 represents a monument and the district judge should have examined 
whether the parties intended Feature 2 to be the boundasy between Lot 16 and the Stafford properly. 
Stafford argues the district judge erred by instead using the metes and bounds description to determine 
the boundary. The argument is unavailing in two respects. First, notwithstanding Stafford's color of title 
and prescriptive easement arguments, the legal significance of Stafford's argument is unclear in that, 
assuming Feature 2 was a monument and established the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford 
property, Stafford still erected a new fence and excavated a new ditch on Weaver's side of Feature 2, 
clearly outside of Stafford's property. Second, a monument is generally considered to be a permanent, 
visible and identifiable physical feature. See Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing 
Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 119,794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) (citing Achter v. Maw, 27 Utah 2d 149,493 
P.2d 989 (1972) (monument must be a "tangible landmark," have physical properties such as "stability, 
permanence, and definiteness of location"); Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303,422 P.2d 525 (1966) 
(monument must be "definitely identified and located")). Feature 2 cannot be deemed a monument, for 
purposes of resolving the boundary dispute between Weaver and Stafford, because Stafford filled in 
Feature 2 in the fall of 1994. The district judge was thus unable to utilize the actual irrigation lateral 
named in the deed because Stafford had destroyed it. The findings made by the district judge are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence and support his determination that Feature 2 is located 
where the original irrigation lateral was and allows an accurate determination of the boundary between 
the Weaver and Stafford property utilizing the metes and bounds description in the deed. We therefore 
hold the district judge did not err by using the metes and bounds description to determine the boundary 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
IV. 
COLOR OF TITLE 
... 
( 1  
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[S-71 Stafford argues the district judge erred by requiring him to prevail on his affmative defenses 
of irrigation right-of-way by prescription and boundary by agreement in order to succeed on his entry 
under color of title argument. The argument is not supported by the circumstances of this case. The color 
of title doctrine arises in the context of adverse possession and refers to an instrument which has the 
appearance of title but is not in fact title. Fouser v. Paige, 101 Idaho 294,297,612 P.2d 137,140 (1980) 
(citing Munkres v. Chatmon, 3 Kan.App.2d 601,599 P.2d 314 (1979)). Color of title involves a writing 
which purports to convey title, but does not have that effect and passes only the color or semblance of 
title. Id. Stafford cannot maintain a color of title argument as he has failed to present evidence of any 
written instrument which purportedly gave him title to the portion of Lot 16 which is the subject of this 
action. Stafford offers only that the Owyhee Subdivision plot map reflects a twenty foot right-of-way 
adjacent to the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16. The argument is unavailing to Stafford because the 
Owyhee Subdivision plot map is not an instrument of conveyance and does not reflect a twenty foot 
right-of-way north of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16. Moreover, Stafford knew where the 
boundary was, as his warranty deed contained a specific description of the boundary and the boundary 
was subsequently established by the Skinner and Eddy surveys. We therefore hold substantial and 
competent evidence supports the district judge's determination that Stafford did not enter Lot 16 under 
color of title. 
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PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
Is] Stafford argues he had a prescriptive easement in that section of the original dirt ditch running 
northwest from the T-Box on the Weaver Laster Lane property and along the boundary between the 
Stafford property and Lot 16. The district judge determined Stafford did not have a prescriptive 
easement in the original dirt ditch as Stafford failed to establish the open, notorious, continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the original dirt ditch under a claim of right for five years. The district judge noted 
testimony from prior owners of Stafford's property was inconsistent and that Stafford filled in the 
original dirt ditch in the fall of 1994 or spring of 1995. The district judge further determined Stafford 
failed to establish a prescriptive easement because the location of the original dirt ditch could not be 
established with certainty. 
19-121 A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convincing 
evidence of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use under a claim of right and with the 
knowledge of the owner of the sewient tenement for the prescriptive five year period. Marshall v. Blair, 
I30 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). While there was testimony by people who had lived on 
or around the Stafford property that they had irrigated their property utilizing the original dirt ditch, the 
testimony was conflicting as to where exactly the ditch was located. This testimony alone is insufficient 
to establish aprescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch as it fails to establish the open, notorious, or 
uninterrupted nature of any prior use ofthe original dirt ditch and does not address the knowledge of 
such use by Weaver or any previous owner of Lot 16. Moreover, assuming Stafford did have a 
prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch, Stafford abandoned this right. Abandonment of a 
property right must be evidenced by a clear, unequivocal and decisive act. Perry v. Reynolds, 63 Idaho 
457,464, 122 P.2d 508, 510 (1942) (citing Sullivan Constr. Co. v. Twin Falls Amusement Co., 44 Idaho 
520,526-27,258 P. 529,530-31 (1927)). Mere nonuse of an easement does not effect an abandonment. 
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65,67, 813 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). Here, Stafford testified that he filled in 
the original dirt ditch in the fall of 1994. Stafford's act is sufficient to abandon any prescriptive easement 
which may have existed in the dirt ditch. We therefore hold substantial and competent evidence supports 
the district judge's determination that Stafford did not have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt 
ditch. 
VI. 
IRRIGATION RIGHT-OF-WAY BY AGREElOlENT 
1131 Stafford asserted an irrigation right-of-way by agreement, located in the original dirt ditch, as an 
afiirmative defense. Stafford offered no evidence of an express or implied agreement between himself, 
or his predecessors in interest, and Weaver, or his predecessors in interest. Moreover, it is difficult to see 
the relevance of this argument. There is no question there was at one time an original dirt ditch between 
what is now Lot 16 and the Stafford property. That ditch was destroyed by Stafford and he then sought 
to relocate the ditch to a location on Lot 16. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
district judge's determination of the location of the original dirt ditch and it is not in the same place 
where Stafford sought to create the new ditch. While Stafford disagrees with the district judge's 
determination, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence in the record to support it. At this point, it 
appears Stafford simply asserts some right to put the new ditch in a location of his choosing and his 
argument for an irrigation right-of-way is unavailing. 
VII. 
WEAVER'S INTEWERENCE WITH STAFFORD'S WATER RIGHTS 
Stafford asserts Weaver made changes to the irrigation lateral which provided water to ihe Weaver 
Laster Lane and Stafford properties. Stafford specifically alleges that Weaver tiled some portions of the 
irrigation lateral, replaced the T-box with a new con- 
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crete collection box and installed PVC pipes to irrigate one of Weaver's fields with water from the 
irrigation lateral. Stafford also alleges that Weaver changed the elevation of the ground around the 
irrigation lateral, lowered the irrigation lateral, blocked the outlet from the new concrete collection box 
which would have served Stafford's property and filled the area between the new concrete collection box 
and Stafford's property with gravel, all of which prevented Stafford from receiving water. Stafford 
argues the district judge erred by holding Stafford was barred from recovery under LC. 5 42-1207 
because he did not have a ditch in place to receive water. Stafford also argues the district judge erred by 
determining Weaver did not intentionally or negligently interfere with Stafford's appropriative water 
rights. 
A. I.C. 3 42-1207 
[I41 Idaho Code 5 42-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation ditch in a manner which impedes the flow 
of water or "otherwise injure[s] any person or persons using or interested in such lateral ditch." Stafford 
failed to introduce any evidence of the historic flow rate of water to the Stafford property before and 
after Weaver's changes. Dorothy Bright, however, whose property receives water from the new concrete 
collection box through an outlet at the same level in the collection box as the outlet to the Stafford 
property, testified that she received more water after Weaver's changes. In addition, Stafford cannot 
maintain that he was interested in receiving water from the irrigation lateral when, in the fall of 1994, 
Stafford filled in the ditch that would have received water from the concrete collection box. Stafford, 
therefore, cannot recover under LC. 5 42-1207. 
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B. Negligent interference with appropriative water rights 
1151 The elements of common law negligence include (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. Brooks v. 
Logan, 127 Idaho 484,489,903 P.2d 73,78 (1995). Here, Weaver incurred a statutory duty to avoid 
injury to Stafford when making changes to the irrigation lateral. Stafford fails to establish that Weaver 
breached that duty. 
1161 Stafford argues that, without a shutoff mechanism on the PVC pipes which Weaver installed 
upstream from the concrete collection box, the concrete collection box would not fill to the top and 
Stafford would not receive water. Evidence at trial, however, included photographs showing the 
concrete collection box full to the top. Stafford also argues he was harmed by Weaver's installation of a 
concrete slab to block the collection box outlet to the Stafford property. Weaver removed the concrete 
slab and installed a pipe from the concrete collection box to the edge of Stafford's property. Stafford, 
however, filled in the ditch which would have received irrigation water from the pipe and carried it 
across Stafford's property. We therefore hold substantial and competent evidence supports the district 
judge's determillation that Weaver did not intentionally or negligently interfere with Stafford's 
appropriative water rights. 
STAFFORD'S MOTION TO ADD CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Stafford argues the district judge erred by denying his motion to add a claim for punitive damages. 
In support of the alleged error, Stafford reasserts his contention that Weaver intentionally or negligently 
- -  . 
interjgred with ~ t a f f o k s  apprbpriative water rights. The district judge denied ~tafford'smotion, stating 
"Ttlhe Court will allow such a motion to amend the aleadings if the moving aartv establishes ... a 
r&sonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an awar;lbf~unitive damages." The 
district judge concluded "the evidence before the Court does not establish such a likelihood in this case." 
117-191 To support a motion to add punitive damages under I.C. 9 6-1604, Stafford is required to 
establish a reasonable likelihood 
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he could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Weaver acted oppressively, fraudulently, 
wantonly, maliciously or outrageously. See Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357,362,956 P.2d 
674, 679 (1998). The district judge's determination that Stafford failed to establish such a reasonable 
likelihood is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id., 131 Idaho at 362-63,956 P.2d at 679-80. The abuse 
of discretion inquiry examines (1) whether the brial judge correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial judge acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to him; and (3) whether the trial 
judge reached his decision though an exercise of reason. Sun yalley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Poweu, 119 
Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991). It is clear from the judge's comments that he correctly 
understood the discretionary decision to be made, applied the correct standards and utilized reason in 
reaching his decision. We therefore hold the district judge did not abuse his discretion by denying 
Stafford's claim for punitive damages. 
WEAVER'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
[20-241 Stafford argues the district judge erred by awarding Weaver punitive damages for Stafford's 
trespass because Skinner's April 1995 survey did not establish the boundary between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property and Stafford believed he had title to Lot 16. We have stated: 
An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the 
defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of 
conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or 
disregard for its likely consequences." The justification of punitive damages must be that 
the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed 
"malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence;" "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or 
simply "deliberate or willful." Hi~hland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,348-349, 
9 8 8 ~ 2 d  996, 1014-15 (1999) (cGations omitted). Punitive damages are thus appropriate in 
a tresoass action when the defendant acted in a manner which was outraneous, unfounded, 
unreasonable, and in conscious disregard of the plaintiffs property right. see,' e.g., Walter 
E. Wilhite Revocable Living Tmst v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 
539,549,916 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1996). Where a trespassing defendant has notice that his 
activities constitute a trespass and nonetheless continues his trespass, the landowner 
plaintiff may be entitled to punitive damages. See Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 
Idaho 566,570,602 P.2d 64,68 (1979). We review an award of punitive damages to 
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the judge's finding of 
extremely unreasonable and malicious conduct. Magic Valley Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. 
Proj'lBus. Sews., Inc., 119 Idaho 558,561,808 P.2d 1303, 1306 (1991). 
[25] Here, the record contains substantial evidence that Stafford's conduct was an extreme deviation 
from reasonable conduct. For example, in the fall of 1994 or spring of 1995, Stafford removed the 
original fence and filled in the original dirt ditch located between the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16 
and the surveyed boundary line. Stafford made no measurements or any documentary record regarding 
the location of the original fence and dirt ditch. In April 1995, the boundary between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property was established by licensed survey and was determined to be in the location of the 
original dirt ditch. In the fall of 1995, Stafford proceeded to erect a new fence on Lot 16 which Skinner's 
November 1996 survey established encroached upon Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a maximum 
of 10.2 feet. In March of 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch on Lot 16 in approximately the same 
location as the encroaching new fence. Stafford admitted at trial that the new dirt ditch was located on 
Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stafford thus erected the new fence and excavated the new ditch on 
Lot 16 with full h-owledge of the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, demon- 
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strating willful disregard for Weaver's property lights. We therefore hold substantial and competent 
evidence supports the district judge's punitive damages award to Weaver. 
SLANDER OFTITLE 
Owyhee Village alleged Stafford slandered its title to Lot 16 by falsely and maliciously asserting an 
easement or ownership interest in Lot 16 which caused Weaver to withhold payment to Owyhee Village. 
Owyhee Village also alleged it incurred legal expenses in defense of Stafford's claims to Lot 16. 
060 
, * ,  
, - ( '  .. !"- y- Page 10of 11 
I 
Stafford argues the district judge erred by basing his slander of title conclusion on Stafford's failure to 
prevail on his affirmative defenses. Stafford asserts the district judge should have focused on Stafford's 
reasonable belief that he owned the property up to where he placed the new fence and that such belief 
negated the malice element of slander of title. The district judge, however, did not rely solely upon 
Stafford's failed a f h a t i v e  defenses to fmd slander of title and instead set out the elements of slander of 
title and articulated the substantial evidence in support of his Emding. 
126-291 A cause of action for slander of title requires Owyhee Village to establish the following: (1) 
uttering or publishing of slai~derous tatements; (2) when the statements were false; (3) with malice; and 
(4) resulting in special damages. See Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758,760-61,572 P.2d 861,863-64 
(1977). Here, Stafford's pleadings assert an interest in Lot 16 and thus satisfy the publication element of 
slander of title. Stafford's repeated assertion of an interest in Lot 16 was clearly false in light of the deed 
wluch set the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property and Stafford's destruction of the 
original dirt ditch which corresponded to the boundary. Moreover, Stafford admitted that he excavated 
the new ditch on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Malice has been generally defmed by Idaho 
courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. See Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 
337, 342, 563 P.2d 395,400 (1977). An action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although 
false, was made in good faith with probable cause for believing it. Stafford argues he believed the 
original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Upon removing the original 
fence, however, Stafford did not make a good faith effort to record the location of the original fence or 
to place the new fence or new ditch where the original fence had been. Stafford admitted the new fence 
was where the original fence had been only in places. Stafford's conduct in erecting the new fence and 
excavating the new ditch on Lot 16 thus belie ally good faith belief in his ownership interest in Lot 16. 
Finally, Owyhee Village has incurred special damages in the form of Weaver's refusal to tender payment 
and the legal expenses incurred in defending Stafford's claims. We therefore hold the district judge's 
slander of title determination is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
XI.  
ATTORNEY BEES 
[30] Weaver requests attorney fees on appeal under LC. $ 12-121. Attorney fees are proper when the 
appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 
244,249,985 P.2d 669,674 (1999). Although Stafford predominantly raises factual issues upon which, 
at best, there was disputed evidence before the district court, he does raise some novel arguments 
concerning the meaning and use of the term monument for purposes of interpreting a deed and 
concsming color of title as an affirmative defense to trespass. Stafford's appeal, therefore, does not lack 
foundation and we decline to award Weaver attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. Ij 12-121. 
Owyhee Village requests attoniey fees on appeal pursuant to LC. Ij 12-120, LC. Ij 12-121 and I.A.R. 
41. We fmd no basis for an award of fees under LC. $ 12-120. As to an award of fees under I.C. $ 12- 
121, we find sufficient merit to the question relating to slander of title to withstand an award of fees. 
Page 702 
CONCLUSION 
The district judge's decision finding Stafford trespassed upon Weaver's Lot 16 and slandered the title 
, ,  ~ t .  
, - 
. .. 
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of Owyhee Village is affirmed. We award costs on appeal to Weaver and Owyhee Village. 
Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER, WALTERS and KIDWELL concur. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
' THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEIT2 & ) Case No. CV-0400080 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
plaintiffs, j 
) ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
vs. ) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
) RULE 16(b) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 1 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE ) 
SHOOK, DAIVIAL T. CASTLE and 
CATHBRINE C. CASTLE, and U.S. 
BANK, N.A., 
1 
Defendants. 1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
1 
1 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. STLVERNALE ) 
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and 
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, 
Counter-Plaintiffs, ) 
1 
VS. 1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ & ) 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited Liability ) 
company, 
1 
Counter-Defendants. ) 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE - 1 
Pursuant to Rule 16(b), I.R.C.P., it is ORDERED that a planning and scheduling 
conference be conducted immediately following the hearing of Defendant/Counter- 
Plaixtiffs' Motion to Amend Counterclaim which is currently scheduled to be heard at 9:00 
A.M. on the 15th day of November, 2004, at which tiine all counsel for the respective 
pgties shall be available to participate. 
At such planning and scheduling conference counsel for each parv shall be fully 
prepared to: 
(a) Advise the Court whether it is contemplated that it will be necessary to join 
additional parties; 
@) Advise the Court whether or not the filing of amended pleadings is 
contemplated; 
(c) Advise the Court as to the status of discovery and what, if my, additioiul 
- 
discovery is contemplated by any party; 
(d) Advise the Court whether or. not such party contemplates the filing of any 
additional pretrial motions, including but not limited to, motions for summary judgment; 
(e) Discuss dates for the filing of amended pleadings and/or pretrial motions and 
the completion of discovery; 
(f) Discuss dates for Rule 16 pretrial conference or conferences; . 
(g) Discuss the possibilities of settlement; 
@I) Discuss the fixing of a time or times for hearing of pending pretrial motions; 
(i) Discuss the fixing of a trial date; 
(j) Discuss any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case, including 
the expeditious disposition of the above entitled action. 
PROVIDED, however, that counsel will not be required to attend the conference if 
they file with the clerk of the Court, at least five (5) days pior  to the conference, a 
stipulation covering all of the above matters. Should the stipulation not be satisfactory to 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
SCHEDULING CONFERF,NCE - 2 
the Court, a new date for the conference will be ordered. 
In the event that counsel for any party is unable to participate in such planning and 
scheduling conference because of prior court comnitments on the date above scheduled, it 
is the duty of such counsel to contact the Court and opposing counsel and arrange a 
mutually satisfactory date to which the matter will be continued. 
9- 
DATED this day of October, 2004. 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, 
true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE - RULE 16(b) was mailed to: 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 8074 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW SCHWAM 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ORDER SETTING PLANNING AND 
SCHEDuLlNG C0NFERE:NCE - 3 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 ORDER PERMITTING 
Plaintiffs, 1 DEFENDANTS/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
v. 1 TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIM 
) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC, ) 
DANIAI, T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., j 
j 
Defendants. ) 
) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, j 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE aiid C A T H E W  C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 1 
1 
Counlerplaintiffs, ) 
V. 1 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WETTZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Counterdefendants, ) 
) 
IT IS I-IEREBY ORDERED that Defendants!Counterplaintiffs are pe~micled to Amend their 
Counterclaim to add a claim for Slander of Title, by the addition of the following paragraphs: 
64. Having the state of mind required by Idaho law, the PlaintiffCounterdefendants, by 
their actions, including the filing of their Complaint against Defendants/Counterplaintiffs, have 
slandered the titles of Defeizdants/Countevplaintiffs. 
65. The Defendants/CounterplaintiSfs have sufferedspecial damages, including attorneyfies 
and costs incurred by them to defend their titles. 
66. The Defendants/CounterplaintiSfs will prove the amount of their special damages at 
trial, or at such other time as the Court demands. 
No additional pleadings are required to Amend the Counterclaim, because this new claim for 
Slander of Title does not in any way affect other claims of DefendantsICounterplaintiffs, and it is 
appropriate not to require a responsive pleading from Plaintiffs!Comiterdefendants because their 
claim of ownership constitutes a denial of this claim for Slander of Title. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Counterclaim is amended as provided above, and the 
amending paragraphs and the claim for Slander of Title by DefeudantsICounterplaintiffs are deemed 
denied by Plaintiffs!Counterdefendants. 
Jr- 
Dated this day of November, 2004. 
District Judge 
ORDER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
XY' X hereby certify that on this day of November, 2004, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck ( ) Overnight Mail 
Attorney for PlaintiffslCounterdeCendants ( ) U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 9344 ($Facsimile 2 ~ 3 -  #593 
Moscow, ID 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Robert M. Magyar ( ) U.S. Mail 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 8974 (flacsimile ~ ~ - / ~ ~ ~  
Moscow, Idaho 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Andrew Schwarn (m. Mail 
Attorney for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs ( ' ) Overnight Mail 
514 South Polk Street ( ) Facsimile 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 ( ) Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
- COURTMINUTES - 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: November 15,2004 
Jodi M. Stordiau 
Court Reporter 
Tape: 04-3-161/531 
Time: 903 A.M. 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSWLO J. ) 
W E E ,  husband and wife, and WEITZ & ) Case No. CV-04-00080 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
Plaintiffs, j 
) APPEARANCES: 
VS. 
) Plaintiff Consuelo J. Weitz present with 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. ) counsel, Ronald J. Landeck, Moscow, ID 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE ) Defendants represented by counsel, 
SHOOK, DAMAL T. CASTLE and Andrew M. Schwarn, Moscow, ID 
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, and U.S. ) Robert M. Magyar, Moscow, ID 
BANK, N.A., ) 
Defendants. 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
1 
1 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE ) 
SHOOIC, DANIAL T. CASTLE and 
CATI-ERINE C. CASTLE, 
1 
I 
Counter-PlainMs, ) 
VS. 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ & ) 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
1 
Counter-Defendants. ) 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
----------------_-_-----_---------------------------------------- 
.................................... 
Subject ofProceedings: Motion to Amend Counterclaim 
This being the time fixed pursuant to written notice for hearing of the Motion to 
Amend in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant. 
Mr. Landeck informed the Court that the parties participated in mediation, but were 
unsuccessful in setthg this case. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Landeck stated that the plaintiffs had no 
objection to the defendants' ~ o t i b n  to Amend; however, he felt that the amendment was 
frivolous. There being no objection from plaintiffs, Court granted the Motion to Amend 
Counterclaim and signed the order as presented by counsel. Counsel agreed that no 
responsive pleading was necessary. 
Court scheduled this matter for jury trial on September 12,2005, counsel estimating 
this matter would take five (5) days to try. 
Discovery deadlines were discussed and fixed. 
Plaintiffs' access to the disputed property was discussed, Mr. Schwam indicating 
that the defendants would provide access to defendants' experts. 
Court stated that should plaintiffs decide to waive a jury in this case, the Court 
would expect to view the property on September 12,2005, prior to starting the trial. 
Court recessed at 923 A.M. 
APPROVED BY: 
JOHN R. STEGNER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
- - - - - --- - - - - 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISI'RICYf OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WITZ, husband and wife, and WElTZ & ) Case No. CV-04-00080 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
. )  
Plaintiffs, 
1 FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER 
VS. 1 ---------------- 
1 ORDER SETTING TRIAL 
TODD A. GR.EEI\J and TONIA L. ) 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SLVERNALE ) 
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and 
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, and U.S. 
1 
BANK, N.A., 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TOMA L. 1 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SLVERNALE ) 
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE m d  
CATEIERINE C. CASTLE, 
) 
) 
) 
Counter-Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WITZ & ) 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liabi!ity ) 
company, 1 
1 
Counter-Defendants. ) 
As the result of a formal planning and scheduling conference conducted in open 
court on November 15,2004, with counsel for each of the respective parties participating, 
FIRST 'PRETRIAL ORDER 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 1 
the Court ertters the following ORDERS: 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL 
It is hereby ORDERED that jury trial shall commence at 9:00 A.M. on September 15, 
2005, in Courtroom #3 of the Latah County Courthouse. This trial is estimated to run five 
(5) days and will be tried on a 9:00 A.M. to 400 P.M. schedule. 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
It is hereby ORDERED: 
(1) On or before May 2,2005, plaintiffs shall disclose to defendants, in writing, the 
names and addresses of all lay witnesses whom plaintiffs intend to call at trial, together 
with a brief summary of the issues as to which each such witness is expected to testify; 
(2) On or before June 1,2005, defendants shall disclose to plaintiffs, in writing, the 
names and addresses of all lay witnesses whom defendants intend to call at trial, together 
with a brief summay of the issues as to which each such witness is expected to test@; 
(3) Plaintiffs shall disclose to defendants, in writing, all expert witnesses IN THE 
MANNER OUTLINED IN RULE 26(b)(4)(A)(i), disclosing the person expected to be 
called as an expert witness, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to test@, the 
substance of the opinions on which the expert is expected to testify, and the underlying 
facts and data upon which the expert opinion is based no later tl~an March 1, 2005; 
defendants shall make a similar disclosure of their expert witnesses no later than June 1, 
2005. Witnesses not disclosed IN THIS MANNER would be subject to exclusion at trial. 
; (4) All potentially dispositive motions including, but not limited to, motions for 
summary judgment and motions to dismiss, shall be served and filed not later than June 1, 
2005; 
(5) Counsel may request that a formal Rule 16 I.R.C.P. pretrial conference be 
conducted in this matter. To do so, counsel should make the request at least twenty (20) 
days prior to trial by filing and serving a written request that a pretrial conference be 
FIRST P I W T W  ORDER 
ORDER SETTING T W  - 2 
conducted; 
(6) Each party shall prepare a list of exhibits which it expects to offer including 
impeachment documents. A copy of the exhibit list should be provided to the Court and a 
copy to opposing counsel. Exhibits should be listed in the order that the party anticipates 
they will be offered; 
(7) Exhibit labels can be obtained fiom my court clerk, Terry Odenborg. Each party 
shall affix labels to their exhibits before trial. Plaintiff's exhibits should be marked with the 
yellow labels, in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits should be marked with blue 
labels, in alphabetical sequence. If there are more than twenty-six exhibits for the 
defendant, mark them "AA", "BB", etc., keeping in mind exhibits that may be grouped 
together for easy reference. The civil action number of the case should also be placed on 
each of the exhibit labels. Exhibits should be lodged and served as required by this pretrial 
I 
order; 
(8) Counsel shall provide a copy of each exhibit to opposing counsel and to the 
Court. Copies should be made after the labels are marked and attached to the original 
exhibit. To expedite trial, each exhibit to be offered should be viewed by opposing counsel 
prior to trial and determination made as to whether an objection will be lodged against the 
exhibit. Oi~ly where counsel has not had a reasoi~able opportunity to see an  exhibit in 
advance will the trial be interrupted for such a review; 
(9) Counsel shall provide each other with a list of their witnesses and shall provide 
the Court with two copies of each list of witnesses, one of which will be provided to the 
Court Reporter to avoid the need for asking the spelling of the witnesses' names. 
Witnesses should be listed in the order that counsel anticipate calling them; 
(10) Exhibits and exhibit lists shall be prepared and exchanged between counsel 
and filed with the Court at least seven (7) days before trial; 
(11) Witness lists shall be prepared and exchanged between counsel and filed with 
FIRST PRETRlAL ORDER 
ORDER SETTING T W  - 3 
the Court at least seven (7 days before the trial unless another date is specified in this 
Order; 
(12) Each party shall serve and lodge wit11 the clerk of the court, at least seven (7) 
days prior to trial, all requested jury instructions which requested instructio~~s must 
comply with the requirements of Rule 51, I.R.C.P.; 
(13) Failure to timely comply in any respect with the provisions of this order shall 
subject the non-complying parties or their counsel to sanctions wlcch may include: (1) 
contempt of court; (2) vacation of the trial with costs and attorney fees being awarded to 
the complying party; (3) the entry of any order the Court deems just, including sty orders 
provided for in Rule 37@)(2)(A), (B), (C), (D), I.R.C.P.; (4) ordering the pleadings of a non- 
complying party stricken from the record and entry of default or dismissal against the non- 
complying party; (5) any combination of the foregoing. 
DATED this &EY of November, 2004. 
District 3udge 
FIRST P R E T m  ORDER 
ORDER SETTING TRIAIL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby cerhfy that full, true 
complete and correct copies of the foregoing 
FIRST PRETRIAL ORDER/ORDER SETTING TRIAL 
were mailed to: 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 8074 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW SCHWAM 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
FIRST P R E T W  ORDER 
ORDER SETTING TRIAL - 5 
RONALD J. IANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAH7AM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck ISB No. 3001; Stewart ISB No. 6369 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
GEFtALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV2004-000080 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho limited liability 1 
company, ) WITHDRAWAL OF 
) JUKY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiffs, ) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIKL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants. 
1 
) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 1 
GREEN, husband and wife, ) 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. ) 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, husband and ) 
wife, and DANIAL T. CASTLE and ) 
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, husband ) 
wife, 
) 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
WITHDRAWAL OF JURY TRIAL DEMAND - 1 
1 
vs . 1 
) 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, ) 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, and ) 
Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
Plaint iff s-Counterdef endants, through counsel, hereby 
withdraw their demand for a jury trial in this action. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2004. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAHAM, P.A. 
BY: \ 
~onbld J. Landeck 
CERTIFZCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of December, 2004, I 
caused a true and correct copy of this document to be served on 
the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ X 1 U.S. Mail 
MAGYAX LAW FIRM [ I Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ 1 FAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ I Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM [ X 1 U.S. Mail 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM [ 1 Overnight Mail 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET #6 [ 1 FAX 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
WITHDRAWAL OF JURY TRIAL DEMAND 1 2 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephoile 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCIIWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) DEFENDANTS' - COUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
Plaintiffs, 1 APPLICATION FOR A 
v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants. 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNAIE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANTAL T. ) 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS' - COUNTERPLAMTIFFS' APPLICATION 
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUh'CTION - 1 
1 
GEEUED E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green) bring this Application 
for a Preliminary Injunction to prevent Plaintiffs - Counterdefendants (herein sometimes referred to 
as Weitz) from trespassing upon land upon which Green holds clear title, and from continuing to 
cause damage to both real and personal property owned by Green. 
Green notes as follows: 
1. That the Deeds of all parties are unambiguous and in agreement regarding property 
lines; 
2. That there is no disagreement in the boundary lines in the various titles; 
3. That title to the property claimed by Weiiz rests clearly in G?.eei~, without doubt; 
4. That Weitz' case is an inferenlial case - an inference based upon a fence that does 
not now exist, and has not existed for many years, that Weitz can not with certainty say when it 
came into existence or whet1 it went out of existence, and which fence can not now be traced as to 
where it was once located, or if it even had a single location in the past. 
Green is compelled to request a Preliminary hjunction against Weitz, because Weitz has 
continued to trespass and cause damage to both real and personal property owned by Green, and has 
threatened to continue such trespass and damage into the foreseeable future (see the correspondence 
between the attorneys for the parties that is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference- 4 
pages). Damage caused by Weitz includes the following: Weitz has cut many trees on Green's 
DEFENDANTS' - COUNTERPLATNTLFFS' APPLICATION 
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 2 
property; Weitz has graded a single track path into a road on Green's property; Weitz has tried to 
build a fence upon Green's property; Weitz has removed "No Trespassing" signs from Green's 
property; and Weitz has removed a log barrier belonging to Green from Green's property onto Weitz 
property. All this damage has occurred since the Monson survey was completed for Green on 
September 24,2002, and after Green objected to Weitz trespassing upon Green's property. 
Unless Weitz is restrained by this Court, Green believes Weitz will continue to trespass and 
cause damage to both the real and personal property of Green. 
Green requests the Court issue a Preliminary Injunction against all Plaintiffs and their agents 
to prevent them from continuing to trespass and cause damage to both the real and personal property 
of Green. 
Green asserts that Weitz, by and tbrough their attorney, have agreed to not make any 
economic use of the property claimed by Weitz, so a preliminary injunction will not impose any 
economic burden upon Weitz. By that agreement, Weitz has refrained from making any economic 
use of this property. Because Green holds clear and unambiguous title to this property, Green is 
entitled to keep Weitz off the property, unless and until Weitz prevails in the claims they are making. 
Green is entitled to prevent Weitz from further damaging or using Green's personal and real 
property. 
This Application for a Preliminary Injunction is based upon the filings in this case to date, 
and a Memorandum in Support with Affidavits and supporting Exhibits, which will be filed soon. 
DATED this 29" day of March, 2005 
/&Lf5Yfiw+-- 
Robert M. Magyar U 
Attorney for ~efendants - Counterplaintiffs 
DEFENDANTS' - COUNTERPLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION 
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of March, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to be served on the following in 
the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Robert M. Magyar 4 "  
DEFENDANTS' - COUNTERPLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION 
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 4 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Iland Delivery 
1:' 
- - - - - 
... - --- MAGYAR - LAW FIRM Established 1974 
Robert M. Magyar Piaza West - Si~itc 5
Attorney at ~ a k  530 Soi1t11 Asbury Street. Post Office Bos 8074. Moscow, Idaho 83841 
Tel(208) 882-1906. Fax (208) 882-1908 
Also Via Fax (208) 863-4593 
November 16.2004 
Ronald J. Landeclc 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Re: Weitz et. al. v. Green et. al. 
Dear Ron: 
Your client continues to trespass upon property owned by Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
Approxin~ately two weelcs ago your clients removed a log barrier across the path located on property 
owned by Todd Green. The log was 20 to 30 feet within the surveyed property boundary line. The 
barrier prevented access to the path by motorized vehicles while still pel-~nitting walking access on 
the path. Please have your clients replace the log barrier innnediately. 
In addition, your clients removed "No Trespassing" signs that were located lrigli up on trees on 
property owned by Greens, Shooks and Castles. Please have your clients replace those signs 
immediately. 
Sincerely, 
nn?*.i"fyr 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
c : Greens, Shooks, Castles 
Andrew Schwam 
. '. NOV-17-2004 WED 06:  1 4  " FAX NO,{-'*' 
LANDECK,' WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
Attorneys 6: Counselors at Law 
Rcif~afcl J. L&nrIot:k A Pivfossiofial S~~rvir;e Corporalion TolephorlrJ: (200)0)1183-1505 
J;i,,n?s I. Wostborg' 410 S. Jeffersor! Tax: (208)803-4503 
Jotin C; Jtddg@ Posl Office Box 11344 E-M~I~I: ailr,omeys@moscow.com 
CI!arli!$ I,.. Gr;,harrl Mawow, Idaho 83843-0117 'Lic6rr.Scd i r ~  ida/)o aild Wf7shinglon 
Trapj)or Stowar'l 
Novernbar 17, 2004 
SENT , . . BY ,..-.-- FAX ,,.. ONLY ( 2 0 8 )  882 -1908 (l.,l.,PAGE)xO; 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
B.O. BOX GO74 
MOSCOW, I D  83843 
Re; . , Wcita ---,,. et al. v, Green et a1 
Idatah County Case No. LV2004-000080 
Dear Bob: 
We ol~viously dispute your continued assertion that: my 
clionts are trespassing upon your clients' properties. You now 
ask that a log, which we prasume M r .  Green or someone at Mr. 
Green's instruction placed across the perimcterroad after 
cornmcncement of this litigation, be replaced. That request, as 
well ar; your request thak the recently placed "NO Trespassing'' 
signs be replaced and al.lowcd to remain within the Disputed 
Pxopctrty is not reasonable given my clients' c1aj.m to the 
Uisputed Property. 
Your clients' recent attempt to exorcise dominion over the 
Disputed property is unnecessary and inflammatory. As you and 
your clients are aware, my clients have purposefully refrained 
from any logging or similar, possessive kctivity within the 
Disputed P:roperty pending a civil resolution of our respective 
claims in this lawsuit. .However, ttley will continue to traverse 
through the Disputeci Property as they and their predecessors in 
intexest have done for more than seventy years. In oo doing, 
the status quo will be maintained pending resolution of this 
case. - 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
r~anlieck, westborg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
Lt..de~.~--- 
RJIJ/RI~w 
cr Gcrald E. and 
Weitz h Sons, LLC 
Established 1974 
Robert M. Magyar Plaza West - Suite 5 
<, Attorney at ~ a w  530 South Asbury Street. Post Ofilce Box 8074. Moscow, Idaho 83843 Tel(208) 882-1906 . Fax (208) 882-1908 
Also by Fax: (208) 883-4593 
December 1 1,2004 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Re: Weitz et. al. v. Green et. al. 
Dear Ron: 
This letter is specifically in response to your November 17,2004 letter to me. 
For the reasons set out below. Your clients are now only permitted upon our clients' property with 
specific permission from either my office or Andy Schwam's office. If Weitz continues to go upon 
this properly without permission, we will all have to go through the wasteful process ofhaving your 
\-, clients enjoined and/or arrested. 
Your clients have only a claim to the Green, Shook and Castle property. This entitles Weitz to go to 
court to see if they can ripen this claim into a right. Until they are successful and prevail in their 
lawsuit, they continue to have only a claim! Green, Shook and Castle have title to this property. As 
such, your clients continue to trespass upon property which Greens, Shoolcs and Castles hold clear 
title. 
We take your November 17,2004 letter as an admission that your clients did remove the log from the 
path located on the Green properly, and did take down 'No Trespassing" signs that were posted by 
our clients on the Green, Shook and Castle properties. 
The log belonged to Green, and it was removed and taken by your clients. The signs were owned by 
Green, Shoolc and Castle, and they were removed and taken by your clients. If anyone is "inflaming" 
this matter, or acting unnecessarily, it is your clients, who continue to trespass, and continue lo 
destroy property owned by GTeen, Shook and Castle. If removing and taking the log and tearing 
down the "No Trespassing" signs is not a "possessive activity", I don't lcnow what would be. 
The posting of this property, and the placement of barriers, is not new, or a "recent attempt to 
exercise dominion over this property." As your clients know, this property has been posted with "No 
Trespassing" signs, and barriers have been utilized, long before it was ever purchased by our clients. 
Ronald J. Landeck 
December 11,2004 
Page - 2 
Our clients have now had enough of your clients' bullying and aggressive behavior against them and 
on property which they hold clear title. As a consequence of your clieiits' continuing pattern of 
outrageous behavior, they are now no longer permitted to walk upon or otherwise be upon the 
property titled in Greens, Shooks and Castles. Our clients now withdraw the permission to walk 
upon the property that was previously granted. 
We want this position to be crystal clear to your clients, and we want written confirmation kom you 
that they will abide by our clients demands. We also want your clients to return the log they 
removed, and replace the "No Trespassing" signs they took. 
Please respond to this letter by infonning me that your clients will not go upon the laud titled in 
Greens, Shoolcs and Castles without specific written permission received from my office or Andy 
Schwam's office, and that they will retun1 the log and replace the signs. 
If your clients refuse to abide by our clients' position, or you refuse or are unwilling to confirm your 
clients' agreement to abide by our clients' position, we will take appropriate action without further 
notice to you. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
c: Greens, Shooks, Castles 
Andrew Schwam 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WESTZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
1 NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
Plaintiffs, 1 APPLICATION FOR 
v. ) PRELMSNARY INJUNCTION 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) 
) 
Defendants. 1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 1 
1 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
v. 1 
) 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, a1 Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
) 
Counterdefeildants, ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the llth day of April, 2005, at the hour of 3:00 
o'clock, p.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, Defendants- Counterplaintiffs will call 
on for hearing their Application For Preliminary Injunction, at the Latah County Courthouse, before 
the Honorable John R. Stegner. 
Leave of Court is requested to permit Defendants - Counterplaintiffs to call witnesses, and 
argue at the said Hearing. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2005. 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for Defendants - Counterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29'h day of March, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
w y ' - t f + y y - ,  
Robert M. Magyar Y 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Hand Delivery 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
CLERK LiF CliSTRigr COUFIT 
LPZ$,Ii COUNTY 
8Y 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwarn #I  573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
compaily, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
Defendants. 1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNLE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 
) 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
v. 
Case No. CV-04-000080 
AFFIDAVIT OF TODD A. GREEN 
AFFIDAVIT - 1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEXTZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Counterdefendants, ) 
STATE OF IDAKO ) 
ss: 
County of Latah ) 
TODD A. GREEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants - Counterplaintiffs in this matter. 
2. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon my own lcnowledge. 
3. I have personally obServed damage done to both real property and personal property 
owned by Greens, Shooks and Castles ( herein Green), which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
4. Damage to Green's personal property includes but is not limited to: damaged and 
destroyed trees; constrnction of a fence upon real property in which Green's have clear title; removal 
and destruction of "No Trespassing" signs owned and posted by Green; and removal of logs owned 
by Green. 
5. Damage to Green's real property includes but is not limited to: damaged and 
destroyed trees; construction of a fence upon real property in which Green's have clear title; and 
damage to a trail running upon real property in which Green's have clear title. 
6 .  I believe that Weitz, through correspondence from their attorney and through their 
Pleadings in this lawsuit, have admitted to the above damage to Green's real and personal property, 
and threatened to continue to trespass upon and damage Green's real and personal property. 
7. T believe that Weitz will continue to trespass upon and damage real and personal 
AFFIDAVIT 
property owned by Green unless restrained by this Court. 
8. I have read the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS - 
COUNTERPLAINTIFFS APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INSUNCTION, and can verify 
that all facts stated therein are true. 
DATED this 30" day of March, 2005. 
72LJ d 
Todd A. Green 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30" day of March, 2005. 
/ & / Y d  
Notary Public in an&k:r the State of Idaho, 
residing in Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 05-05-09 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that oil this 1 day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
f(am-* 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
&) Hand Delivery 
AFFIDAVIT 
MAGYAX LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Pollc Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ j Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. SHOOK 
Plaintiffs, 1 
v. 1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANI( N.A., ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. ) 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, j 
husband and wife, 1 
1 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
v. 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. SHOOK - 1 
J 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Counterdefendants, ) 
STATE OF IDA130 1 
ss: 
County of Latah 1 
STEVEN R. SHOOIC, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants - Counterplaintiffs in this matter. 
2. The informatioli contained in this affidavit is based upoil my own knowledge. 
3. I have personally observed damage done to both real property and personal property 
owned by Greens, Shooks and Castles ( herein Green), which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
4. Damage to Green's personal property includes but is not limited to: damaged and 
destroyed trees; construction of a fence upon real property in which Green's have clear title; removal 
and destruction of "No Trespassing" signs owned and posted by Green; and removal of logs owned 
by Green. 
5. Damage to Green's real property includes but is not limited to: damaged and 
destroyed trees; construction of a fence upon real property in which Green's have clear title; and 
damage to a trail running upon real property in which Green's have clear title. 
6 .  I believe that Weitz, through correspondence from their attorney and through their 
Pleadings in this lawsuit, have admitted to the above damage to Green's real and personal property, 
and threatened to continue to trespass upon and damage Green's real and personal property. 
7. 1 believe that Weitz will continue to trespass upon and damage real and personal 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN R. SHOOIC - 2 
property owned by Green unless restrained by this Court. 
8. I have read the MEMORANDUM Dl SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS - 
COUNTERPLADJTIFES APPLICATION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, and can verify 
that all facts stated therein are true. 
DATED this 3oth day of March, 2005. 
%OOL 
Steven R. Slioolc 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30" day of March, 2005. 
me- 
Notary Public in and f%r 5r'ile State of Idaho, 
residing in Moscow, Idaho 
My Coinmission Expires: 05-05-09 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeclc 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
&P+ 
Robert M. Magyar ' 
( ) Over'llight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( d ~ a n d  Delivery 
AFFLDAVIT OF STEVEN R. SHOOK - 3 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T I B  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
3. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, ail Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS - COUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
V. APPLICATION FOR A 
1 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
1 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONU L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husbalid and wife, and DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and C A T H E W  C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 
1 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 1 
v. 1 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
5. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Counterdefendailts, ) 
Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green) submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of their Application for a Preliminary Injunction against Plaintiffs - 
Counterdefendants (herein sometimes referred to as Weitz). 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This dispute involves the boundary between the NE ?4 and the SE ?4 of Section 8, T4ON, R 
5 W.B.M., and references to Section 8 refer to these parcels. See Exhibit 1, Schematic of t h e m  and SE 
quarters of Section 8. 
SE ?4 History (Green-Shook-Castle Property - hereafter Green proper@) 
Rogers acquired the SE ?4 of Section 8 December 22, 1928, and the SE !4 remained in the 
Rogers family until transferred to Green. Defendants Todd A. and Tonia L. Green are husband and 
wife, and purchased the SE ?4 of Section 8 from the Rogers Trust July 26,2002. Green deeded the 
Castle parcel to Defendants Danial T. and Catharine C. Castle, husband and wife, on February 28,2003. 
Green deeded the Shook parcel to Defendants Steven R. and Mary E. Silvemale Shook, husband and 
wife, on May 13,2003. 
NE ?4 History Weitz pro~erty) 
Schoepflin acquired t h e m  '/4 of Section 8 October 3 1,1929. Schoepflin is the Grandfather of 
Plaintiff Consuelo Weitz. Gerald and Consuelo Weitz are husband and wife, and acquired the E ?4 of 
the NE !4 on June 3, 1977. Weitz & Sons, LLC (Weitz LLC), an Idaho Limited Liability Company, 
acquired the W '/z of the NE ?4 of Section 8 on February 10,2003, well after this dispute arose, and 
knowing the true boundaries of the Green and Weitz properties. 
This dispute arose after Defendant Green had his property surveyed by Monson on September 
24,2002, which survey was filed for record in Latah County, Idaho. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 2 
ThereaRer, on February 4, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants for: (1) 
Quiet Title - Boundary by Agreement and/or Acquiescence; (2) Quiet Title - Estoppel and Laches; 
(3) Prescriptive Easement; and, (4) Trespass. 
On March 30, 2004, Defendants filed their Answer denying the allegations in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, and their Counterclaiin against Plaintiffs for: (1) Trespass; (2) Timber Trespass (Idaho 
Code § 6-202) by Plaintifc and alleging that boundaries and quarter corners were Icnown and 
established for many years. 
On April 23,2004, Weitz filed his Reply to Defendants' Counterclaim. 
On September 28,2004, Green filed a Motion to Amend Counterclaim of Defendants Greens, 
Shoolts and Castles, to add a SLANDER OF TITLE claim, and on November 15, the Court entered its 
Order Permitting DefendantsICounterplaintiffs to Amend their Counterclaim to add the Slander of Title 
claim, which Order permitted amendment without firrther pleading by either party. 
See Exhibit 2, Tiineline for the E '/z of Section 8. 
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
A U.S. Government Land Office Survey was performed by Henry Meldrum in 1871. The 
survey set the comers of Section 8, and the east and west 1/4 comers of Section 8. The original survey 
can be found in Book 20 of Survey Records, Latah County, Idaho Recorder's Office. 
The Idaho Department of Lands placed an IDLBLM monumel~t at the east 1/4 comer of Section 
8 on May 27,1988. 
Green had his property surveyed, including the bouidary between his and Weitz' properties, by 
Ron%lTFTMonson, Idaho licensed surveyor, on September 24,2002. Exhibit 1 shows the relative 
locations of the Weitz, Weitz LLC, Castle, Shook and Green properties, and the 2002 Monson survey. 
January 10,2003, Monson re-established the east and west % comers of Section 8. 
Monson used the original 1871 Government Land Office Survey notes to re-establish the Green 
NE % corner. Later surveys performed by Hodge on behalf of Weitz and Weitz LLC used Monson's 
re-established survey monuments to survey portions of Weitz and Weitz LLC properties located in ihe 
NE % of Section 8. Neither Hodgenor Weitz question the accuracy of the Monson Survey. See Exhibit 
3, Schematic showing the 2002 Monson survey and various monuments - 3 pages. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 3 
There is clex evidence of historical monuments establisking the % section comers of Section 8, 
and the Monson east-west survey line as the correct boundary line between the Weitz property and the 
Green properly. The historical monuments are also consistent with the 2002 Monson survey. 
All relevant deeds to the Weitz and Green parcels contain legal descriptions by division of 
quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. The deeds to Weitz and Weitz LLC, and to their 
predecessors in interest, include no lands in Green's property. Green, Shook and Castle hold title by 
Warranty Deeds to all property located in the SE % of Section 8. Taxpayer assessed valuations for 
Weitz, Weitz LLC and their predecessors in interest make no reference to any property located in 
Green's property, and make no reference to any property in the SE % of Section 8. 
Some time after the Monson survey, Weitz informed Green that Weitz claimed ownership of 
part of Green's property, which property Green held in fee simple by Warranty Deed from Rogers. 
Weitz claims a collection of inferential material establishes the path of an old fenceline that no longer 
exists. Weitz claims that at some time in the past a boundary by agreement was created along what is 
now a non-existent fenceline. Weitz claims that as a result of his assertions he has now suddenly 
acquired 8.57 acres of land never included in the Weitz deeds. Weitz claims this 8.57 acres never 
having paid for that land. Green, who purchased the 8.57 acres of land from Rogers, of course disputes 
this claim. 
There is very little evidence of an old fence running generally easterly and westerly in the Green 
property. There is poor evidence of the path of the old fence. At this time no fenceline exists, and no 
photograph of a fenceline can be taken. There is neither a substantial fence, nor a maintained fence, to 
establish a boundary by agreement. Further, it is impossible to locate any continuous fenceline, or even 
the vestiges of any continuous fenceline, as alleged by Plaintiffs, upon which a boundary by agreement 
could be argued. 
Between July 19& and July 31Sf 2003, without authorization, Weitz cut down at least 157 trees 
and severely damaged 20 standing trees, all located on Green property. Weitz also begins to construct a 
fence on Green property. The cut and damaged trees and "new fence" are all located on Green's 
properly, and occurred after written request that Weitz refrain from trespassing upon and damaging 
Green's property. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER - 4 
On April 11,2004, Weitz and/or agents of Weitz collected, removed and destroyed nearly all 
slash evidence specifically cited in the Defendants' Counterclaim. 
Letters have been exchangedregarding this dispute. Green requestedthat Weitz stop trespassing 
upon their property until the matter could be resolved. Green requested that Weitz stop damaging their 
real and personal property until the matter could be resolved. Nevertheless, Weitz andor agents of 
Weitz continue to txespass upon Green's property, and damage both real and personal property owned 
by Green. Further, Weitz, through correspondence between the parties attorneys, has threatened to 
continue to trespass, and to continue to damage both the real and personal property of Green. See 
Exhibit 4 ,  Correspondence between the attorneys, 4 pages. 
ID. POINTS AUTHOKITlES - UNDEIUYING CASE. 
1. There can be no Boundary by Agreement. Boundary by Agreement is the crux of the 
Plaintiffs' case. Boundary by agreement requires: (1) an uncertain or disputed boundary involving 
adjacent properties, and (2) an agreement fixing the boundary, See Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,493, 
50 P.3d 989,990 (2002). 
There was no dispute or uncertainty as to the boundary line between the Weitz and Green 
properties until this particular dispute arose. The Rogers family owned the Green property since 1928, 
and sold it to Todd and Tonia Green. The Rogers family always knew where the actual boundiuy line 
between the properties was located, and that it was located on the new survey line. 
The location of the &ue boundary has been known since Henry Meldrum performed the original 
survey of Section 8 in 1871. 
The actual boundary line is evidenced by several historical monuments that are still in existence 
at this time - additional evidence that the location of the actual boundary was known, and that it was on 
the surveyed line. See Exhibit 3.  Vestiges of an old fence that is still visible runs north and south and 
divides the W '/z and E $4 of ffie Weitz property. The southern point of that fence terminates at the 
surveyed line between the Weitz and Green properties, and such termination is clearly marked by a 
monument tree with the word ''LINE7' inscribed into a round metal plate and posted on the tree. This 
monument tree is more than I01 feet north of the line claimed by Weitz, but is almost right on the 
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surveyed boundary line as set out in the deeds. There also is aE ?4 comer section monument on the true 
property line that has been in existence for many years, and a monument tree that predated such 
monulnent. There are remnants of an east-west fence that runs right on the surveyed boundary line 
dividing the NE (Weitz) and SE (Green) quarters of Section 8. And, Weitz recognized the location of 
the true boundary when they installed their "blue gate" mentioned in Paragraph 21 of Weitz' Complaint. 
Unless this first requirement is met - an uncertain or disputed boundary - a party claiming 
boundary by agreement never gets to the second requirement. 
The second requirement to determine that a boundary has been establislied by agreement- that 
there was a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary- is not satisfied in this case. A boundary by 
agreement can be fured by either an express agreement, or implied by the surrounding circumstances and 
conduct of the parties. There certainly is no express agreement claimed by Weitz. Assuming Weitz can 
convince a Court the true boundary was unknown, they will then be left with the burden of establishing 
an agreement implied by the surrounding circumstances and co~lduct of the parties. 
The most recent Idaho case that deals with facts very similar to o m  is Cox V. Clanton, 137 
Idaho 492,50 P.3d 987 (2002). With facts eerily parallel to ours, both the District Court and the Idaho 
Supreme Court found a substantial fence in the condition as when it "was hastily put up to contain 
cattle" was not a boundary fence. Both courts further found that no express or implied agreement 
existed, and neither the parties nor their predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence representing 
the boundary between the properties. 
In Cox, the Court found that 
"Although the actual boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the 
existence of an express or implied agreement to treat the fence as the boundary. 
Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the time they were making the 
improvements, the fence was still being used to contain cattle; appellants knew this 
because they damaged the fence while working, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified 
that her family used the land outside the fence to access recreation areas and that her 
family never treated the fence as the boundary to the property. Affidavits from 
predecessors in interest submitted by the appellants also do not reveal any express or 
implied agreement to treat the fence as a boundary." 
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Weitz suggests there is an absence of evidence as to the manner or circumstances of the 
construction of the "old fence". We agree. To prevail, Weitz must prove the "old fence" was intended 
as a boundary. 
There is absolutely no admissible evidence as to who created the "old fence" or why it was 
created. All we do know is that by family hearsay, Rogers believe that the "old fence" was 
constructed by Rogers specifically to keep the Rogers cattle fenced in, and none of the Rogers have 
ever considered the "old fence" as a boundary line fence. The conduct ofthe parties that have owned 
the Green property will not support a claim that they treated the fence as the boundary. 
Weitz and Schoepflin's unilateral claims or actions will not independently support a finding of 
boundary by agreement. There must be an actual agreement to satisfy this requirement. Even if Weitz 
thought they owned the disputed area, just them thinking so does not make it so, or impute any 
agreement to or by any owner of the Green property. 
A review of all recent Idaho Supreme Court cases that discuss the boundary by agreement theory 
reveals that in each case the fence that was argued to have established such a boundary was a substantial 
enclosure and in good repair. That is not the situation we have in our case, as the "old fence" cited by 
Weitz has been in disrepair for many, many years, and neither Weitz, nor anyone else, has maintained 
that fence as a boundary. There is even doubt as to when the "old fence" would have last qualified as a 
"lawful fence" under Idaho law, if ever. See Idaho Code Sections 35-101 and 35-102, Exhibit 5. Had 
Weitz truly believed the old fence was the southern boundary of their property, they surely would have 
maintained it as such and in good repair. 
The vestiges, such as they are, cf the "cld fence99 (see Exhibit 6) do not run straight east - 
west. In fact, they did not run in a straight line, but insteadmeanderedgenerally back and forth between 
trees, generally without fence posts, in an easterly and westerly direction. There is no evidence of a 
continuous fenceline, as alleged by Weitz. 
The ease of traversing the relatively flat or gently sloping ground, the location and convenience 
of available trees to attach the barbed wire, maximizing the suitable grazing area that the "old fence" 
enclosed, the location at the tree line and south of the existing traillroad all contributed to the siting of 
the "old fence", and corroborate the suggestion that it was installed as a barrier to fence in cattle, andnot 
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a boundary fence. 
From its simple construction techniques the "old fence" appears to have been hastily built, as a 
cattle banier, with no relevance to a boundary, as it zigzags between whatever trees happen to be close 
by. While it is unlilcely that anyone would construct a boundary fence in this manner, it is not unusual at 
all for a barrier fence to be constructed in this manner. And, the "old fence" certainly has not been 
maintained as a boundary by Weitz or anyone else. 
Every case that f i d s  that a fence constitutes a boundary by agreement finds a boundary, that is, 
a substantial fence that has been maintained as a boundary. In this case there is no fence, other than a 
20 foot section of 2 strands of barbed wire strung between 3 trees (the Monson east-west survey line 
between the Weitz and Green properties is approximately 2,636.61 feet). There is minimal evidence of 
several small lengths of barbed wire lying on the ground in other locations, some evidence of barbed 
wire imbedded in trees, but only 20 feet of "standing fence". Where miirimal evidence of old fencing 
does exist, it zigzags haphazardly from tree to nearby tree, for no reason other than convenience. 
In paragraph 10 of Weitz Complaint, it is alleged that "a fence and fenceline have existed in the 
same place since that time [1929]." This statement is not true. There is neither a substantial fence nor a 
maintained fence to establish a boundary by agreement. Further, it is impossible to locate any 
contixuous fenceline, or even the vestiges ofany continuous fenceline, as alleged by Plajntiffs. There is, 
therefore, no way to even establish a boundary upon which a legal descriptioii can be written to describe 
the property claimed by Plaintiffs. See Cramer v. Driesbach, 77 Idaho 75 1955. 
Paragraph 11 of Weitz Complaint mischaracterizes the 2002 Monson Survey. That survey did 
not determine the location of the Weitz' "fence" or "fenceline." While Monson noted several locations 
where vestiges of an old fence remained, he did not locate a continuous fenceline as alleged by Weitz. 
The U.S. Government Land Office Survey and Survey Monuments established by the Henry 
Meldrum survey in 1871 set the comers of Section 8, and the east and west ?4 comers of Section 8. The 
original survey can be found in Survey Boolc 20, Latah County Recorder's Office. Further, Deeds 
within the Green chain of title specifically refer to the "Government Survey," in their legal description. 
Case law is clear that a boundary is not unltnown when a government survey was used to set the 
original corners and boundaries, as we have in this case. One must go back to the original government 
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survey notes and attempt to re-establish lost or obliterated corners. See Vaught v. McClvmond, 116 
Mont. 542,155 p.2d 612 1945, and Cramer v. Driesbach, 77 Idaho 75 1955. 
In this case Monson used the original government survey notes to re-establish the GreenNE ?4 
comer. Later surveys performed by Hodge on behalf of Weitz and Weitz LLC used Monson's re- 
established survey monuments to survey portions of their property located in the N 112 of Section 8. 
Thus, Weitz and Weitz LLC accepted the Monson survey. 
There is clear evidence of historical monuments establishing the ?4 section comers of Section 8, 
including bearing tree evidence from the 1871 Meldnun survey, the 1871 survey notes, and the 
IDLBLM monument and corner search note, established May 27, 1988. 
There is also clear evidence of historical monuments establishing the Monson east - west survey 
line as the correct boundary line between the Weitz and Green properties. There are vestiges of an old 
fenceline found on the Monson east-west survey line, giving credibility that this line established the 
correct boundary line many years ago. There is also a tree posted with a metal sign with the inscription 
"LINE" found almost on the Monson east-west survey line between the Weitz and GTeen properties that 
is also approximately on the north-south division line between the E !h and the W !h of the Weitz 
property. These historical monuments are consistent with the 2002 Monson survey, and clear evidence 
that the boundary could not be unknown. 
Because the boundary can not be unknown in this case, Plaintiffs can not establish a boundary by 
agreement. 
2. Estoppel and Laches do not apply against Defendants. Rogers simply cannot be considered 
to have acquiesced in activities by Schoepflin or Weitz that Rogers knew nothing about. Conversely, 
Weitz has done nothing to pursue a claim of ownership of a part of Green's property until now, even 
though his Complaint alleges 70 years of "stewardship" of that property. There is simply no historical 
evidence of Weitz claiming or exercising ownership of any of Green's property. 
3. Prescriptive Easement claims by Weitz should be disallowed. The allegations found in 
paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 of the Weitz Complaint only establish causes of action against Weitz for 
logging and harvesting firewood on property they do not own and have never owned. 
4. The Trespass claim in Weitz Complaint is without merit. Green, Shook and Castle have 
undisputed and recorded legal title to all lands lying in the SE ?4 of Section 8. They cannot be deemed 
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to have trespassed upon property that they own in fee simple. 
Weitz, at best, has merely a & of inter& in property located in the SE ?4 of Section 8. 
Unless and until a Court grants Weilz some type of interest, it remains only a claim of interest. 
5. Legal Descriptions favor the Defendants' position. All relevant deeds to the Weitz and Green 
parcels contain legal descriptions by division of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. The 
deeds to Weitz and Weitz LLC, and to their predecessors in interest, include no lands in the Green 
property. Taxpayer assessed valuations for Weitz, Weitz LLC and their predecessors in interest make no 
reference to any property located in Green's property. Had Weitz claimed land in Green's property, 
Weitz could have, and should have, filed notice with the Latah Cou~lly, Idaho Assessor of that claim, 
and been taxed accordingly. 
6. The lease cited in Weitz' Complaint supports Green's position. The lease cited by Plaintiffs 
ill their Complaint specifically refers only to land in the Weitzproperty, and does not include any land in 
the Green property. 
7. The claim by Weitz & Sons, LEC iacks foundation. Weitz & Sons, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company, did not acquire the W 54, of the NE ?4 until February 10,2003. Green acquired his 
property on July 26,2002, and the Monson survey was completed in September, 2002, both occurring 
prior to Weitz & Sons, LLC acquiring any interest in the W 54, of the Weitz property. Therefore, Weitz 
& Sons, LLC cannot claim any use of the Green property prior to Green obtaining title to that property. 
Further, no claim has ever been made by the Weitz & Sons, LLC predecessor in interest to the Green 
property. 
8. Weitz committed Timber Trespass upon Green's property. Between July 19" and JUIY 3 lS', 
2003, Weitz cut down at least 157 trees and significantly damaged 20 standing trees, all located in 
Green's property. Weitz also began to construct a fence on the Green property. Weitz' actions constitute 
a timber trespass under Idaho Code 9 6-202, and Green is entitled to recover treble damages, plus a , 
reasonable attorney's fee from Weitz for such trespass. Defendants estimate their loss resulting from 
Weitz cutting and damaging trees to be in excess of $50,000.00, and the statute allows treble damages in 
excess of $150,000.00. 
9. Weitz Destroyed Evidence. In paragraphs 56, 57, 58 and 59 of Defendants Answer and 
Counterclaim, Defendants alleged Plaintiffs damaged and cut down many trees owned by Defendants 
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and located on Defendants' property, and left slash and debris on Defendants' property, causing further 
damage to Defendants. Shortly after receiving the Counterclaim, Weitz and/or agents of Weitz 
collected, removed and destroyed nearly all slash evidence specifically cited in the Counterclaim. To 
collect, remove and destroy this evidence, Weitz again trespassed upon land owned by Green. 
10. The "road" claimed to have been constructed by Schoepflin is not a road, but a trail that 
has been in existence for a Iong time, and was not constructed by Schoepflin. The road Weilz 
claims in the Complaint was constructed by Schoepflin in 1967 has been in use by the Greens, the 
Rogers, the Rogers predecessors in interest, and various persons granted permission to traverse the 
RogersIGreen property, for many years prior to 1967. 
11. Similar Montana Case. Please see Reel v. Walter, 131 Mont. 382; 309 P.2d 1027; 1957 (see 
Exhibit 7,)'. This case is strikingly parallel to the instant case, although it is a Montana decision. The 
issues and facts are surprisingly similar, and the decision involves a government survey and boundary by 
agreement or acquiescence. This decision supports Green's position in this case 
IS'. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES - PRELIMINARY IN;fVNCTION STANDARDS. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65( d) provides: 
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the 
reasons for its issuance; $hall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, 
andnot by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be 
restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or 
participation with thein who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or 
otherwise. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(e) provides: 
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
(1) When it appears by the conlplaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission 
or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance 
of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury 
to the plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or 
is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the 
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plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action and tending to render the 
judgment ineffectual.. . 
It is well established that 
"the granting or refusing to grant ... a temporary restraining order is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and its order will not be disturbed except upon a 
clear showing of such abuse." See Blue Creek Land & Livestock Co. v. Battle 
Creek S h e e ~  Co. (1933) 52 Idaho 728, 19 P.2d 628. 
Moreover, "[oln an application for apreliminary injunction, it is not necessary that a 
case should be made out that would entitle complaint to relief at all events on the 
final hearing. If, from the pleadings and affidavits, it appears that a case is presented 
proper for its investigation on a final hearing, a preliminary injunction may issue to 
preserve the property or rights in controversy in statu quo and to prevent irreparable 
injury thereto." Id. 
V. DEFENDANTS - COUNTERPLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF 
DEMANDED. 
Green states as follows: 
1. That Weitz has merely asserted a claim against the clear and unambiguous title held by 
Green, and unless and until a Court grants Weitz some type of interest 111 the land in which 
Green holds clear title, it remains only a claim of interest; 
2. That Weitz' claim does not permit Weitz to trespass upon the Green land, and further 
does not permit Weitz to cause damage to both real and personal property owned by Green; 
3. That the Deeds of all parties are unambiguous and in agreement regarding property 
lines; 
4. That there is no disagreement in the boundary lines in the various titles; 
5. That title to the property claimed by Weitz rests clearly in Green, without doubt; 
6. That Weitz' case is an inferential case - an inference based upon a fence that does not 
now exist, and has not existed for many years, that Weitz can not with certainty say when it 
came into existence or when it went out of existence, and which fence can not now be traced as 
to where it was once located, or if it even had a single location in the past. 
Green is entitled to the relief demanded. Green has clear and undisputed title to the real 
property in question. Weitz, at best, has merely a claim of interest in property located in the SE 'A of 
Section 8. Unless and until a Court grants Weitz some type of interest, it remains only a claim of 
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interest. Weitz has continued to trespass upon the real properly in which Green holds clear title, and 
has continued to damage both real and personal property of Green. Damage caused by Weitz 
includes the following: Weitz has cut many trees on Green's property; Weitz has graded a narrow 
single track path into a twelve foot wide and one-half mile long roadbed on Green's property; Weitz 
has tried to build a fence upon Green's property; Weitz has removed "No Trespassing" signs on 
multiple occasions from Green's property; and Weitz has removed and taken a log barrier belonging 
to Green from Green's property onto Weitz' property. All this damage has occurred since the 
Malison survey was completed in September, 2002. Further, Weitz has threatened to continue to 
trespass, and continue to damage both the real and personal property of Green. 
VT. CONCLUSION. 
Green asserts that Weitz, by and through their attorney, have agreed to not make any 
economic use of the property claimed by Weitz, so a preliminary injunction will not impose any 
economic burden upon Weitz. Weitz has refrained from making any economic use of this properly. 
Because Green holds clear and unambiguous title to this property, Green is entitled to keep Weitz off 
the property, unless and until Weitz prevails in the claims they are making. Green is entitled to 
prevent Weitz from further damaging Green's personal and real property. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Green respectfully requests that the Court grant their 
Application for a Preliminary Injunction, preventing Weitz from trespassing upon property in which 
Green holds clear title, and further preventing Weitz from continuing to damage both the real and 
personal property of Green. 
DATED this 1' day of April, 2005. 
Az4-r~- 
Robert M. Magyar fl 
Attorney for Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (Green) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lst day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM W SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR PRELIMWmY 
INJUNCTION to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attoniey at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
/a* 
Robert M. Magyar 
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Time Line -East 112 of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian 4 
- 
What and Who Where When Quarter Document 
year Day Document Type, Parties Involved, Notes 
Section Filing 
1871 IJnkrown U.S. Government - General Land Office Survey Section 8 Originai Survey Book 20 housed 
Survey conducted by Henry Meidrum. 
Survey sets corners of Section 8 and the east and west quarter corners of Section 8 (pages 26,27,36, and 37 provide details concerning in Latah County Recorder's theestablishment of quarter corners). Corners set using metes and bounds. Office 
1890 juiy 8 Warranty Deed -James J. Rowland to Richard Beasley SE % 
Book 439 6, Page 
Property described as: 
"South East quarter o i  Section Numbered Eight (8) in township Forty (40) North of Range No five (5) West B.M. containing one 
hundred and sixty 160 acres." 
Note: Due to the tremendous amount of iand soid in the 180O's, the General Land Office experienced quite a backiog in the middle 
part of the 19th century. It was not unusual ior several years to pass between the time an individual purchased iand irom the local iand 
office and the time a patent ior that trad was finaily signed by the GLO in Washington, D.C. This is why Beasley's deed from ~owiand 
is dated prior to Rowland receiving his iand patent. (http:liwww.giorecord~.bim.~ovlF~Q.asp#l1) v-General Land Office - Land Patent issued by United States of America to James J. Rowland SE % BLM, GLO 
Conveyance of 160 acres to James J. Rowland in GLO land patent. Propeity described as: 
BLM Seriai No. 
"South east quarter of Section eight in Township forty North of Range five West of Boise Meridian in ldaho Territory containing IDIDAA 025630, Book NO. 3, 
one hundred and sixty acres." Page 223 
NO". 11 Warranty Deed - Horace H. Brooks and Mary Brooks to John J. Pearsons NE % Book1 295 I, Page 
Property described as: 
"The North East quarter of Section Eight (8) in township forty (40) Norih of Range iive (5) W. B. M., containing one hundred sixty 
(1 68) acres." 
Note: Due to the tremendous amount o i  land sold in the 1800's. the General Land Office experienced quite a backiog in the middle 
part of the 19th century. It was not unusuai for several years to pass between the time an individual purchased land from the local land 
office and the time a patent for that trad was finally signed by the GLO in Washington, D.C. This is why Pearson's deed from Brooks Is 
dated prior to Brooks receiving his land patent. (http:l/w.glorecords.blm.goviFAO.asp#l1) 
1892 Apr. 29 U.S. Government - General Land Office - Land Patent issued by United States of America to Horace H. Brooks NE.% BLM, GLO 
Conveyanceof 160 acres to James J. Rowland in GLO iand patent. Properiy described as: BLM Seriai No. 
"North EaSt quarter of Section eight in Township foity North of Range iive West of Boise Meridian in ldaho containing one iDiDAA 025635, 
hundred and sixty acres." Book NO, 4, Page 262 
1896 Mar. 5 Warranty Deed - Richard Beasley and Sarah Beasiey to Colden B. Sanders SE % Book 236 22, Page 
Property described as: 
"The South East Quarter of Section Eight (8) Township Forty (40) North, Range Five (5) West, Boise Merdian containing one 
hundred and sixty (160) acres, according to Government SulveY." 
1902 May 26 Warranty Deed - Colden B. Sanders and Sallie A. Sanders to Arthur Draper SE % instrument No. 
Property described as: 25562, Book 
"South East Quarter (SE 4) of Section numbered Eight (8) in Twp. Numbered forty (40) North of Range five (5) W.B.M. No. 32, Page 
containing one hundred sixty (160) acres, more or less." No. 520 
1904 Sep. 24 Warranty Deed - Arthur Draper and Anna Draper to A. H. Averill Machinery Company, an Oregon Corporation SE % Instrument No. 
Property described as: 341 12, Book 
"Southeast quarter of Section Eight (8) in Township Forty (40) North of Range Five (5) West of the Boise Meridian, containing No. 39, Page 
160 acres, more or iess." No. 252 
Timeline of the East 1/4, Section 8, Township 40 Norih, Range 5 West 1 
I > 
1908 Feb. 11 Warranty Deed - A. H. Averill Machinery Company, an Oregon Corporation t o  M .E. Lewis SE % instrument No. ,I 
Property described as: 46464, Book 
'The South East Quarter (SE 114) of Section Eight (8), Township Forty (40), North, Range Five (5) WB.M. containing 160 acres. No. 58, Page C.l 
more or less, according to the United States Government Sutvey thereof." No. 21 
1911 Dec. 18 Warranty Deed - John  J. Pearson and Catherine E. Pearson t o  Harry I. Lapham NE % Instrument No. 
Property described as: 60474, Book 67, 
"The North East quarter of Section Eight (8), in Township Forty (40), North Range Five (5) W. 8. M." Page 39 
1916 Jan. 8 Warranty Deed - M .E. Lewis and Henrietta Lewis t o  T. A. Meeker SE 'A instrument No. 
Property described as: 72190, Book 
"The Southeast quarter of Section Eight (8) in Township Forty (40) North, of Range Five (5) West of the Boise Meridian, No. 71, Page 
containing One Hundred and Sixty (160) acres by Government survey thereof." No. 264 
1928 Dec. 22 Warranty Deed - T. A. Meeker and Mae I. Meeker t o  Thomas H. Rogers SE '/, instrument No. 
Property described as: 110970, Book 
"The Southeast Quarter (SE114) of Section Eight (8), in Township Forty (40) North, of Range Five(5) West of the Boise No. 87, Page 
Meridian." No. 514, Roii 
No. 39, Latah 
County, idaho 
1929 Sep. 6 Quit Claim Deed - George H. Gushing t o  C. A. Hagan NE % instrument No. 
Property described as: 112422, Book 
"The North-east quarter (NE114) of Section Eight(8) in Township Forty (40) North, of Range Five (5) West of the Boise No. 88, Page 
Meridian." No.277 
Oct. 31 Warranty Deed - C. A. Hagan and Hattie B. Hagan t o  Fred J. Schoepfiin NE % Instrument No. 
Property described as: 113310, Latah 
:'The North-east Quarter (NE'A) of Section Eight (8) in Township Forty (40) North, of Range Five (5) West of the Boise Meridian." County, Idaho, 
Note: Deed makes no reference to any property situatedin the SE 114. Book No. 88, 
Page No. 4.69 
1963 Nov. 19 Agreement - Between Merrill Hart and Fred J. and Sylvia Schoepflin NE % Instrument No. 
Lease agreement for Merriii Hart to use reai property described as: 223359, Book 
"Such portion of the Northeast Quarter (NE%) of Section 8 (8). Township Forty (40) North, Range Five (5), West of the Boise 14, Page 389 
Meridian, as may be necessary to operate a radio receiving and sending station to be brought up to a minimum Federai 
Communicaiions Commission specifications. It is agreed that said lease is to be for a period of ten (10) years, for the sum of 
Three Hundred Dollars ($300), payabie in the sum of Thirty Dollars ($30) per year, the first to be made upon execution of this 
contract." 
Note: The agreement also refers to "saidpremises" three times, but premises are not listed as being any property situated in the SE 114. 
This agreement faiis to put both owner@) and titie company(ies) transacting land exchanges within the SE 114 on notice of any ciaim(s) 
made by Schoepflin, Yeatts et al., Weitr & Sons LLC, andlor Weit: to property located between the dereiict fence and true northern property 
boundary in the SE 114. 
Nov. 19 Agreement - Between Merrill Hart and Latah CountyICity o f  Moscow NE % instrument No. 
Lease agreement for Merriii Hart to use reai property described as: 223360, Book 
"Such portion of the Northeast Quarter (NEX) of Section 8 (a),  owns ship Forty (40) North, Range Five (5), West of the Boise 14. Page 391 
Meridian, as may be necessaly to operate a radio receiving and sending station to be brought up to a minimum Federai 
Communications Commission specifications: for a period of ten (10) years, forthe sum of Thirty Dollars ($30) per year, which 
rental is payable in advance, the first payment having been made at the time of the execution of said lease agreement." 
Note: The agreement also refers to "saidpremises" three times, but premises are not listed as being any property situated in the SE 114. 
This agreement faiis to put both owner@) and title company(ies) transacting land exchanges within the SE 114 on notice of any claim(s) 
made by Schoepflin, Yeatts et ai., Weitr & Sons LLC, andlor Weit: to property iocated between the dereiict fence and true northern property 
boundary in the SE 114. 
Timeline of the East 1/4, Section 8, Township 40 Noifh, Range 5 West 2 
1967 Oct. 03 Warranty Deed - Fred J. Schoepflin and Lydia E. Schoepflin to Howard Schoepflin and Constance Schoepflin NE % instrument No. 7 
Property described as: 238845, Book 
"The Northeast Quarter (NE%) of Section 8; The Northeast Quarter (NE%) of the Northwest Quarter (NW%) of Section 8; and 161, Pages 3 0 ~ 4  
that portion of land in the Northwest Quarter (NW%) lying East of the East boundary line oithe county road as it now exists, all in and 303, Latah 
Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West oithe Boise Meridian." County, idaho 
Note: Deed makes no reierence to any property situated in the SE 114. 
Nov. 10 Deed o f  Gift - Ladessa E. Rogers t o  Inez H. Rogers SE % instrument No. 
Property described as: 239346. Latah 
'The Southeast Quarter of Section 8 Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian." County, idaho 
(Book NO. 161, 
Page No. 549, 
550) 
1969 Ncv. 10 Decree Settling Community Interest o f  Deceased Wife (Constance Schoepflin) - Probate Court of Latah County, NE % instrument No. 
State o f  ldaho 247287, Book 
Decree speciflcaiiy lists the iollowing real property: 24, Pages 125- 
"The Northeast Quarter (NE %) of Section 8; The Northeast Quarter (NE %) ofihe Northwest Quarter (NW %) of Section 8; and 128 (OARE Roll 
that portion o i  iand in the Northwest Quarter (NW %) lying East of the East boundary iine oithe county road as it now exists, ail No. 1 I), Latah 
in Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian." County, ldaho 
Note: Decree makes no reierence to any property iocated in the SE 114. 
1975 Apr. 10 Deed o f  Gift - Howard Schoepflin t o  Sylvia L. Schoepfl in NE % Instrument No. 
Howard Schoepflin grants "an undivided one-haif interest in and to the ioiiowing described real property situated in Latah County, State o i  274564, Latah 
Idaho, to-wit:" Coimhi iriahn 
Nor!i-east Ouaner ('1.4,. Nortneast Quarcr ("14) Northwest Qua-ier ,114) n Seclon Eignt (8) Tounsh p Fony (40. honl, Qange 
Fiu? ,5), West @ m e  Mer d a n  ALSO tnat pol'on of lanc i i  rhe Ncl?hv!esr Qiaeer (714) Nortbih:es! Quane, (11:) I,ilg Fast of ti3c 
East bcunuary (t ie of the Co~n:y road as .: no'!! elists in Sec180n Eight ,f3 Tci..nsh'p Fody ,4O) Ncrth, Ran~e r i e  15 \A,esi 
Eoise fher dlai: 
Note: Deed makes no reference to any property iocated in the SE 114. 
1977 June 03 Warranty Deed - Howard C. Schoepflin and Sylvia L. Schoepflin t o  Gerald E. Weitz and Consuelo S. Weitz E % of instrument No. 
Schoepflins convey to Weitz: NE % 287179, Latah 
"PARCEL I. East half (112) of northeast quarter (N. E. 114) o i  Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 w . B . ~ . ~ x c e ~ t i n ~ :  County, Idaho 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Section 8, Twp. 40 N, Range 5 W.B.M.; thence S. 89"24'00 W. aiong the North boundary 
iine of said Section a distance of 2692.25 ieet to the North quarter comer of said Section 8; thence S. 0"28'30" W. a distance of 
641.49 feet; thence N. 8Qa27'25" E. a distance of 2684.64feet to the intersection with the East boundary iine o i  said Section; 
thence N. 1'08'50 E. aiong said East boundary iine a distance oi644.57 ieet to the point of beginning." 
Note: Deed makes no reference to any property iocated in the SE 114. 
1984 Apr. Corner Record for Section 8's east quarter corner filed a t  IDL Ponderosa Supervisory Office (Deary) East 
Prepared by George Bacon, the Corner Record notes the existence of two bearing trees within the immediate vicinity of the Quarter 
quarter corner. Corner of 
Section 8 
1988 May 27 ldaho Department of Lands places IDLIBLM monument a t  east quarter corner o f  Section 8 East 
Obliterated corner monument re-established by idaho Department oiLands (monument dated 5-27-88 and installed by "MDL") and has Quarter 
never been disputed by Schoepflins or Weitz as the boundary between NE and SE 114's of Section 8. Corner of 
Timeline of fhe East 1/4, Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West 3 
c3 
Jan, 10 Corner Perpetuation and Fil ing Record West Instrument No. -4 
Description of Corner Evidence Found: Quarter 472241, Latah ,+ 
"Found remains of old wood stake and scaffered rock mound and old E-S fence corner. Land owner Jack Smetana stated this corner of County, Idaho 
location 'always' accepted as % corner" 
Surveyor: Ronald P. Monson, Monson Associates Section 8 
Date of work: 12/06/2002 
Feb. 10 Warranty Deed - Raymond L. Yeatts, Daniel W..Yeatts, Mary Ann Knight Yeatts, John C. Welch, and Merilyn Welch W % of instrument No. 
t o  Weitz & Sons, LLC NE % 473230, Latah 
Yeatts and Welch convey to Weitz and Sons, LLC: County, Idaho 
'The following parcels of iand iocated in the Wli2NEli4 and the NlI2NW114 of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5, W.B.M. 
and more particulariy described as follows: 
That portion ofthe NW114NW114 of said Section 8, lying East of Saddle Ridge Road, a public highway: 
NEli4NW114, EXCEPTING the North 330 Feet thereat 
Wli2NE114 EXCEPTING Beginning at the Northeast corner of said Section 8; thence S. 89"24'00 W. along the North boundary 
line of said Section 8,2692.25 feet to the North quarter corner of said Seciion 8; thence S. 0'28'30" W. 641.49 feet; thence N. 
89"27'25 E. 2684.64 feet to the intersection with the East boundary line of said Section 8: thence N. l"08'5c" E. along said East 
boundary line, 644.57 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING." 
Note: Deed makes no reference to any property located in the SE 114. 
Feb. 28 Warranty Deed -Todd A. Green and Tonia L. Green t o  Danial T. and Catharine C. Castle SE %, instrument No. 
Subdivided tract described by metes and bounds. Tract 1 473688, Latah 
County, ldaho 
Mar. 21 Weitz Survey "No. 1" executed and record by Larry Hodge NW %of  lnstrument No. 
The purpose of the survey was "to survey and establish the boundaty of a parcel of land as described to me by Gerald Weitz,' which is section 8 . 474343. Latah 
located in the NW 114 of Section 8. The survey describes, via metes and bounds, the boundary between NE and SE 114's of Section 8 using County, Idaho 
quarter comers established by the Monson Survey of January 2003 (Instrument No. 472606, Latah County, Idaho). The boundary iine 
established in the survey between the NE and SE 114's of Section 8 continues uninterrupted and as a straight iine as the boundary line 
between the NW and SW 114's of Section.8, essentially cutting Section 8 intononh and south halves. No notes are included in this survey 
concerning any alleged dispute or discrepancy in the established boundary between the NE and SE 114's of Section 8. ldaho Code [Titie 55, 
Chapter 19 (55-1 90411, however, dictates that "A record of survey shall be fiied within ninety (90) days after cornpleflng any survey which: (I) 
Discloses a material discrepancy with previous surveys of record." This survey indicates, due to lackof notes concerning dispute and 
discrepancy, that Geraid Weitr was aware of the location of the boundary between the NE and SE 114's of Section 8. 
May 13 Warranty Deed - Todd A. Green and Tonia L. Green t o  Steven R. Shook and Mary E. Silvernale Shook SE %, instrument No. 
Subdivided tract described by metes and bounds. ~~~~t 2 472954, Latah 
County, ldaho 
June 19 Letter t o  Robert M. Magyar (Green's counsel) f rom Ronald J. Landeck concerning disputed property S E  % 
Letter attempts to describe the Weitzes' iegai rights to the property in the SE 114. 
July 13 Civil Case: Consuelo Weitz v. Schoepflin L iv ing Trust et al. dismissed Portions 
See December 23,2003 above. o i N W %  
Case No. CV-02-00908 - District Court of the 2nd Judicial District of the State of ldaho, Latah County 
Release of Lis Pendens filed on February 27,2003, as Instrument No. 473658, Latah County, ldaho 
Between Trespass - Gerald Weitz cuts 157 trees and damages 20 trees in SE % SE % 
July 19 Geraid Weitz andlor agents working on his behalf cut 111 trees o f 5  diameter orsmaiier, 43 trees oi5" to lc "  diameter, and 3 trees of 
and greater than 1 0  diameter in the SE 114. In addition, 20 trees are seriously damaged by blazes used to instail a fence in the SE 114. Slash 
~~l~ 3, from cutting timber is left in the SE 114. Robert M. Magyar Contacts Ronald J. Landeck to demand that Weitz not enter property whiie it is in dispute. 
Between Trespass - Gerald Weitz attempts t o  instai l  fence i n  SE % SE % 
July 19 Gerald Weitz andior agents working on his behalf attempt to instaii a 3-strand barbed wire fence in the SE 114. 
and Robert M. Magyar contacts Ronald J. Landeck to demand that Weitz not enter property whiie it is in dispute. 
July 31 2 
Timeline of  the East 1/4, Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West 5 
Aug. 19  Letter t o  Weitz and  Osborne f r o m  Steven R. Shook. S E  Y4 
Notification to refrain from trespassing into Shook property (as described in their recorded Warranty Deed). 
Aug. 20 Wei tz  Survey "No. 2" executed a n d  record b y  Lar ry  Hodge N W  % of instrument No. 
The purpose of the survey was "to survey the boundaries of a poIiion of land owned by Weitz and Sons ilc and Gerald and Consueio Weitz." Section 8 479571. Latah 
which is located in the NW 114 of Section 8. The survev utilizes the central auarter corner of Section 8 established bv the Monson Survev of County, Idaho ~ . - . ~ ~ ~  
January 2003 (instrument No. 472606, Latah County, idaho). The bounda j iine described in the survey between the NW and SW 114sbf 
Section 8 terminates onihe east end at the Section's centrai quarter corner established by the Monson Survey of January 2003. No notes 
are included in this survey concerning any alleged dispute or discrepancy in the established centrai quarter corner, which has aiso been 
used to establish the western boundarv between the NE and SE 114's of Section 8. Idaho Code ITitle 55, Chapter 19 (55-1904)1, however, 
~~~~ ~ ~ 
ccrares trsr A record c i  sumcj sl ial ' ie i led wi1h.n nmery (90) nays afrcr comp.erinq an/ s i r ~ e y  u,h~ch: (1, Discloses a rnateril oiscrcpan:) 
v,rh previous suw?ys oireroro. Th's Survey inocates, aJc lo lac& oi noles concernng a sputc a l a  d'srrepancy, Inat Grrn'c 'Ne 1z aru 
Cotlsjelo V\e iz we7e amre  of th? ICCS~ on of the boundary between !he NE an0 SE 1 4's o i  Sect on 8 
Aug. 27 Letter t o  Steven R. Shook  a n d  Mary  E. Silvernale Shook  from Ronald J. Landeck (Landeck, Westberg, Judge & S E  % 
Graham, P.A.) representing t he  Weitzes 
Letter states in Dart that: 
~ e ~ ~ r d l e s s  cf any r?cenr posr'ngs oy you oranyone elscp!trpori.ng to prc11b;l enrry and i:se of rhe d'spuiad[lrogeriy the 
!fi/e'izcs :~11l, conrinue to use lha,'r progsny as ;t nas been used by fnem and Illel,  in^ I, f~*o\ ,cr  70 )'?3's 
N9te Ccrr~l iar-c for,? !makes no reierenre lc any propen) ocateo r, lne SE 1 4 
Aug. 27 IDL  Certificate of Compl iance - Fire Management Agreement - Notif icat ion o f  Forest Practice IDL Notification 
Gerald Weitz files a Notification of Forest Practice form with the IDL Ponderosa Supervisory Off~ce (Deary). The contract describes the of Forest 
property to be heid in compliance as: 
"Division - PTS. NWNE 10008\. Section 08, Township 40N. Ranae 5W, County Latah, No. 2 9  
Practice No. 
45456 F 
Not= Cnrnniiance form makes'no reierence to anv orooertv located inihe SE 114 .~ .~~ ~~ ~ , .  , , 
Sept. 1 Letter t o  Weitz a n d  Osborne f rom Danial T. Castle & Catherine C. Castle. S E  % 
Notification to refrain from trespassing into Castle property (as described in their recorded Warranty Deed). 
nrt 21 Weitz Survev "No. 3" executed a n d  record bv Lar rv  Hodae  - recorded as t he  Randv  Humble  Survev N W  % of Instrument No - . . . . ..-. . 
-, ~- - ~~ ~~ ~ ~ - 
Tne pjrpcse o i  r l~e suve) !./as ro s w ~ e y  the bwndartes c i a  conion cilanc owned ny Dusrn :n/eirz. ~thicn is lxared :n tne N'A' 1 : cf s ~ ~ ! ' ~ ~  8 482242. Lalnv 
Sect on 8. Dcsrli, ?/e tl is a llcmber of Wetz & Sons LLC. Tne suwey util zes rhe ccnlral quaner corner of Sectlon 8 eslabl shea oy l r e  County. id310 
Monson Survev of Januarv2003 (Instrument No. 472606, Latah County, Idaho). The boundary iine described in the survey between the NW I 
and SW 114's of Section 8terminates on the east end at the Section's centrai auarter corner established bv the Monson ~ u r v e v  of Januarv I 
~ ~ 
1033. '40 nstes are i~ciuded ;I ths sLrvey roncerl3!ng any al le~ed spdtc or otscrepanci n !he eslablshed centrai qdaler corPcr, wn:ct 
PRS also b ie? used 13 es1aS 'sh l i e  ii'estern 53un3ary bet,Neen the KE an:! SE 114's of Seclor 8. ldaho Co?e r 1  e 55, CPapter 19 155- 
1004)l t~ovever, o'crares Ira1 -A recoro cf si,t~le;. shall be K.ed .'~:rh~n s e l j  (90 days aher complering sn,, surve,, .#hich: (1, D ss,oses a 
.~ ~ 
mafe&l discreoancv with orevious suwevs of re-cord." This survev indicates. due to-lack of notes concernha dis~ute and discreoancv. that I , , . .. 
Dust n i \e.z. a rnemrer of 'A1e.Q 8 S O ~ ~ L L C ,  mas a.vare of tne lbcation of tne ooLnday bervteen the hE G o  SE %.s oi  Section 8. \ore. 
V!ny s survey t'tcd the Recnro'ofSur/c), Randy Humole" when execurcd ior Dusr'n Vvetl? Perhaps tiodgr forgo1 lo proof n s c3rnpuler- 
i i based survey tempiate? I 
- 1 Ocr. 3' IDL Certificate o f  Compl iance - Fire Management Agreement - Notif icat ion o f  Forest Practice NE '. I[)_ hol ica1:cn Gerald ?/c rz i es a Not'fcat'on of Foresl Prac!:ce form tvth the IDL PonL'erosa Supen,iso\, O5ce (Deay The contracl nosc"!?es the of Forest 
property to be held in compliance as: 
"Division - PTS. NWNE (0008), Section 08, Township 40N, Range 5W, County Latah, No. 2 9  
Note: Compiiance form makes no reference to any property located in the SE 114. 
Practice No. 
45536 F 
Nov. 8 Trespass - Wei tz  places t w o  metal  s igns  o n  Shook  property  SE % 
Geraid Weitz andlor an aaent workina on his behalf installs two metai sians well inside the northern boundarv of DroDertv titled to Steven R. 
Shook and Mary E. ~i iver ia ie ~hool; l~ract 2 in SE 114). One sign states "Keep Our and other states "~r iva ie ~ i o~e r t y . '  I 
Nov. 9 Shook  removes t w o  metal  sign i l legal ly pos ted  by Wei tz  SE % 
Steven R. Shook removes two signs iiiegaiiy posted well inside northern boundary of his property (Tract 2 in SE 114) by Gerald Weitz andlor 
an agent working on his behalf. 
Timeline of the East 1/4, Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West 6 
Dec. 1 Letter to Ronald J. Landeck f r om Robert M. Magyar SE  % 
Maavar refutes claims bv Landeck's June 19.2003, letter. 
", 
Feb. 4 Weitz et  al. f i le  complaint  against Green e t  al. SE % 
District Court, 2nd Judicial District, State of ldaho, Case No. CV2004-000080 
Mar. 30 Green et  al. respond t o  Weitz et al. complaint and file counterclaim SE % 
District Court, 2nd Judiciai District, State of idaho, Case No. CV2004-000080 
Apr. 23 Weitz et  al. respond t o  Green e t  at, counterclaim SE % 
Note: Paraoraoh 4 of reolv indicates that Weitz et al. admit to '"reoairinq a fence" located in the SE 114. 
District coirt, 2nd ~ud id i i l  District, State of Idaho, Case No. ~~2004-600080 I 
Apr. 11 Trespass - Weitz tampers with and destroys evidence SE % 
Gerald Weitz andlor aaents workina on his behalf collect and remove nearlv ail siash evidence that is suecificallv cited in the Green et al. - - ~ -  ~ ~ 
co.rqrerc.aim (see paragraph 5@ of couiterca,m). Sash r.as gathered ano transported cy We 2 using a sk oder or large trac1o.t.i a site 
Ixaied approx:ma!e', 50 ice: n3nh!:esr of tne east warier corner of Secton 8 on propelmy cv~nes by \'!ei!z ('11 In? NL ' 4) and v .3~  
destrovea vv burlns Three 20 T-es.lassin~' signs ",ere also remlvec from lrees localeo in rile SE 1.4 o' Seriion E a m  n ccso p~ox~wty  
to the bum& siash i i le  on the Weitz arooerti in the NE 114. I 
~ ~ . .  . 
Apr. 12 "No Trespass" signage and log  barrier placed across trai l  t o  impede vehicular access SF 
Sle,en R. Shlon Dlaces a ca varrer across tral: rnal \'!e:o b u ' l d o ~ o  ih Sf: 1 4 in Oclober 2032 Shook as0 repl3ces t n w  1\3 
Trespassing" rembved by ~ e i t z  andlor his agents. 
Apr. 20 Green a n d  Shook contact  Latah County Sheriff 's Off ice SE % 
Todd A. Green and Steven R. Shook visit Sgt. Brannon Jordan to discuss trespass committed by Gerald Weitz andlor agents working on his 
behaif. Sgt. Jordan personally contacts Ronald J. Landeck and Consueio Weitz by telephone and informs them to not enter the disputed 
property in the SE 114 unless they have an order from the court to do so, as Weitz et al. have no legal title to the disputed property. 
May 14 Weitz et  al. sett lement offer t o  Green et  al. SE  % 
Weitz et al. offer settlement in the amount of $20,000 for exchange of disputed property located in SE 114 between true northern boundary 
and derelict fence. 
Sept. 22 Mediation of Dispute SE % 
Weitz et al. and Green et al. meet with Judge Kenick in Moscow, ldaho, to mediate dispute. A few offers of settlement arise, but none are 
accepted by either party. 
Between Trespass - Weitz removes trespass signage, removeslsteals log, and accesses property with motorized vehicles SE % 
Oct. 23 Gerald Weitz andlor agents working on his behalf use a bladed skidder or bulldozer along various points of entrance into the SE 114 from the 
-?,A NE 114 of Section 8. Numerous all terrain vehicle tracks and skidder or tractor tracks are evident on the entire len~th of the Ridae Trail in the 
-1 ," 
SE 114 that originatedfrom the NE 114. At least six "No TrespassingS'signs placed along the entire one-half mile tiorder betwe& the NE and 
SE quarters were removed and eithertaken or destroyed from trees located within the SE 114. One sign was found torn and thrown into a 
slash piie located approximately 50 feet northwest of the east quarter corner of Section 8 on propeliy owned by Weitz (in the NE 114). A log 
placed across the Ridge Trail and used to restrict motorized vehicle into Green's property was removed and placed within a slash pile 
located approximately 50 feet northwest of the east quarter corner of Section 8 on property owned by Weitz (in the NE 114). This wa's a 
sound log with residual value. 
Nov. 15 Motion t o  Amend t o  add Slander of Title Claim; Planning and Scheduling Conference SE % 
Counsei in dispute has conference with Judge Stegner. Andy Schwam indicates that Weitz et ai. can access the disputed property on foot 
only to prepare their case. Weih et a&. are required to notify Green at al. in advance when access will be made into the disputed property. 
Andy Schwam informs Judge Stegner, in the presence of Landeck and Consuelo Weitz, that Welh continually trespasses into the disputed 
property. Green's Motion to Amend Countercialm granted, and a Slander of Title claim is added against Weitz without further pleading. 
District Court, 2nd Judicial District. State of ldaho. Case No. CV2004-000080 
Jimeline o f  the East 114, Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West 7 
, .  . .. . 
Dec. 4 Letter t o  Robert M. Magyar f rom Ronald J. Land-er;k SE % 
Landeck indiiat6s:that Weitzes will not restrain from enteiing the disoutetl oro6em. Leitei-suaaests that:Weiaes moved the loa barrier and 
CD 
4 
. .   -- 
destroyed the p6sted.no trespassingj+ignage. 
.. ~ ~ . .  
~ ...., . . .  . . .  ~ ~ ~ 
Dec. ? 1 ~ e t t e i  toRonald'J. Landeckitfdgi:K6bOli Ms-M'a&$at. . .  ,.. SE '/, 
Madfar ~"di6Btc's:that Land&kf~.ciied$-muStbqieafl6r $~$k~p,~c@i$+6ni&;a6~~~$ Q$$peity io:wtedin;fhe:SE 114. Magyar demands tbahjo~ 
irespassing.ii$~ge a"d:ldg.owiiedib$ iitie h o l d e r s ! o ~ t h . e : ~ . ~ ~ l i 4 : ~ d ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ ~ i ~ t ~ i g ~ ~ ~  ~e ti:~d@$.acalso.indica@s that ttieWei@e*,
onlyhav<a,clgM ~ o , f ~ e p ~ o p ~ ~ y . ~ ~ d ~ $ ~ f  t ~ I & e e ~ W h ~ ~ h ' , l e g y t , d s s d f  @dl. 
... 
. . < .  , 
, ~ ,  : , .,, ..~.* .., . . .*, ~, .: ...,-.a:.. . . ~ <! * ,.., , .. , ..':; :.~:~~,;:-,:.~.r~~:'.~<x~.;?~~~z~.,#~~:: Y ? 5  ,?... :.; ..., ;;*;::**:;:.a .:. ~ . > :  . ,:. . . ,..;,.. -.. ,:.., .. .. 
2005 Jan. 15 "Posted No  Trespass" signs installed a t  s ix  access points SE % 
Steven R. Shook places a seven "Posted No Trespass"signs at six access points into SE 114 from NE 114. These signs replaced the "No 
Trespassing" signs removed by Weitz andlorhis agents between October 23 and November 6,2004. 
Between Trespass - Weitz accesses property with motorized vehicle SE % 
Feb. 20 Gerald Weitz andlor agents working on his behalf enter property located in the SE 114 with an all terrain vehicle. Tracks from the vehicle 
and fzeb enter and leave the SE 114 from the Weitz propetly in the NE 114. 
97 
Nov. 22 Letter toRonald  J. Landeck f romRobert  FIR. Magyar SE % 
Magyar indicates that Weitzes' expert witnesses mayenter disputedproperiy in the presence of one or mdre of his ciients. 
. . . ~  . ,. ~ ~. 
Nov. 26 Evidence Collection - MaroldOsborne and Penelope:Mbr$an-c~IS~ct:e\iidenc$ on behalf-of WWeitz etal. 
- 
SE % 
Harold Os$om and Penelope Mbrgan feil six trees inatteni@tio establj~h thw2Yeifiatihe UerPli'et fehcelinewas installed. Trees removed 
were loceted inshook and Green propertles.Pther individualspresent duriiigfeliiiig and rehoval of evid'ncwweie Consuelo Weitz,Gerald 
Weitz, Rocky Weiti, Todd Green andsteve Shook. 
L ,  
Between Trespass - Weitz accesses property w i th  motorized vehicle SE % 
Mar. 25 Gerald Weitz andlor agents working on his behalf enter properiy located in the SE 114 with an all terrain vehicie. Tracks from the vehicie 
and M ~ ~ ,  enter and leave the SE 114 from the Weitz properiy in the NE 114. 
30 
d 
Timeline of the East 1/4, Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West 8 
Assessments of NE 114 of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian 
When . .Whatand;Wh:? :.. . ~ .~.. ~ .. ..: . ~~ , .. ~ + . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  ... Where 
1963 Mar. 31 Taxpayer7sASSesSed valuation  red S~chaepf~in NE % 
Assessment of realproperty makes no reference to any Property looated inihe SE 114 of Sedion 8. Only 14.9 of 1'60 acres assessed as grazing iand, remaining 
iand assessedas timber reproduction land. . . 
Note: Thisevfdence disputes blah made in Weitz etal..wmplaint ieeeiaragfaph 13; Case Ejo;@2004-000080, Distiict:Cowrt..2nd Judioial District, State of 
Idaho) that land cattle were grazing in all of NE 114ofSectidn8, astimtieiiepr'oductiohni~ndls~as$essed.at-i~ugnly 1 . 5 i i m p s ~ r e  than gming-land. 
1963 LatahCotTntv:Assessment No'. 7530 . ~ 
~ ~ 
. . . .  . . . . . .  . . : .  :: . . . .  ~ 
1970 not dated Taxpayer's Assessed Valuation - Howard Schoepflin NE % 
Assessment of real property makes no reference to any property located in the SE 114 of Section 8. Only 14.9 of 160 acres assessed as grazing land, remaining 
land assessed as timber reproduction land. 
Note: This evidence disputes claim made in Weiiz et at. complaint (see paragraph 13, Case No. CV2004-000080, District Court, 2nd Judicial Disiiict, State of 
Idaho) that land cattie were grazing in ali of NE 114 of Section 8, as timber reproduction land is assessed at roughly 1.5 times more than grazing land. 
1970 Latah County Assessment No. 8797 
not dated ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ & < $ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ , ~ d ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ t i & ~  -.H,i&grd :s&&&$@)f . ,- : SW % of 
Asse'ssni$nt of.real:propertyriialies nore7@renceto~an'y~:piop~~i1:d&~k4~~ti~i~~ .~ ~. ...... SE 1/46~~e 8@n"8..~.f$tai of 19.9 6 f ~ t ~ d ' 6 0 ~ ~ 6 ~ ~ r e $ ~ ~ ~ d  asSess d asgrazing NE r/, 
. ~. 
.~ .,. . 
. . .  
., 
. . . . . . . . .  . . .  
.,. .L 
, . ; .. 
. . . .  . . . .  
... . . .  
. . 
. ~~ 
~ ~ 
. . .  
land. . ~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ........ . .  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  
. . 
: ;  .~ : . ,~ . . 
1997 not dated Taxpayer's Assessed Valuation - Gerald E. Weitz E % of 
Assessment of real property makes no reference to any Property located in the SE 114 of Section 8. Only 9 of 109.84 acres are assessed as arazins land. NF 'A 
- - .  ,- 
remaining land assessed as timber reproduction land and homestead site. 
Note: This assessment also took piace approximately nine years afler a IDUBLM survey monument was put into place at the east quarter corner of Section 8. 
2001 not dated Taxpayei'sAs~essed?+kuatitin-Gerald a $ & ? r ; i j s @ $ l ~ j ~ . ~ ~ ~ : ,  : ',; ;-: ;"-,*::. ,, E % NE 
Assess~n~of:rBaI p@peQymaKes hb r e f e r ~ n ~ e i o a n ~ ~ r ~ ~ e ~ ! ~ ~ ~ f ~ d ~ i P ? t h ~ ~ ~ S ~ E 1 ~ 4 . d i . $ e e g t I O ~ ~ I I ~ ~ i ; ' e ~ ~ t h e 1 0 9 ; 8 4 ~ j ~ d i e e s . ~ ~ ~ . a S e ~ " , ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ r a z i n g  iand. 
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Assessment of real property makes no reference to any Property located in the SE 114 of Section 8. None of-the 59.7 acres are assessed as grazing land. NE % 
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NOTE: The current plat map on file at the Latah County Assessor's Office show the boundary between the NE and SE 114's of Section 8 as being the same 
line surveyed by Ron Monson in the fall of 2002. The original General Land Office plat map located at the Latah County Recorder's Office also shows the 
boundary between the NE and SE 114's of Section 8 as being as straight line between the west and east quarter corners. 
Timeline of the East 114, Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West 9 
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Robert M. Magyar i'li\za west - Suite 5 
Attorney at Law 530 Soutli Asbiiry Street. Post Office Box 8074. Moscow, idalio 83843 
Tei (206) 882-1906. Pax (208) 882-1908 
Also via ~ a i  (208) 883-4593 
November 16,2004 
Ronald J. Landecli 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 93843 
Re: Weitz et. al. v. Green et. a1 
Dear Ron: 
Your client conlil~ues to trcspass upoil property owned by Greens, Sbooks and Castles 
Approxic~lately two weelcs ago your clients rei~loved a log barrier across tile path located on property 
owned by Todd Green. The log was 20 to 30 feet within the surveyed property boundary line. The 
barrier prevented access to the path by motorized vel~icles while still perlnitting walking access on 
tile path. Please have yoxz clients replace the log barrier immediately. 
In addition, yoxu clients reilloved "No Trespassing" sigils that were located high up on trees on 
property owned by Greens, Sboolcs and Castles. Please have your clie~lts replace those signs 
. . in~lllediately. 
Sincerely, 
/2.4bfA4 J r  
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
c : Greens, Shookcs, Castles 
Andrew Schwarn 
v'NOV-17-2004 WED 06: 14 L- ' 
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ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
ATTOKNZY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 0074 
MOSCOW, 3 0  8 3 0 4 3  
Re; Wcitz, e t  a l .  v ,  Green et: i l l , ,  , 
, ,x ------,,< .- ..^ .-..,.-- - 
hatah County Case No. LV2004-000080 
Dear Bob : 
We ol~viouoly d i spu te  your contixrued a s se r t i on  that: m y  
c l i c l ~ t s  are t respasii ing upon your c l i e n t s '  p roper t ies .  You now 
n,sk tilac a log ,  which we presume M r .  Green o r  someone a t  M r ,  
Green's i n s t r u c t i o n  placed across tho perimeter road a f t o r  
corn~ncncncement of t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n ,  be replaced. That request ,  a s  
we1.l as your reques t  t h a t  the  recen t ly  pliaced "No Trespassing" 
sj.gris ljct rep laced  and a3,lowed to  r ~ m a i n  wi th in  t he  Disputed 
Propcirty is  no t  reasonable given my c l i c n t s '  claim t o  the  
Uisguted Propar ty .  
Your clier ' l ts '  r ecen t  attempt t o  exorcise  domi.nion over t h e  
Dispute($ Property i c  unnecessary and inf  l a m a t o r y .  As you a n d  
your clients a r e  aware, tny c l i e n t 5  havapurposei"ul1y re f ra ined  
frotn az>y logging o r  similar, possessiva a c t i v i t y  witktin E.he 
Disputed P:roperty pending a c i v i l  reso lu t ion  of our  rcspeckive 
claims i n  t h i n  lawsui t .  However, they w i l l  continue t o  braversa 
througt! t he  Dispute(! P ~ o p e ~ t y  as they and khoir predecessors 3.n 
i n t e r e s t  have done f o r  more than seventy, years .  In so  doj.ng, 
the s t a t u s  qllo w i l l  be  maintained pending ret:nlution of t h i s  
(?L19e. 
191ank you. 
Sinceraly, 
Landeck, Westborg, J~idge & Graham, P .A. 
RJL/nraw 
0: Ge?ra;Ld E. and 
Weiti CI Sons, 1,322 . . 
- 
Established 1974 
= - 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
--* 
Plaza West - Suite 5 
530 South Asbury Street. Post Officc Box 8074. Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Tcl(2OS) 882-1906 . Fax (208) S82-1908 
Also by Fax: (208) 883-4593 
December 11,2004 
Ronald J. Laldeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, JD 83843 
Re: Weitz et, al. v. Green et. al. 
~ i a r  Ron: 
This letter is specifically in response to your November 17, 2004 letter to me. 
For the reasons set out below. Your clients are now only permitted upon our clients' property with 
specific pe~mission iiorn either my office or Andy Schwam:~ office. If Weitz continnes to go upon 
this property without permission, we will all have to go through the wasteful process ofhaving your 
clients enjoined and/or arrested. \-. 
Your clients have only a claim to the Green, Sl~ook &d Castle property. This entitles Weitz to go to 
court to see if they can ripen this clatm illto a right. Until they are su.ccessfu1 and prevail in their 
lawsuit, they continue to have only a claim! Green, Shoolc and Castle have title to this property. As 
such, your clients continue to trespass upon property which Greens, Shoolcs and Castles hold clear 
title. 
We take your November 17,2004 letter as an adnlissio~l illat your clients did remove the log from the 
path located 011 the Green property, and did take down "No Trespassing" signs that were posted by 
our clients on the Green, Sl~oolr and Castle properties. 
The log beIonged to Green, and it was removed and taken by your clients. The signs were owned by 
Green, Sl~ook and Castle, and they were removed and talcen by your clieilts. If anyone is "inflaming" 
tlus matter, or acting unnecessarily, it is your clie~lts, who conti~lue to trespass, and corltinue to 
deshoy property owned by Green, Shook and Castle. If removing and taking the log and tearing 
down the "No Trespassing" signs is not a "possessive activity", I don't lmow what would be. 
The posting of this properly, and the placement of barriers, is not new, or a "recent attempt to 
exercise dominion over this property." As your clients lknow, tl.~is psopei-ty has been posted witl~'%Jo 
Trespassing" sigrls, and barriers have been utilized, long before it was ever- purchased by ourclieiits. 
. c 
i 
- * 
\ 
Ronald T. La~deck 
December TI; 2004 
Page - 2 
L. Our clients have now had enough of your clients' bullyi~lg and aggressive behavior against them and 
on property which they hold clear title. As a consequellce of your clients' continuing pattern of 
outrageous behavior, they are now no longer permitted lo walk upon or athenvise be upon the 
property titled in Greens, Shooks a ~ d  Castles. Our clients now withdraw the penliission to walk 
upon the propex-ty that tvas previously @anted. 
We want this position to be crystal clear to your clients, and we want writte~i confirmation fiom you 
illat tliey will abide by our clients demands. We also want your clients to retunl the log they 
removed, and replace the "No Trespassing" signs they look. 
Please respond to Chis letter by irmforn~ing me that your clients will 12oi go upon the land titled in 
Creex~ls, Shoolcs and Castles without specific written permission received from my office or Andy 
Schwm's office, and that they will retu~n the log and replace the signs. 
Ifyour clients refi~se to abide by our clients' position, or you refuse or are unwilling to confirm your 
clients' agreement to abide by our clients' position, we will talce appropriate action without further 
notice to you. 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
c : Greens, Shooks, Castles 
Andrew Schwam 
35-101. Lawful fences in general. 
A lawful fence, except as hereinafter provided, must be not less than four and one half feet (4 
@ 
112') high, and the bottom board, rail, pole or wire must not be more than twenty inches (20") 
%".\%,. above the ground, and the space between the top and bottom board, rail, pole or wire must be 
well divided. (1956) 
35-1 02. Lawful fences described. 
Lawful fences are described as follows: 
(1) If made of stone, four feet (4') high, two feet (2') based, and one foot (1') thick on top. 
(2) lf it be a worm fence, the rails must be well laid and at least four feet (4') high. 
(3) If made of posts, with boards, rails or poles, the posts must be well set in the ground and 
not more thali eight feet (8') apart, with not less than three (3) six-inch (6") boards, or rails, or 
poles not less than two and one-half inches (2 112") in diameter at the small end; if four (4) poles 
are used, they must not be less than two inches (2") in diameter at the small end. The top board, 
rail or pole must not be less than four feet (4') from the ground, the spaces well divided, and the 
boards, rails or poles securely fastened to the posts; if poles not less than three inches (3") in 
diameter at the small end are used, the posts may be set twelve feet (12') apart. 
(4) If wire be used in the consbruction of fences, the posts 
must not be more than twenty-four feet (24') apart, set substantially in the ground, and three (3) 
substantial stays must be placed at equal distances between the posts, and all wires must be 
securely fastened to each post' and stay with not less than three (3) barbed wires, or four (4) 
coiled spring wires of not less than nnmber nine (9) gauge. The bottonl wire shall be not more 
than twenty-one inches (21") from the ground, and the other wires a proper distance apart. The 
,@ 
wires must be well stretched and the fencenot less than forty-seven inches (47") high. If all 
woven wire fencing is used, the top and bottom wire must be not less than number nine (9) 
gauge, or two (2) number thirteen (13) gauge wires twisted together, with intermediate bars not 
less than twelve inches (12") apart and of not less than number fourteen (14) gauge wire, and the 
stay wires not more than twelve inches (12") apart, and the top wire not less than forty-seven 
inches (47") f2om the ground. If woven wire less in height is used, it must be brought to the 
height of forty-seven inches (47") by additional barbed wires, or coiled spring wire of not less 
t h a ~  nnrnber nine (9) gauge, and not more than twelve inches (12") between the wires: provided, 
that if barbed wire only is used, and the posts are not more than sixteen feet (16') apart, no stays 
need be used. 
Provided further that the minimum forty-seven inch (47") fence height specified above may be 
reduced to forty-two inches (42") ibr right-of-way fences on the state highway system when 
mutually agreed by the Idaho director of depadment of transportation and the director of the 
Idaho fish and game department as necessary to accommodate big game animals at major 
migration crossings. 
(5) E made in whole or in part of brnsh, ditch, pickets, hedge, or any other materials, the 
fence, to be lawful, must be equal in strength and capacity to turn stock, to the fence above 
described. 
(6) All fences in good repair, of suitable material and of every description and all creeks, 
brooks, rivers, sloughs, ponds, bluffs, hills or mountains, that present a suitable obstruction to 
stock are deemed lawful fences. (1967) 



Doclg:las fir stump showing derelict fence remnant (yellow 
(arrows pointi.ng to wire). The single strand of wire on this 
s$.um:p iG the only remaining remnant of fence within 30 feet 
of ei,th.er side of stump. 
I , @ 
Photograph taken August 2003, facing east, on Green property. 
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C, M. REEL AND WINNIFRED L. REEL, PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS, v. WILLIAM 
R. WALTER, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. 
No. 9318. 
SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA 
February  28,1957, S u b m i t t e d  
April 24, 1957, Decided  
SUBSEQUENT HISTORYl\r: [***I] As Amended May 6, 1957. 
PRIOR HISTORV: Appeal from the  District Court of Madison County, John B. McClernan, 
Judge presiding. 
See 11 C. J.  S. Boundaries 116. 
Action t o  quiet title. Judgments for plaintiffs. Defendants appealed. 
Affirmed. 
DISPOSITION: Judgment  affirmed. 
HEADNOTES: QUIET TTTLE--BOUNDARIES-"EVIDENCE--BURDEN OF PROOF. 
1. Boundaries--Evidence suff icient  to s h o w  b o u n d a r y  c l a imed  by plain&ff. 
In action t o  quiet title t o  land and establish b&ndary between parties' adjoining quarter 
sections, evidence was sufficient t o  support trial court's finding that  survey by licensed 
surveyor employed by plainriff was properly made a ~ i d  iines properly located a s  claimed by 
plaintiffs. 
2. Boundaries--Y;aiiure of d e f e n d a n t  to p r o d u c e  t e s t i m o n y  as  to boundary .  
Where defendant, who had a survey made, produced no test i~nony of his surveyor to  
dispute testimony of iicensed surveyor employed by plaintiffs a s  t o  his survey and location 
of iines a s  claimed by plaintiffs, trial court was justified in finding such survey correct. 
3. Boundiaries--Conformance to t r u e  lines. 
Owners of adjoining iands divided by a fence which they suppose to  b e  on t rue line a r e  not 
bound by supposed line, but must conform to  true line when ascertained. 
4. Boundaries--Burden o f  proof. 
The burden of proof is on party attempting t o  show existence of agreement  fixing location of 
boundary line between parties' adjoining lands and their acceptance of and acquiescence in 
boundary s o  fixed. 
5. Boundar ies - -Defendant  did n o t  s u s t a i n  bu rden .  
Evidence was insufficient to sustain burden on defendant to prove alleged agreement of 
parties or their predecessors in title, fixing iong existing fence iine as boundary line and 
their acceptance of and acquiescence in boundary so fixed. 
COUNSEL: Mr. Lyman H. Bennett, Jr., Bozeman, Mr. Chester Lloyd Jones, Virginia City, for 
appellant. 
Messrs. Doepker & Hennessey, Butte, Mr. Frank E. Blair, Virginia City, for respondents. 
Mr. Jones, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Blair and Mr. Mark 3 .  Doepker argued orally. 
JUDGES: MR. JUSTICE CASTLES. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and MR. JUSTICE 
BOTTOMLY, ANGSTMAN, and ADAIR, concur. 
OPJNIONBV: CASTLES 
OQICNION: [*383] [**I0281 MR. 3USTICE CASTLES: 
This is an appeal from a judgment quieting title in certain described land in respondents, 
plaintiffs in the district court. The respondents sought to quiet title to land owned by them 
in Madlson County, and as incidental reiief sought the establishment of the boundary 
between the property of themselves and the appellant Waiter. The controversy centered 
around a determination of the boundary between the northeast and the southeast quarters 
ofSec. 28,T. 2S,R.2 W.0fM.P.M. 
Appellant claimed [***2] that a fence was the boundary line, while respondents claimed 
that the quarter section line running From east quarter corner of said section 28 to the west 
quarter corner of the said section was the division line between the respective parties. 
Respondents established the quarter section iine by means of plats and surveys of one 
Matthew, a licensed surveyor and engineer, who had been employed for that purpose. The 
line as established by respondents' witness, the surveyor, was south of the fence iine 
claimed by appellant as the boundary. The area involved was 8.13 acres in a iong strip 
between the fence and the quarter section iine established by the surveyor. 
Upon the trial, the respondents produced testimony on the survey and plats establishing the 
actual governmental division of the land. The appellant pressed the claim on the grounds 
that (1) the reestablishment of government corners and thus the survey line, as carried out 
by the respondents' surveyor, was improperiy accompiished; and (2) that usage, custom 
and acquiescence by the respondents, appellant, and their predecessors in interest had 
created a practical boundal-y, consisting of the aforementioned fence, between the 
two [***3] properties. 
Documentary proof of the chains of title to the property of both parties was introduced. I n  
both chains of title, the land involved had been conveyed by legal subdivision according to 
[*384] the government survey. The chain of title of appellant revealed that in additlon to 
the legal description, that is, the southeast quarter of Sec. 28, T. 2 5, R. 2 W. M.P.M., 
appeared the words: "subject to any state of facts an accurate survey may show." 
Appellant's case consisted mainly of an attack on the method of the survey, and testimony 
as to the location and notoriety of the division fence between the properties. Also, the 
appellant produced testimony showing improvements on the strip in question, consisting of 
a barn some fiRy [**I0291 years old, and a smaii brooder house and as to a long 
continued use of tiiem. I t  appears from the record that the appeiiant had aiso had a survey 
made, but did not produce the surveyor or any testimony concerning the survey in 
contradiction to that of the respondents. 
There was no controversy as to the ownership of the buildings situated on the contested 
strip. The respondents acknowledged that the appellant owned them and the trial [***4] 
court so found. 
The appellant's specifications of el-ror are encompassed in the two aforementioned claims. 
Two questions are posed: 
(1) Was the survey properly conducted so that the trial court couid properly find the quarter 
section iine between the northeast and southeast quarters of Sec. 28; and (2) was there a 
boundary, consisting of a fence, estabiished by usage, custom and acquiescence? 
At the time the surveyor went upon the ground, the situation was that: 
(1) The northeast section corner ~narker had been obiiterated, the east quarter section 
corner marker had been obiiterated, and the southeast section corner marker had been 
obiiterated. In short, ali corners of the east side of the said section had been obliterated. 
(2) The northwest corner of Sec. 28 "was a stone ill place properly marked and witnessed." 
The southwest corner of the said section "was a stone in place and the regulation U.S. brass 
caps and marks." The north quarter corner marker of said section was in place, and the 
surveyor used the northwest corner in place and the north quarter corner to project the 
north line [*385] of the section to the northeast corner thereof. These were the United 
States Government [***5] established corners upon the ground. At: the northeast corner, 
the surveyor found a fence corner at the intersection of the iine so projected from the 
northwest corner of the section to the northeast corner thereof, as previously indicated, 
with the east section line. There the fence was very oid, a few rotten posts were all that 
remained. A piie of sand was near the northeast corner, but the marked stone had been 
used as a brace against one of the posts of the fence. 
The surveyor used the intersection of four fences as his originai approach to the re- 
establishment of the southeast corner of the section. These fences were aii in proper 
relation to the course of the section. By projecting this iine northeriy it intersected the 
northeast corner with but siight error, i, e., the old fence corner previously referred to. The 
surveyor checked his work with the transcrlpt of original survey fieid notes of the United 
States Government sLlrvey, a copy of which was introduced in evidence without objection. 
All of the surveyor's work was done pursuant to instructions of the Bureau of Land 
Management, and he testified that he followed the rules of the Manual of survey as 
estabiished by the said [**%I Bureau. 
That left for considel-ation two markers of said Sec. 28, namely, the south and west quarter 
corners. It was of evidence that the north to south center iine was on a fence iine, and 
checking from the three fence corners the measul-ements given to Wiiiow Creek by the 
originai United States Government survey notes, it agreed very ciosely with the present 
position of the fence corner so the fence corner was taken as the south quarter corner of 
the section. The surveyor located the position of the west quarter corner of Sec. 28 aiso. 
The stone couid not be foulid, but the witness piie or witness mound was there, and the 
distance agreed with the original survey notes, so he used the fence corner a t  the witness 
mound for the west quarter corner of said sectcon. 
After having found and re-established the west quarter corner a s  heretofore mentioned, a s  
weil,as having re-established the eas t  [*386] quarter corner, t he  surveyor's line connected 
from t h e  west quarter corner [**1030] to t he  eas t  quarter  corner a s  shown on the  
surveyor's plat which was received in evidence and considered by the trial court. 
The appellant concedes that  tile Biireau of Land Management manual contained [***7] the  
proper procedure. This court has previously held in Vaught v. McClymond, 116 Mont. 542, 
155  P.2d 612, that  such procedure is proper. 
The appellant contends, however, that  the procedure a s  t o  lost quarter corners was not 
followed. The surveyor had treated the corners a s  obliterated corners and had foilowed t h e  
method of single proportionate measurement between t h e  sectlon corners t o  establish the  
quarter corners. For t he  purpose of this opinion, we do  not think it necessary to go into a 
lengthy explanation of the difference between lost and obliterated corners and t h e  methods 
used t o  re-establish them. Suffice it to say that  t he  triai court had before it t he  testimony of 
the respondents' surveyor and the  survey notes and piat prepared by him, together with the 
original government field notes. There was sufficient evidence before the  trial court t o  
support t he  finding tha t  t h e  survey had been properly made  and the lines properly located. 
As was said by this court in Myrick v. Peet, 5 6  Mont. 13, a t  pages 22 and 23, 180 P. 574, a t  
page 577:  
"The court below, short of being actually upon the ground, following s tep  by step the  
witnesses In examining [X**8] t h e  monuments which t h e  surveyors testified bore the  
official s tamp of Identification, was in a peculiarly advantageous position to get  t h e  
psychological effect of t h e  testimony given by the witnesses. They were all fresh from the 
locus in quo, and gave the  court first impressions by pointing out  upon the maps t h e  objects 
by which t h e  definite location of t he  monuments could be  determined. Before the  judgment 
of t h e  court below reached by such means, and presumptively correct, can be impeached, it 
must b e  made  clearly t o  appear tha t  some fact properly for the consideration of t h e  jury 
was arbitrarily determined by the court * * *.I' 
[*387] It appeared from the record that  t he  appellant had a survey made also, but he did 
not produce any evidence of that  survey a t  the triai. If t he re  was any disagreement between 
the  resuit obtained by respondents' surveyor as discussed above and the appellant's 
surveyor, it could have been demonstrated. 
R.C.M. 1947,  section 93-2001-1, provides: "7. That if weaker and  less satisfactory evidence 
is offered, when it appears that  stronger and more satisfactory was within the power of t he  
party, t h e  evi'dence offered should b e  vlewed with distrust. [***9] " 
Where, a s  here, t he  trial court had before it the testimony of a licensed surveyor and 
engineer; and the  appellant failed to produce evidence of his own surveyor to dispute it; t h e  
triai court was justifted in finding the  survey correct, establishing the quarter section line 
between the  northeast and southeast quarters of section 28. 
The second question posed, as t o  whether a boundary w a s  established by usage, custom 
and acquiescence will next be considered. The triai court found in its findings of fact these 
matters: 
"The respondents leal-tied and asceitaine? the true bounilary liric? berv~esn the nol-tlicast 
ann sotitneast quartar of wct.ion Viiei:ty-efyiit, lri!z~nsli.p l.'wo 57utI1, Ranyr? Tv,o \"lest ' " 
at o r  about the time of the initiation of this action upon * " having had a iand survey 
made * * * and a plat prepared. * * * 
"That prior t o  said iand survey * * * the parties to this action and their predecessors had 
supposed that  the fence shown on t i le  piat of said survey was upon the half section iine 
dividing the northeast and southeast quarters of said section * * * and all of the iand 
transfers of the  plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest recognized the half section iine 
dividing [***lo] the northeast and southeast quarters of said section * * * as 
the [**1031'J true division iine between the farm o f  the piaintiffs in the northeast quarter 
and that of the defendant in the southeast quarter o f  the said section. 
"Moreover, neither of the parties to this action nor their [%388] predecessors, while 
believing the  true division or boundary iine between the northeast and southeast quarters of 
section 28, i n  question here, t o  be uncertain ever a t  any time o r  at all fixed b y  any 
agreement whatsoever a boundary line between the lands now owned by the piaintiffs or 
respondents in the northeast quarter and iands of the  defendant and appellant in the 
southeast quarter of said sectton twenty-eight but  upon the contrary supposed the said 
fence t o  be upon the true boundary iine as fixed by  the Official government survey o f  said 
section, until about the time this action was commenced. 
"Upon learning the iocation of the true boundary line between the iands of the parties to this 
action the piaintiffs (respondents here) moved quickly and with dispatch to initiate this 
action in  the tr ial  court." 
As previousiy mentioned, the fence iine had been in existence for many years. On [***I11 
the plat, introduced in evidence, it appears as a fence slanting from the east section iine in 
a southwesterly and westerly direction along a county road. It contains two pronounced 
jogs. No written or oral agreement as t o  its being the boundary between the parties was 
introduced. The appeiiant contends that usage, custom and acquiescence established it as 
the true boundary. 
Again i n  Myrick v. Peet, supra, it was said: 
"It is  also well settied that where two adjoining proprietors are divided by a fence which 
they suppose t o  be the true line, they are not  bound by  the supposed iine, but  must 
conform to the true iine when ascertained. Jacobs v. Moseley, 91 Mo. 457, 462, 4 S.W. 135; 
Schraeder Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Packer, 129 U.S. 688, 9 S. Ct. 385, 32 L. Ed. 760; 4 Am. & 
Eng, Ency. o f  Law, 866, and cases cited; Kinies v. Libby, 87 Neb. 113, 126 N.W. 869; Foard 
v. McAnneily, 215 Mo. 371, 114 S.W. 990; Voigt v. Hunt (Tex. Civ. App.), 167 S.W. 745; 
Janke v. McMahon, 21 Cai. App. 781,133 P. 21; Lind v .  Hustad, 147 Wis 56, 132 N.W. 
753." 
This rule was reaffirmed in Schmuck v. Beck, 72 Mont. 606, a t  page 616, 234 P. 477, a t  
page 481. [***I21 
[*389] Again, quoting from Myrick v. Peet, supra, 56 Mont. a t  page 25, 180 P. a t  page 574 
at 578: 
"The burden o f  proof is always upon the party attempting to show the existence of an 
agreement fixing the iocation of a boundary line, and that the boundary so fixed had been 
accepted and acquiesced in. 4 R.C.L., title, Boundaries, section 66; Jones v. Pashby, 67 
Mich. 459, 35 N.W. 152, 11 Am. St. Rep. 589." 
Here the appellant's tit le shows that his deed is from his father and mother. His father and 
mother received a deed to the same property, dated in  1944. Both deeds described the 
southeast quarter of section 28, and said that the deed is "subject t o  any state of facts an 
accurate survey may show * " *." 
The deed of the pl'edecessors was the same. All the documentary evidence of the chain of 
tit le shows transfers by legal subdivisions. Not once is a fence used as a boundary line. 
It is not contended by the appeilant that there was eve]- a written or oral agreement that a 
fence line was a boundary. They contended that there was an acquiescence amounting to an 
implied agreement, contrary to the trial court's findings. The appellant cites the case of Box 
Eider Livestock Co. v. Giynn, 58 Mont. 561, 193 P. 1117, 1118, [***I31 in support of his 
position. We have no quarrel with the ruie as laid down in  that case, but  we simply do not 
have the same fact situation. As was pointed out in Box Elder Livestoclc Co. v. Glynn, supra, 
in distinguishing the [**I0321 Myrick v. Peet case, "upon t i le facts presented, it was there 
held that neither party claimed more than to the true line, and that occupancy was merely 
subject to future ascertainment of t l ie proper location o f  the boundary * * *." 
The evidence was very strong in this case that the appellant and his predecessors i n  interest 
knew that the boundary was "subject to any state of facts an accurate survey may shown as 
the deeds recited. 
The appeliant failed in his burden of proof to show the existence o f  an agreement fixing the 
location of the boundary line as being the fence, and that t l ie boundary so fixed had been 
accepted and acquiesced in. 
[*390] For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and MR. IUSTICE BOTTOMLY, ANGSTMAN, and ADATR, 
concur. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 AMENDED 
Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
v. 1 APPLICATION FOR 
1 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERWE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) 
1 
Defendants. 
) 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVl3RNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husba~ld and wife, 1 
Counterplaintiffs, ) 
V. 1 
NOTICE OF HEARMG - I 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, aild WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, a11 Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Counterdefendants, ) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the 15" day of April, 2005, at the hour of 9:30 
o'clock, a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, Defendants - Countcrplaintiffs will call 
on for hearing their Application For Preliminary Injunction, at the Latah County Courthouse, before 
the Honorable John R. Stegner. 
Leave of Court is requested to permit Defendants - Counterplaintiffs to call witnesses, and 
argue at the said Hearing. 
DATED this lSt day of April, 2005. 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for Defendants - Counterplaintiffs 
CERTLFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on this lSt day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attomey at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
/z&ffi+ 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) Iiand Delivery 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRhI3[AM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck ISB No. 3001; Stewart ISB NO. 6369 
Attorneys for PlaintiffslCounterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATJ.3 OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. W m Z ,  husband and wife, Case No. CV2004-000080 
and WElTZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho limited liability 
coqany,  hfClTION FClR E N L i L P G E m  
OF TIME 
PlaintiffslCounterdefendants, ) 
VS. 
TODD A. G B E N  and TONLA L. 1 
GREEN, husband and wife, 1 
STEW34 R. SHOOK and MARY E. 1 
SEWRNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 1 
C A S m  and CATHEWNE C. ) 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
1 
PlaintiffslCounterdefendants (hereafter collectively "Weitz"), by and through their 
attorneys Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., move under Rule 6(b) I.R.C.P. for an 
enlargement of time to file affidavits and brief responsive to DefendantsICounterplaintiffs' 
I 
Application for Preliminary Injunction such that Weitz's responsive affidavits and brief may be 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME - 1 I 136 
filed and served on or before April 12,2005. 
As grounds for this nlotion, Weitz assert that undersigned counsel was away from work 
when Defendants' Application was filed, returned .to the office on April 6,2005, and needs this 
additional time to respond in advance of the April 15,2005 hearing. Undersigned counsel has 
spoken with Defendants' counsel and represents to the Court that Defendants' counsel have no 
objection to this motion or to the Court's entry of an order enlarging time as requested by this 
motion. 
Weitz requests the Court grant this motion without hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this 8& day of April, 2005. 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
I hereby certify that on this 8" day of April, 2005, I caused a hue and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ Xj U.S. Mail 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM ] Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 
P.O. BOX 8074 
[ IFAX [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM [X ] U.S. Mail 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM [ ] Overnight Mail 
514 SOUTEI POLK STREET if6 C IFAX 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 [ ] I-Iand Delivery 
\ 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TlME - 2 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-i505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck ISB No. 3001; Stewast ISB No. 6369 
Attorneys for PlaintifFslCounterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAJ3 
G E U D  E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEilTZ, husband and wife, 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
TODD A GREEN and TONJA L 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R SHOOK and MARY E 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANW, T 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C 
CASTLE,andUS BANKNA. 
THIS MATTER having come before this Coust upon PlaintiffslCounterdefendants' 
Motion for Enlargement of Time filed herein and good cause appearing: 
IT IS ORDERED that PlaintiffsICounterdefendants may file and sesve on or before April 
12, 2005, affidavits and brief responsive to DefendantlCounterplaintiffs' Application for 
ORDER ENLARGING TaME - 1 ORIGINAL I38 
Preliminary Injunction 
qr .\ 3G, 
JO% R. Stegner 
District Judge 
@LERK9S CERTiFPCATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on tl~is 1 1 day of April, 2W5,I caused a true and correct copy 
ofthis document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
RONALD J. LANDECK W . S .  Mail 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE [ ] Overnight Mail 
& GRAHAM, P.A. [ IFAX 
P. O. BOX 9344 [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR p U . S  Mail 
MACiYAR LL4W FlRM [ 1 Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ IFAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ ] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCINVAM G;rU.S. h&il 
SCNWAM LAW EIRM [ 1 Overnight Mail . 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET #6 [ IFAX 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 [ ] Hand Delivery 
ORDER ENLAR-GING TLME - 2 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDIECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck ISB No. 3001; Stewart ISB No. 6369 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE? DISTRICT COURT OF THE? SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THfl COUNTY OF LATAl3 
GERALD E. WERZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
TODD A. GREEN and TONLA L. 
GRFEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVER.NALE SHOOK, DANLIV. T 
CASTLE and CATHEBUN? C. 
CASTLE, and U S. BANKN.A., 
1 
) Case No. CV2004-000080 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
County of Latab ) 
Harold L. Osboine, being first duly sworn under oath, hereby states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD L. OSBOXNE - 1 
1. I am over eighteen years of age and make this Affidavit based upon my own 
personal knowledge, as further described in Exhibit A. 
2. A true and correct copy of my expert witness report, dated January 30,2004, is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference as if set forth l l l y  here. 
3. If called by PlaintiffsICounterdefendants to testify related to a preliminary 
injunction, at trial, or for any other purpose in this matter, my testimony will be consistent with 
and include the information contained in Exhibit A. 
4. A true and correct copy of my Vitae, is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B and 
incorporated by reference as if set for& l l Iy  here. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 2005. 
Harold L. Osborne 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of April, 2005. 
, \ , l \ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l l l ,  
+S.IESTSe '//, \' \ 4 ..."...?@ 5 Z Q . .  : . -  Y . i 
: a: + e . - 
- . - * .  
- . e *  . - 
- .  My commission expires: 
AFFlDAVIT OF HAROLD L. OSBORNE - 2 
CERTWICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifl that on this /# day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated beIow: 
ROBERT M. 'MAGYAR 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 
P.O. BOX 8074 
MOSCOW, I D  83843 
ANDREW M. SCIlWAM 
S C ~ A M  LAW FIRM 
514 SOUTI-I POLK STREET K6 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[ ]U.S.Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ I F M  
[ & Hand Delivery 
[ ]U.S.Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ IFAX [MI Hand Delivery 
Ro ald J. Landeck (7 
AFFIDAVIT OF HAROLD L OSBORNE - 3 
REPORT BY HAROLD L. OSBORNE January 30,2004 
Re: Property line dispute between Weitz and GreenRogers 
lying within See. 8, T40N, R5W, B.M. 
I am currently the consulting forester and forester-in-charge for the Weitz #1 Timber Sale which 
I prepared for Gerald and Consuelo Weitz. The sale was sold at public auction to Regulus Stud 
Mills Inc. of St. Maries, Idaho on January 13, 2004. A map of the sale area is enclosed. Portions 
of the south edge of the sale abut the disputed area. During the sale layout and the marking of 
"Timber Harvest Boundaries" during the fall of 2003 1 avoided any entry into the disputed area. 
Prior to the placement of the No Trespassing signs by purchasers of the Green property, I 
traveled the ridgetop road during my work on the Weitz property. The disputed area was shown 
to me by Consuelo Weitz through site visits and maps and was detailed in an August 19,2003 
letter from Steven and Mary Shook and by an August 29,2003 correspondence from ~ d e l  and 
Catherine Castle. Both letters were directed to Gerald Weitz, Consuelo Weitz and Harold 
Osborne. I recognized the disputed area to be the land lying between the east-west barbed wire 
fence and an east-west line connecting a series of four (4) survey pins installed by Monson. My 
recognition of the disputed area is not recognition of the Monson survey line as the WeitzIGreen 
property boundary. At times my timber harvest boundary is aligned with the Monson survey line, 
as ownership of the land to the north of this survey line is not disputed. 
At three separate times (December 19,2003; December 23,2003 and January 15,2004) at the 
request of Gerald and Consuelo Weitz, I visited the disputed area to search for evidence of past 
activity in terms of 1) fence construction, 2) road construction, 3) timber harvest, and 4) fire. I 
took digital photos during all three visits and thumbnail prints #1 -#58 are enclosed as well as 
selected larger prints from this series. 
I also called two loggers who had previously harvested timber on the Rogers property. On Dec. 
23,2003 I called Dan Howard of Potlatch, Idaho (875-0679). Dan came to Idaho in the early 
1980' s from California where he had worked as a logger. He enrolled in the College of Forestry 
at the University of Idaho, found a residence on Saddle Ridge Road and secured a logging job 
from forestry consultant Randle Buck on the Rogers property. I became acquainted with Dan at 
the University and I visited his loggingjob on the Rogers property in July of 1983. During the 
phone call Dan told me he sub-contracted for another logger from northern Idaho who was hired 
by Randle Buck. Dan used a small crawler dozer (Caterpillar D-3) to log and to dozer pile the 
logging slash. Dan cut his trees close to the ground, leaving very short stumps as he was used to 
California logging requirements. I asked Dan what he used for a cutting boundary on the north 
side of the Rogers property and he stated that he used the existing 3-wire fence. He also cut 
every other tree to which the fence was nailed, as that was the accepted practice for trees on a 
property line. Howard has pictures of the logging in his files. 
I also contacted logger Steve (Curly) Ely &om Potlatch (875-0319). He stated that he had logged 
on the Rogers property three (3) different times. He also stated that he recognized the fence on 
the north side as a cutting boundary but he cut little if any timber near the fence. 
Observations by Osborne from 3 site visits to the disputed area: (reference to numbered 
photos). 
1. The fence: A barbed 3-wire fence completely traverses the disputed area on the south of 
Weitz (north of Rogers). This fence was constructed approximately 70 years ago (early 1930's) 
and was stapled to trees and to fence posts. Both the east and west ends were on large trees. 
(Photo #20 -ponderosa pine on east end) (Photo #21 -') Douglas-fir on west end). Some of the 
fence trees were harvested by Dan Howard in 1983 and were directionally felled toward the 
Rogers property. The fence construction date could be obtained by cutting a wedge section 
containing the wire from living trees to which the fence is still attached and overgrown. Dr. 
Penny Morgan, Professor of Forest Resources, University of Idaho indicated to me that she could 
perform this sampling and precise dating as a tree ring expert. I determined the early 1930's date 
mentioned above by ring counts of fence trees harvested in 1983 and adding 20 years (Photo # 
19). 
Other fence evidence: 
Photo #28 shows a "LINE" sign attached to a ponderosa pine with bailing wire. This sign and 2 
other similar signs were placed by Howard Schoepflin to indicate the division between his and 
Weitz property to the east. There is no evidence of a fence on this old north-south property line. 
The "LINE" sign is on the ridge road and appears placed for convenience. The other two "LINE" 
signs fkrther north were also on road edges. Photo #54, 55, 56,57 show one strand of old barbed 
wire partially buried in skid trail debris. Skidding approximately 50 years ago appears to have 
resulted in this piece of barbed wire beizg dragged to the north along the skid trail, which runs 
northerly and downhill through Weitz property. The wire scarred a cedar tree at the base as it 
was dragged and deposited at this location (Photo #57). I tied a ribbon on this piece of barbed 
wire to indicate to timber fallers of a danger situation when logging occurs. Such stray pieces of 
wire are not easily seen, especially during winter, and can easily be caught up by a chainsaw. 
2. Roads: A forest road suitable for travel with a 2-wheel drive vehicle during the dry season 
enters the disputed area from the northeast in the southwest comer of Weitz land (Photo #33). 
This road traverses the length of the disputed area in a west to east fashion (Photo #32) and exits 
the disputed area near the blue gate (Photo #25). There is evidence that the road has been in 
place for decades. Such evidence includes the well-vegetated road cut slope (Photo #33) and a 
mature shrub community on soil side cast during road construction or maintenance (photo #32). 
Photo #34 shows a Douglas-fir tree scared by a dozer during road construction or road 
maintenance. Sectioning the scared area can date this scar. There is recent evidence of road 
maintenance by Weitz in 2002-2003. 
3. Timber harvesting evidence: There is ample evidence that timber harvesting has occurred 
both north and south of the 3-wire fence. Dan Howard stated to me that he cut to the fence from 
the south in 1983. There are numerous stumps, both ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir, 
immediately south of the fence. Also eveIy other fence line tree (photo #13, #19) was harvested. 
Skid trails are not readily apparent next to the fence but may be more apparent as one travels to 
the south (photo #35 through #44). There is no evidence that skid trails crossed the fence. 
There is evidence of a harvest of timber to the north of the fence line. I estimated that this harvest 
occurred in the 1950's based on decomposition of the stumps, chainsaw tooth marks on the 
stumps, and natural regeneration of trees and shrubs in the skid trails which all trend to the north 
off the ridge (Photo # 1 through #6). There is no evidence that skid trails crossed the fence. 
: ,, . iJ4 
There is evidence of a much earlier timber harvest then those two mentioned above. Photo 117, 
#8, #46) are of large trees cut using cross cut saw technology as indicated by stump height. There 
is no evidence as to which direction logs from those trees were skidded. I estimated this logging 
occurred between 1890 and 1910. There is fire evidence that post -dates the early timber harvest. 
There is evidence on the north side of the fence that dead trees were cut for firewood. There are a 
variety of ages of cutting based on stump decomposition and there are a variety of cutting 
techniques based on the sawingpattem on residual sm.ps (Photo #49, #50). Both Consuelo and 
Gerald Weitz have stated to me that they have been gathering firewood along the ridge road for 
years. 
4. Fire: There is ample evidence that fire occurred in the disputed area previous to and after the 
turn of the century logging. Fire scars and charcoal are apparent on living trees and on the very 
old pine stumps. Photo #22 and #23 are examples of fire scars. These fires could be dated by. 
sampling and ring analysis of living trees. There is no way of determining whether these fires 
were natural or man-caused. 
There is other evidence of activity on the disputed area including the shed and antennae. Photos 
#45 through #49 are of the shed and immediate area. A horse or ATV path crosses through the 
fence approximately in the middle of the disputed area. 
My observations and conclusions are based upon nearly 40 years of woods walking in Latah 
County, Idaho and from education and experience gained as a forestry educator and timber 
harvester. I spent twenty-five (25) years as manager of the nearby University of Idaho 
Experimental Forest. 
It is clear to me that both-Weitz and Rogers and their predecessors have recognized the 3-wire 
fence as a boundary for timber harvest, road construction, and firewood gathering since the 
1950's. The fence predates the 1950's and 1983 and more recent logging by at least 20 years. 
Forester 
115 4th Street 
Onaway, Idaho 83855 
208-875-1471 
hosbome@potlatch.com 








V I T A E  
University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho 83844 
NAME: C&@ZX, Harold h e  DATE: February 28, 2005 
EMPILOYMENT SINCE 2003: Forestry consultant, contract educator for the University of Idaho, 
contract educator for the Idaho Forest Products Commission, 
fuels reduction and logging contractor, landscape and Christmas tree grower 
RANK OR TITLE at the UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO: 
Extension Professor Emeritus of Forest Resources (retired June, 2003) 
Forest Manager of the University of Idaho Experimental Forest (retired Jan, 2002) 
D%PARTMEW2 Forest Resources 
OFFICE LOCATION: 115 4h Street, Onaway, Idaho 83855 OFFICE PEONE: (208) 875-1471 
DATE OF FTRST EMPLOYMFDT AT UI: January 1,1972 
DATE OF TENURJ3 July 1, 1989 
DATE OF PRESEIW RANK OR TITLE: June, 2003 
EDUCATION BEYOND HIGH SCHOOL: 
Additional graduate coursework: 30 credits that include I8 credits in CEFES (Continuing Education in Forest 
Ecology and Silviculture) 
M.F., Forest Management, 1974, University of Idaho 
B.S., Forest Management, 1971, University of Idaho 
EXPERIENCE: - 
Academic Experience in the Department of Forest Resources, College of Forestry, Wildtife and Range Science, 
University of Idaho: 
Extension Professor Emeritus of Forest Resources, June 2003 
Extension Professor, Jan 1998-June 2004 
Associate Extension Professor, July 1989-present 
Assistant Extension Professor, 1987-89 
Assistant Professor, 1984-87 
Instruct~i, 1981-84 
Manager, Experimental Forest, 1978-present 
Research Associate, 1974-81 
Research Assistant, 1972-74 
Academic Teaching: 
For 270 Principles of Forest Ecosystem Management (2 cr.) 
For 299 DS: Student Management Unit (SMU) Silviculture (1 cr.) 
For 404 ST: Afforestation (2 cr.) 
For 404 ST: Concepts and Practices of Sustainable Silviculture (team with K. Stoszek) (1-2 cr.) 
For 404 ST: Small Scale Forestry (2 cr.) 
For 424 Silviculture (team with D. Adarns, D. Wenny, J. Moore, and K. Stoszek) (3 cr.) 
For 474 Forest Resource Inventories (team with C. Stiff) (3 cr.) 
For 479 Forest Contracting (2 cr.) 
For 499 DS: Student Management Unit (SMU) Silviculture 
For 502 DS: Forest Management 
For 203 WS: Cruising and Scaling (2 cr.) 
For 300 Forestry Summer Camp 
For 324 Silviculture (3 cr.) 
For 403 WS: Cruising and Scaling (2 cr.) 
For 478 Western Forestry Practices (1 cr.) 
Guest Lecturer: 
For 302 Wildland Field Ecology II 
For 427 Prescribed Burning Lab 
For 466 Forest Disease and Insect Problems 
For 470 Interdisciplinary Natural Resource Planning 
For 477 Integrated Forest Management Models 
ForPr 430 Forest Engineering and Harvesting 
ForFr ID432 Low Volume Forest Roads 
International Experience: 
. . . . . . . . . 
Sweden, FinIand, Belgium, Austria, Germany, and Slovenia as part of a' July i-~ecembkr 31, 1995 
Sabbatical Leave focused on Small Scale Forestry Equipment for the Intensive Management of 
Inland Northwest Forests. Included 50 days of travel in these and adjacent countries to study timber 
management methods and techniques, especially those activities focused on small equipment and 
small timber. I developed contacts with forestry equipment researchers and users and established 
linkages with equipment manufactures. The sabbatical bas resulted in the shipment of equipment to 
Idaho for testing and evaluation in northwest forests as well as international students and equipment 
manufactures coming to Idaho to assist in research and demonstration efforts. In addition, a summer 
internhip in forest ecology and silviculture for international students from Austria and Slovenia bas 
attracted 32 students during a five year period. Two of these students have returned to pursue 
graduate studies. 
Far East Russia and Siberia, September 1994 for 13 days. A Forestry Study Tour focused on a wide 
array of forest management methods and problems, especially as Russia struggled with the 1991 
breakup. 
Honduras, Central America, February 1992 for 11 days. This travel was to study fxsthand the forestry 
practices in Honduras to better present instructional materials in future (two-month) Honduran 
Forestry Field Training Courses in Idaho. I had participated as an instructor in courses in Idaho the 
previous 3 years. 
British Columbia, Canada. Five trips of 3-5 days between 1984-1997 to study research forest operations 
across British Columbia and to interact with managers of these research forests. Most of these trips 
have been in connection with the Research Forest Managers' Symposium, a group which I 
organized in 1984, aid which has now met 13 times in the western United States and Canada. 
Administration: 
Manager, Experimental Forest, College of Forestry, Wildlife, and Range Sciences, University of Idaho, 
1978-Jan 2002. Coordmate and implement all activities on the 7,564-acre Experimental Forest. 
Emphasis areas are research, teaching, demonstration, harvesting, and planning. Major duties 
include mapping, record keeping, inventory, timber management, road design, supervision of timber 
harvest operations, equipment procurement, budgeting, administration of grazing contracts, 
easements and right-of-ways, collection and storage of data, land line and comer work, coordination 
of activities with adjoining ownerships, and public relations, coordination of research and teaching 
activities. Develop land exchange and land acquisition proposals. (Note: This work occupied 50% 
of a full-time position) 
Extension/Service Committee Assignments: 
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Latah County Coordinating and Administrative Committee (an interagency committee of agency directors 
for Latah County) 
Forest Resources Curriculum Committee (developmcnt of departmental curriculum) 
Idaho Logging Safety Committee 
McCroskey State Park General Development Planning Committee (developed plan) 
Experimental Forest Advisory Committee, CFWR 
Research Committee Assignments: 
Inland Empire Tree Improvement Cooperative 
White Pine Tree Improvement Committee (Moscow Seed Orchard Management Working Group) 
Trees on the Palouse Research Advisory Committee 
Adaptive Forestry Committee 
Other Professional: 
1980-May 1986, Co-owner of hvo forestry consulting businesses: Harold L. Osborne &Associates and 
Osborne and Corrao, Inc. (Northwest Management of Mosww, Idaho). Provided a full range of 
forestry management services to private, industrial, federal, and state forestry operations. Services 
included forest management plans, inventory, logging, slash disposal, and reforestation. 
June 1986-Snne 2003. Provide professional timber management services to nonindustrial private forest 
owners in the Moscow/Potlatch vicinity. Average of 1.5 clients per year. 
July 2003 -present. Osborne Forestry. I provide a fuil range of forestry management services to private, 
industrial, federal, and state forestry operations. Services included forest management plans, 
inventory, logging, slash disposal, and reforestation. 
Membership in Profes$ional and Scholarly Organizations: 
Society of American Foresters, 1972-present 
Chapter Chairman Elect, 1982, 1983 
Chairman, 1984 
Membership Chairman, 1985-88 
Forestry Day ChainndCo-Chairman, 1986-present 
Northwest Scientific Association, 1975-84 
Idaho Christmas Tree Growers Association 
Vice President, 1976, 1977 
Board of Directors, 1978, 1979 
Chairman, Research Committee, 1978 
Idaho Tree Farm Committee 
Alumni Association, College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences 
Board of Directors, 1984-85, 1985-86 
Treasurer, 1985-86 
Idaho Woodland Council 
Secretary, 1978 
Other Experience: 
Armed Forces: 
December 1969-December 1975, Idaho Army National Guard 
Home Unit - Orofmo, Idaho 
Attained rank of Staff Sergeant (E-6) 
Honorable discharge 
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Community and Service: 
. City Councilman, City of Onaway, Idaho, 1987-1997 
Potlatch Lions Club, Potlatch, Idaho, 1988-96 
PUBLICATIONS: 
Osborne, H.L., and R. Appelgren. 1996. University of Idaho Experimental Forest. &Experimental Forests, 
Ranges, and Watersheds in the Northern Rocky Mountains: A Compendium of Outdoor Laboratories in 
Utah, Idaho, and Montana. U.S.D.A. For. Serv., INT-GTR-334, 118 pp. 
Refereed Journal Publications: 
Wenny, D.L., Y. Liu, R.K. Dmoese ,  and H.L. Osborne. 1988. First year field . growth . of chemically root 
pruned containerized seedlings. New Forests 2 1 1  1-1 18. . . .  . . .  
Stoszek, K.J., P.G. Mika, J.A. Moore, and H.L. Osborne. 1981. The relationship between site and stand 
attributes and Douglas-fir tussock moth caused defoliation. Forest Science 27:43 1-442. 
Kulhavy, D.L., and H.L. Osborne. 1976. Arthropods inhabiting sporophores of the pouch fungus, 
Cryptopom volvatus on grand fu in northern Idaho and adjacent areas (Polyporales: Polyporaceae). 
Jour. Id. Acd. Sci. 12(1):13-20. 
Osborne, H.L., and D.L. Kuaavy. 1975. Notes on Nosodendon califomicum Eorn on slime fluxes of grand 
fir, Abies grandis (Douglas) Lindley, in northern Idaho (Coleoptera: Nosodendridae). Coleop. Bull. 
29(2): 71-73. 
Refereed Manuscripts in Preparation: 
Boyd, R.J., J.M. Mandzak, J.D. McLeod, and H.L. Osborne. Enhancement of conifer production with 
Herazinone in the Northern Roclcy Mountains. 
MacRae, S.J., J.C. Mosley, J.L. Kingery, and H.L. Osborne. Conifer seedling response to early and late 
summer sheep grazing. 
Technical Monographs, Bulletins, and'Published Reports: 
Pamidge, A.D., E.R. Canfield, R.J. Chacko, D.L. Kulhavy, H.L. Osborne, J.W. Schwandt, and R.E. Stone. 
1976. Keys to major disease, insect and related problems of forests in northern Idaho. Univ. of Idaho, 
Forest, Wildlife and Range Exp. Sta., Cont. No. 27. 99 pp. (peer reviewed). 
M i ,  P.G., and H.L. Osbome. 1976. Weed control with glyphosate in Christmas trees. 1975 Res. Progress 
Repoa, Western Society of Weed Science. 
Extension Publications: 
Mahoney, R.L., H.L. Osborne, and P. Town. 1996. Evaluating Private Forest Ecosystems for Silvicultural 
Prescriptions and Ecosystem Management Planning. Forest, Wildlife, and Range Exp. Sta. No. 59, 
University of Idaho, 15 pp. 
Adams, D.L., H.L. Osborne, D.P. Hanley, and S. Messat. 1990. Response from Thinning Ponderosa Pine 
Plantations in Nonhern Idaho. University of Idaho, Forest, Wildlife &d Range Exp. Sta. Cont. No. 521, 
4 PP. 
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Osbome, H.L. 1989. The UI Experimental Forest, MapIBrochure 
Osborne, H.L. 1989. Flat Creek Driving Tour, UI Experimental Forest, Interpretive Brochure, 11 pp. 
Osbome, H.L. 1987. Pinestia, The Guernsey Outdoor Classroom and Demonstration Area, Interpretive 
Brochure. 
Video Productions: 
"Logging Safety in the Intermountain Northwest." 1992. This video series consists a f 8  video tapes designed 
to increase safety awareness and reduce injuries in the timber industry. The series was produced under a 
U.S. Department of Labor (OSHA) grant with participation by H. Lee, UI Forest Products, H. Osbome, 
UI Forest Resources, and the Education Technology Center, Lewis-Clark State College with technical 
assistance of the logging safety staff of the Idaho Department o i  Labor and Industrial Services, Ross 
Appelgren and the UI student logging crew and the men and women of the Idaho timber industry. The 
series includes the following videos: 
Logging Overview 18 min. 
Line Skiddimg 16:30 min. 
Logging Safety 15 min. 
LoadingandHauliig 16:35min. 
Landings 18 min. 
Mechanized Logging 11 :40 min. 
Ground Skidding 10:45 min. 
Physics of Falling 13:30 min. 
"We Grow Full Circle." 15 minutes, with the Intermountain Forest Industries Association, 1991. 
Ribtished Procediags a d  Symposia: 
Neuenschwander, L.F., H.L. Osborne, and P. Morgan. 1985. Integrating Harvest Practices and Site- 
Preparation Activities to Manage Competing Vegetation. & Proceedings of Weed Control for Forest 
Productivity in theJnterior West. Washington State University, Pullman, Washington. 
M i a ,  P.G., H.L. Osbome, and K.J. Stoszek. 1980. "Douglas-fir Tussock Moth Defoliation in Northern 
Idaho Associated with Nutrient Deficiencies in Grand Fir." Abstract. Northwest Science Annual 
Meeting, Moscow, Idaho. 
Newsletter: 
Editor for Newsletter: Idaho Logging Safety News. A newsletter to promote safety withi  the Idaho Timber 
Industry, Vol. I-Vol. 4, 1990. 
Other Pubtications: 
Mosley, J.C., J.L. Kingery, H.L. Osbome, and S.D. McCoy. 1992. Multiple Use in Sheep's Clothing. 
Focus on Renewable Natural Resources, Vol. 17, University of Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Experiment 
Station. 
Osbome, H.L. 1988. The Ewperimental Forest. Focus, 1987 Annual Report of the University of Idaho 
Forest, Wildlife and Range Experiment Station, Vol. 13, p. 1. 
Osbome, H.L. 1988. UI Experimental Forest. Idaho Forester, 1988, pp. 33-34. 
Osborne, H.L. 1985. School Forest Update. The Idaho Forester. Vol. LXVII. 
Osborne, H.L. 1984. They're Still a Loggin' the School Forest. The Idaho Foresrer, Vol LXVI, pp. 22-24. 
Osborne, H.L. 1983. ?liming for Firewood. Idaho Tree Farm News, p. 9. 
Page 6 OSBORNE, Harold L. 
Osborne, H.L. 1981. Should Foresters Know How to Walk in the Woods? Logger's Handbook. 1981 
Edition, Vol. XLI. 
Stoszek, K.J., J.A. Moore, P.G. Mika, and H.L. Osborne. 1975. Forest conditions affect tussock moth 
outbreak severity. Focus, 1975 Annual Report of the University of Idaho Forest, Wildlife and Range 
Experiment Station, 2(2):18-19. 
Moscow Mountain Will Bum Again. A F i e  History Display. College of Forestry, University of Idaho, 
Moscow, Idaho, 1991. 
Reports: 
Osbome, H.L. 1996. Small Scale Forestry Equipment for Intensive Management of InlandNorthwest Forest* 
Final Report, Sabbatical Leave from July 1-December 31, 1995, 8 pp. . ' . . .  . 
Osbonle, H.L. 1995. The Blodgett Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1995, 5 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1995. The Guernsey Outdoor Claisroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1995, 9 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1994. The Blodgett Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, 5 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1994. The Guernsey Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1994, 12 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1994. The HungerfordIByers Outdoor Classroom, Activity Report, FY90-FY94, 6 pp. 
Osbome, H.L. 1993. The Blodgen Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1993,4 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1993. The Guernsey Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1993, 12 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1992. The Blodgett Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1992, 13 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1992. The Guernsey Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1992, 12 pp. 
Osbome, Harold L., and the 1991 Forest Resources Silviculture class (For 324), January 28, 1992. A Natural 
Resource Management Plan for Frank Robinson Nature Park, 24 pp. plus appendix. 
Osborne, H.L. 1990. Guernsey Outdoor Classroom, Activity Report, 15 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1990. The Blodgett Outdoor Classroom, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1991, 13 pp 
Osborne, H.L. 1987. Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1987; The Experimental Forest, College of FWR, Univ. 
of Idaho. Inhouse Report. 160 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1987. A Combined Annual Report for Fiscal Years 1980 through 1986; The Experimental 
Forest, College of FWR, Univ. of Idaho. Inhouse Report. 42 pp. 
Osborne, H.L. 1987. The Allowable Cut for the Experimental Forest, College of FWR, Univ. of Idaho. 
Inhouse Report. 19 pp. 
Lohse, G.L., H.L. Osborne, and J.H. Ehre~eich,  Jr. 1982. Experimental Forest Stand Inventory Program, 
EFSIP documentation and user's manual. College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences, University of 
Idaho. Inhouse report. 143 pp. 
. . 
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Reports (cont.): 
Stoszek, K.J., H.L. Osborne, P.G. Mika, and J.A. Moore. 1977. The relationship of site and stand attributes 
and management practices to Douglas-fir tussock moth epidemics. Final Rpt., USDA DFTM-R. and D. 
program, 49 pp. 
Stoszek, X.J., P.G. M i ,  and H.L. 0sborne; 1977. Comparative studies on the physiological environment 
indices of grand fir stands located on high, moderate and low DFTM hazard sites in northern Idaho. Fmal 
Report. USDA Douglas-fir Tussock Moth Program, Portland, Oregon. 
PAPERS PRESENTED AT MEETINGS: 
"European Small-Scale Logging Equipment." 13" Annual UI Forest Engineering Conference, Moscow, Idaho, 
February 1996. 
"European Small-Scale Logging Equipment." 4th Annual NIPF Foresters Workshop, Spokane, Washington, 
January 19, 1996. . . 
"New Ideas from the Old World." Palouse Chapter of the Society of American Foresters, Moscow, Idaho, 
January 17, 1996. 
"An Evaluation of Tree. and Shrub Plantings in the Palouse Region of Southeastern Washington." 4th North 
American Agroforestry Conference, Boise, Idaho, July 1995. 
"Herbicide Effect on Container-Grown Ponderosa Pine Seedlimgs in a Conservation Reserve Planting in 
Northern Idaho, U.S.A." 4th North American Agroforestry Conference, Boise, Idaho, July 1995. 
"I-Ierbaceous Vegetation Control in a Ponderosa Pine Plantation in Northern Idaho, U.S.A.: Bonomic and 
Silvopastoral Implications." Poster at 4th North American Agroforestry Conference, Boise, Idaho, July 
1995. 
"Experience with a Cukto-Length Logging System. " 12th Annual UI Forest Engineering Conference, Moscow, 
Idaho, March 1995. 
"Enhancement of Conifer Production with Hexazinone in the Northern Rocky Mountains." R.J. Boyd, J.M. 
Mandzak, S.D. McLeod, and H.L. Osborne. 2nd International Conference on Forest Vegetation 
Management, Rotorua, New Zealand, March 1995. 
"Enhancement of Conifer Production with Hexazinone in the Northern Rocky Mountains." R.J. Boyd, J.M. 
Mandzak, S.D. McLeod, and H.L. Osborne. Western Society of Weed Science, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 
April 1994. 
"Tractor Mounted Skidding Winches." 1 lth Annual Forest Engineering Conference, Moscow, Idaho, March 
1994. 
"How to Market Woodland Timber Products." Woodland Workshop, Post Falls, ldaho, September 23-24, 
1988. 
"Harvest and Site Preparation Methods to Control Forest Weeds." L. Neuenschwander and H.L. Osborne 
Weed Control for Forest Productivity, a Symposium, Spokane, Washington, February 4-7, 1985. 
"Using Fire as a Site Preparation Tool in Northern ldaho." H.L. Osborne and L. Neuenschwander. Western 
Forestry and Conservation Association 72nd Western Forestry Conference, Sun Valley, Idaho, 1981. 
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PRESENTATIONS TO CLIENTELE GROWS: 
"Manufacturing Logs for Maximum Profit." Scaling and Marketing Private Timber Workshop, Sandpoint. 
Idaho, June 13, 1997. 
"New Technologies and Opportunities in Small Scale Forestry." Private Forest Landowner Workshop, 
Moscow, Idaho, March 26, 1996. 
"Silviculture and Forest ~ a n a ~ e m e n i . "  Forest Products Academy. Mosww, Idaho, March 1994 
"Forestry and Logging in Honduras." Potlatch Lions Club, Potlatch, Idaho, March 1994. 
"Clearcutting is Just Applied Forest EcoIogy." Gold Hill Resource Coalition, Potlatch, Idaho, October 1993. 
"The UI CFWR Experimental Forest." Boy Scout Troop #345, Moscow, Idaho, March 1993. 
.. . . 
"Planting Stock Root Morphology and Root Rot; Preliminary Investigations." T.M. Shaw and H.L. Osborne. 
A presentation to CFWR faculty and staff, Moscow, Idaho, May 13, 1992. 
. . .  
"The UI Experimental Forest, An Education Beyond Books." UI President's Pre-Game Presentation, Moscow, 
Idaho, September 14, 1991. 
"Log Manufacturing and Sealimg." Clearwater R C and D Woodland Workshop, Moscow, Idaho, March 26, 
1991. 
"Log Manufacturing and Scaling." Marketing Woodland Timber Workshop, Lewiston, Idaho, March 14,1990. 
"Forest Management m.d Silviculture." Elderhostel, Wild Co:untry Botonizbg, Clark Fork, Idaho, June 1988. 
"Forest Management and Silviculture." Elderhostel, Wild Country Botoniziig, Clark Fork, Idaho, June 1987. 
"Forest Management and Silvi~~lture." Elderhostel, Wild Country Botonizimg, Clark Fork, Idaho, June 1986. 
"Cost Effective Intensive Management Ideas; T h i i g  for Firewood." Idaho Tree FarmCommittm, Mosww, 
Idaho, 1982. 
TOURS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL FOREST FOR CLIENTELE GROWS: 
# of Tours # of People 
WORKSEOPS PREPARED AND TAUGFlT: 
Small Scale Logging Technology for Management of Idaho State Parks, Potlatch, Idaho, June 24, 1997 
Small Scale Logging Technology at the CFWR Clark Fork Field Campus, Clark Fork, Idaho, June 12, 1997 
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WORKSHOPS PREPARED AND TAUGHT (cont.): 
Potlatch Grade School (4&, 5", 6'" grades), Forestry Days and Tour, Potlatch, Idaho, May 30, 1997 
Small Scale Logging Technology. A Workshop and Field Demonstration for Tribal Forestry Personnel, 
Moscow, Idaho, May 6, 1997. 
Small Scale Logging Technology, Potlatci~, Idaho, June 19, 1996. 
Small Scale Logging ~ech$lo~y,  Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, June 8, 1996. 
Potlatch Grade School (4th, 5th, 6th grades), Forestry Days and Tour, Potlatch, Idaho, May 29, June 4, 1996. 
Northern Rocky Mountain Forest Ecology and SiIviculture: A 6-Week Field Training Internship for 
International Forestry Students. luly-August period, Moscow, Idaho. 
&g # of Students Countries Represented 
1996 10 Austria, Slovenia 
1995 5 Austria 
1994 5 Austria 
I993 7 Austria 
1992 5 Austria 
Logger Education to Advance Professionalism (LEAP), Forest Ecology and Silvicnllure (with D. Ad&). 
Oroiino, Idaho, April 18-19, 1994 
Coeur dlAleue, Idaho, April 11-12, 1994 
McCall, Idaho, April 27-28, 1993 
. . & X P  - - - .  . .. . -~ 
. 
Moscow, Idaho, April 8-9, 1993 
Valby Chipper Demo Day 
Moscow, Idaho, January 22, 1993 
Potlatch, Idaho, h u a r y  15, 1993 
FFA (Future Farmers of America), Forestry Contest, Moscow, Idaho 
June 1997 
June 5, 1996 
June 6, 1995 
June 8, 1994 
June 9, 1993 
June 10, 1992 
June 5, 1991 
June 6, 1990 
Community Forest Stewardship Day, University of Idaho Experimental Forest, Moscow, Idaho 
April 29, 1995 
September 18, 1993 
September 16, 1992 
May 11, 1991 
April 27, 1990 
Cut-to-Length Timber Harvesting Demonstration, Potlatch, Idaho, December 20, 1994 
Koller Yarder Skidding Demo, Potlatch, Idaho, November 18, 1992. 
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WORKSIiOPS PREPARED AND TAUGHT (conk.): 
Robotic Skidder Demo Day, Potlatch, Idaho 
June 4, 1992 
May 27, 1992 
Wood Products Academy, Moscow, Idaho 
August 1991 
August 1990 
Honduras Forestry Field Training Course, a two-month shortcourse for Honduran Foresters, Moscow, Idaho 
August-September 1991, 96 hours of instruction 
August-Septeinber 1990, 85 bours of instnction 
August-September 1989,40 bours of instruction 
Logging Safety and Log Quality, Potlatch Corporation, Headquarters, Idaho, December 17, 1991. 
Idaho Logging Safety Committee, Sandpoint, Idaho, December 10, 1991. 
Water Quality and Timber Management (moderator), Joint Meeting of Inland Empire Soil and Water 
Conservation Society, Moscow, Idaho, November 8, 1991. 
Logging Safety and Log Quality, Konkoville Lumber Company, Orofno, Idaho, April 17, 1991. 
Idaho Logging Safety Committee, McCall, Idaho, March 7, 1991. 
Xow to Objectively Monitor and Elvaluate Timber Harvest Practices (moderator), Moscow, Idaho, February 20, 
1991. 
Log Scaling Workshop, Cottonwood, Idaho, April 1990. 
Idaho Logging Safety Committee, Potlatch, Idaho, March 27, 1990. 
Logging Safety and Log Quality Seminar (Workshop) at Riley Creek Lumber, Sandpoint, Idaho, March 17, 
1990. 
WORKSHOPS PWPARED: 
Moscow Mountain Will Bum Again: F i e  Awareness Workshop, Moscow, Idaho, April 1991. 
Foresr Advisors Workshop, with Bill Love and Ron Maltoney, May 1989. 
GRANTS AND CONTRACTS: 
Awarded: 
Stewardship Interpretive Center - Interpreting the Palouse Land Use and Settlement History. Idaho Humanities 
Council. 1995. $2,925 (Co-investigator). 
Trees on the Palouse. Tree and Shrub Establishment in Southeastern Washington. Palouse Conservation 
District. 1995. $31,000. 
Trees on the Palouse. Tree and Shrub Establishment in Southeastern Washington. Palouse Conservation 
District. 1992. $5,700. 
Logging Safety. U.S. Department of Labor - OSHA. 1992. $133,000 (Co-investigator). 
, < 
" j l  ( 
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GRANTS AND CONTRACTS (cont.): 
Awarded (cont.): 
Adaptive Forestry. Potlatch Corporation. 1992. $2,500 (Co-investigator). 
Sheep Grazing as a Silvicultural Tool in Conifer Plantations. McIntire-Stemis. 1991. $78,002 (Co- 
investigator). 
F a m  Tractor Wmchimg Systems for Woodlot Management.' Clearwater R C & D. 1990. $18,406 (CO- 
investigator). 
Submitted: 
Development of Six Introductory Virtual Courses in Natural Reso*urces (January 1, 1997-December 31 199% 
with Dr. Alton Campbell, et al. Idaho State Board of Education. $135,847. (Decried) 
- 
A Study Tour of Forest Management Practices in the Iutemounkain Northwest U.S. (February 21, 1996), with 
Dr. Charles T. Stiff. Partners for Iuternational Education and Training, Washington, D.C. $42,925. 
(Declined) 
As Major Professor: 
Ilahi, Bakhsh Mali.  Professional Paper: "Fuelwood Scarcity Situation in Pakistan: A4 Overview" 
(M.S., Nan-Thesis, 1994). 
Syed, GhuIam Muhammad. Thesis: "Herbaceous Vegetation Control in a Bareroot and Container-Grown 
Ponderosa Pine Flantation in Noahern Idaho: Economic and Silvopastoral Implications" (M.S., 
1994). 
Raja, Rajiv G. Thesis: "An Evaluation of Tree and Shrub Plantings in the Palouse Region of 
Southeastern Washington" (M.S., 1993). 
Poitevien, Lionel. ..Professional Paper: "A Conifer Regeneration Evaluation of Selected Stands on the 
University of Idaho, College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences Experimental Forest" (M.S., 
Non-Thesis, 1993). 
Worman, Douglas. Thesis: "A Financial Investigation of Integrating F m  Woodland Management into 
the Overall Farm Management Plan" (M.S., 1990). 
Kent, Nicholas. Professional Paper, "Horse Logging a Group Selection Stand in Northern Idaho" (M.F., 
1985). 
As Committee Member: 
Harkins, Kobe. Thesis: "Design Assessments and Implementation of Landscape GIS Data Bases: A 
Case Study of Heyburn State Puk" (M.S., 1997). 
Kerscbbaumsteiner, Willibald. Diplothesis: "Effects of a Timber Sale on Water and Sediment Yields 
from a North Idaho Watershed" (Diploma Thesis at Universityof Bodenwtqr, Viema, Austria, 
1997). 
Schroder, peter. Thesis: "Small Scale Systems for Applications to Overstocked Small-Diameter Stands" 
(M.S., 1996). 
Sepulveda, Norvin E. Professional Paper: "An Integral Environmental Assessment for the East Hatter 
Creek Unit of the University of Idaho Experimental Forest" (M.S., Non-Thesis, 1996). 
Edelen, Walter J. Thesis: "Land Use Management Effects On Headwater Riparian Ecosystems of the 
University of Idaho Experimental Forest" (M.S., 1996). 
Elwell, Brandt. Thesis: "The Significance of Forest Canopy Structure and Species Types on the Effective 
Operation of Global Position Systems" (M.S., 1996). 
MacRae, Steven 1. Thesis: "Effects of Sheep Grazing on Tree Seedlings in a Northern Idaho Conifer 
Plantation" (M.S., 1996). 
Behrens, Michael Allen. Thesis: "Modeling the Ecological Effect. of Timber Harvesting and Fire 
Management on Ponderosa Pine/Douglas-Fir Forests" (M.S., 1995). 
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GRADUATE STUDENTS ADVISED AND COMPLETED (cont.): 
As Committee Member (cont.): 
Dodd, Brady Nicholson. Thesis: "Evaluation of Forest Fire Effects on Snowpack Accumulation and Melt 
in the Fourth of July Creek Drainage of Northwest Montana" (M.S., 1995). 
McCoy, Scott. Thesis: "Performance and Diets of Sheep Grazing Within a Northern Idaho Conifer 
Plantation" (M.S., 1995). 
Whitlach, Heidi L. Thesis: "Evaluation of Adaptive Forestry Techniques in the Inland Northwest" 
(M.S., 1993). 
Poxleimer, David. Thesis: "An Overview of Timber Harvesting Accident Reporting Feedback Loops and 
Existing Safety Programs in the PaciEc Northwest Region" (M.S., 1993). 
Philbiin, Michael. Thesis: "The Influence of Landscape and Stream Characteristics on Large Woody 
Debris Frequency in Clearwater National Forest Headwater Streams" (M.S., 1993). 
Sedney, Damian G. Thesis: "Simnlation of a Log Merchandising and Sorting Yard" (M.S., 1992). 
Bizeau, Jim. Thesis: "Guidelines for Urban Soil Evaluation for Species Selection in Community Forests" 
(M.S., 1991). 
Howard, Dan G. Thesis: "An Analysis of the NIPF Problem and Guidelines for Developing a 
Nonindustrial Private Forest Demonstration Area" (M.S., 1991). 
DeGroot, John Roger. Thesis: "Yield of Ponderosa Pine Seedlings Following Broadcast and Spot 
Hexazinone Applications" (M.S., 1991). 
Carey, Patricia. Thesis: "Skidding and Yarding Options for Smallwood" (M.S., 1987). 
Liu, Yong. Professional Paper: "First Year Growth of Field Planted Chemically Root Pruned 
Containerized Seedlings" (M.S. Non-Thesis, 1987). 
Gregory, Larry C. Thesis: "Design and Results of a Study Concerning Felling and Bucking Errors" 
(M.S., 1986). 
Bloch, Vaiden E. Thesis: "An Experimental Design for Studying the Vibrational Soil Compaction Spread 
Caused by Ground Based Logging Machinery" (M.S., 1985). 
Smith, Gary K. Thesis: "Analysis of Ponderosa Pine Plantations by the Stand Prognosis Model to 
Determine Optimum Stand Density" (M.S., 1983). 
Verner, Eric. Thesis: "Recovery and Processing of Logging Residue on Steep Terrain in Northern 
Idaho" (M.S., 1983). 
Boucher, Joseph H. Professional Paper: "A General Overview of Harvest Schedulmg and Its Application 
to the University of Idaho Experimental Forest" (M.S. Non-Thesis, 1983). 
HONORS AND AWARDS: 
Outstanding Advisor Award, College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences, 1996. 
Outstanding Continuing Education and Service Award, College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences, 1995. 
Alumni Award for Faculty Excellence, University of Idaho Alumni Association, 1995. 
Outstanding Teacher Award, College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences, 1994. 
Outstanding Technical Advisor Award, Clearwater R C & D, Council, Inc., 1990. 
Alumni Award for Excellence, University of Idaho Alumni Association, 1987. 
Communicator of the Year, Society of American Foresters, Inland Empire Society, 1983. 
Outstanding Research Award, College of Forestry, Wildlife and Range Sciences (team of K. Stoszek, P. Mika, 
J. Moore, H. Osbon~e), 1978. 
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RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck ISB No. 3001; Stewart ISB No. 6369 
Atto~neys for Plaintifi/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEFE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF U T A H  
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSmLO ) 
J. WiTZ, wife and wife, Case No. eV2004-000080 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
) 
c o q q ,  AFFIDAVIT OF GERALD E. mITZ 
> 
PlaintiffslCounterdefendants, ) 
vs . 
TODD A GREEN and TONL4 L. ) 
GWEN, wife andwife, 
STESrEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
) 
SILVEmALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 1 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U S BANK N A ,  ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Gerald E. Weitz, being first duly sworn under oath, hereby states as follows: 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this matter, a r i ~  over eighteen (18) years of age, am 
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married to Plaintiff Consuelo J. Weitz ('cmy wife") and make this Affidavit based upon my 
personal knowledge. 
2. I fkequently drive a bulldozer on the roads in our properly, including on wl@ we 
refer to as the "perimeter road" within the Disputed Property, to clear the roads of brush and 
windfall. I did this in October or November, 2002 to clear brush only and did not &den the 
perimeter road at all. Prior to this particular a c t i d ,  my wife and I had no idea that anyone had 
a claim of any kind to the Disputed Property. 
3. The factual. allegations set forth in the Complaint 'iiled February 4, 2004, in this 
action are true to the best of my information and belief and are incorporated into this affidavit by 
this reference. 
4. In early April, 2004, without consultation with my wife who was out of town, as 
part of usual maintenance activity on our propefly, I decided to clean up the area where our fence 
builder had cut saplings by collecting and burning some slash. When my wife returneCa, I told 
her what I had been doing. We discussed the matter and agreed that we would not burn any 
mre slash within the Disputed Property pending the outcome of this litigation. 
5. Since that singular incident in April, 2004, neither I nor my wife nor anyone at 
our direction has burned slash or cut any trees within the Disputed Property and we will re-6-sin 
60m burning slash or cutting any trees within the Disputed Property, except to clear trees that 
fall across the perimeter road, pending the outcome of this litigation 
6 Because of our 27 plus years of constantly driving snowmobiles, four wheelers, 
heavy equipment and other vehicles on the peltmeter road and our need and desire to caretake 
our property and monitor activities on our property, my wife and I intend to drive such vehicles 
on the perimeter road and remove obstacles placed on the perimeter road pending the outcome of 
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this litigation 
7. My wife and I, and our family and friends also have continuously enjoyed 
walking on the perimeter road and intend to do so pending the outcome of this litigation. 
8. My wife and I will cause no damage of any kind to the Disputed Property pending 
the outcome ofthis litigation. 
DATED this 12& day of April, 2005. 
SUl3SCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
4. w 
NOTARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
Residing at Moscow. 
My commission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF S E R W E  
I hereby certify that on this 12" day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 
P.O. BOX 8074 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCEIWAM 
SCEWAM LAW FIRM 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET #6 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[ ]U.S.Mail 
[ 1 Overnight Mail 
I: IFAX 
[ X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ IFAX [ Hand Delivery 
Ro ald J. Landeclc 
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RONALD J. LANDECK 
TRAPPER STEWART 
LAPDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P A. 
414 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Landeck IS% No 3001, Stewart IS% No. 6369 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE3 SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, W AND FOR TNE COUNTY OF U T A H  ' 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, 1 Case No. W2004-000080 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho limited liability ) 
cowany, 1 AFFIDAVIT OF COhTSUELO J. mIT'Z 
) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONLA L 
GIXEEV, husband and wife, 
SlXRTN R SHOOK and MARY E. 
SEVEXNALE SHOOK, DANIAI, T 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C 
CASTLE, and U S BANK N A ,  
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ' ) 
Consuelo J. Weitz, being first duly sworn under oath, hereby states as follows: 
1. I am one of the Plaintiffs in this matter, am over eighteen (18) years of age, am 
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marifed to Plaintiff Gerald E. Weitz ("my husband") and make this Affidavit based upon my 
personal knowledge. 
2. My husband frequently drives a bulldozer on the roads in our property, including 
what we refer to as the "perimeter road" within the Disputed Property, to clear the roads &brush 
and windfall. He did this in October or November, 2002, and shortly thereafter I received a 
telephone call from Defendant Todd Green who complained that my husband had operated 
equipment on Green's property. I told Todd Green that the perimeter road was on our prope~ty. 
This conversation signaled the beginning of our property dispute. 
3. The factual allegations set forth in the Complaint filed February 4,2004, in this 
action are true to the best of my information and belief and are incorporated into this affidavit by 
this reference. 
4. Our attorney, Ron Landeck, received a letter from I&-. Magyari one of 
Defendants' attorneys, dated December 16,2002, a true copy of which is attached hereto as 
Attachment A. 
5. After conferring with Mr. Landeck and upon research being undertaken by him, 
Mr. Landeck stated our position regarding this matter in a letter to Mr. Magyar dated June 19, 
2003, a true copy of which is attached hereto as Attachment B. 
6. In late June, 2003, based upon a ~ont~m~oraneous discussion between Mr. 
Magyar and Mr. Landeck, it was my understanding that Defendants Green were pursuing 
reimbursement ffom the Rogers family, who had sold the Disputed Property (as that term is used 
in the Complaint) to Greens, and that the Greens were not objecting to the exercise of  o w  
property rights to the Disputed Property. Based upon that understanding, discussion with Mr. 
Landeck, and our perceived right to repair and/or replace the fence on our property, in early July, 
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2003, we hired a person to rebuild the fence along the existing fenceline. 
7 In mid-July, 2003, our fence builder, without our express knowledge, did cut some 
crowded saplings, having little or no com~~ercial value, in order to conshuct the fence, installed 
fence posts, conshucted rock "baskets" to solidify the fence and strung wire between posts along 
the course of .the existing fenceline. 
8. In late July, 2003, I observed that someone had totally destroyed the fence 
improvements constructed by our fence builder. 
9 Our attorney then received a letter from Mr. Magyar dated July 28,2003, ahue 
copy of whieb is attached hereto as Attachment C. 
10. On July 28,2003, our fence builder, Dana Townsend, went to the Disputed 
Property to observe the damages to the fence and was met by a a brandishing a han+ who 
declared this was "his property." 
1 1. My husband I have since voluntarily refrained from constiucting the fence or 
having anyone else construct the fence for us. 
12. In the latter past of 2003, someone began to post "No Trespassing" signs within 
the Disputed Pmperty, which I took down. Also, someone placed logs across the perimeter road, 
which I dragged offthe road. Prior to that time there were no barriers or obstacles of any kind 
across the perimeter road In May and June, 2004, we instructed our lawyer to communicate 
concerns regarding use of the Disputed Property to Defendants' attorneys by letter, which he did 
and hue copies of which are attached hereto as Attachments D and E. Attachment D has been 
redacted upon advice of cbunsel. 
13 Although we do not like it and do not think it is right for Defendants to place 'Wo 
Trespassing" signs within the Disputed Property, my husband and I have regained and will 
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refrain from removing "No Trespassing" signs within the Disputed Property pending the 
outcome of this litigation. 
14. I learned in early April, 2004, that my husband, as part of usual maintenance 
activity we undertake on our property, had cleaned up the area where our fence builder had cut 
saplings by collecting and bming some slash. My husband and I then discussed the matter and 
agreed we would not bum any more slash within the Disputed Property pending the outcome of 
this litigation. 
15. Since that singular incident in April, 2004, neither I nor my husband nor anyone 
at om direction has bu~ned slash or cut any trees within the Disputed Property and we will 
refrain from bwning slash or cutting any trees within the Disputed PropeftYs except to clear trees 
that fall across the perimeter road, pending the outcome of this litigation. 
16. Because of our 27 plus years of constantly driving snowmobiles, four wheelers, 
heavy equipment and other vehicles on the perimeter road and our need and desire to caretalce 
our property and monitor activities on our property, my husband and I intend to drive such 
vehicles on the perimeter road and remove obstacles placed on the perimeter road pending the 
outcome of this litigation. 
17. My husband and I, and our family and friends also have continuously enjoyed 
walking on the perimeter road and intend to do so pending the outcome of this litigation. 
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18. My husband and I will cause no damage of any kind to the Disputed Property 
pending the outcome of this litigation. 
DATED this 12& day of April, 2005. 
#. 
Consuelo J. Weitz 
\%%y of April, 2005. SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this -
\,,,\\~i'~~ltt,, 
,- 6 5. wy ///, i d & b J ~  s'~:. - ..Te// NO~ARY PUBLIC for Idaho 
- a; o-iPRY e . 9 5  Residing at Moscow 
=u. + . - - - 
./ . - My commission expires: =x: / 
- .  
. - 
- 
e .  ; .. 
, 
I .. .' 
....... 
\Q \\' 
'%:QTE OF ,\ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
' ~ / / f , , , ,  \ \ \  
I hereby certify that on this /P day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy 
of this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ ]U.S.Mail 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM [ ] Ovanight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ IFAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [$(I Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
514 S O W  POLK STREET #6 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
C IFAX [XI Hand Delivery 
i&da.d4 b- 
Ro ald J. Landeck 
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Attorney at Law 530 south ~sbury Screer post Office Box 8074 MOSQOW, Idaho 83843 
Ttl(208) 882-1906. Fax(208) 88%1908 
Also Via Fm: 208-883-4593 
December 16,2002 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ED 83843 
Re: Property Line Dispute 
Your Client: Weitz 
My Client: Gwen 
Dear Ron: 
This office represents Todd and Tonia Green. It is my understanding from talking with you several 
weeks ago that you have been retained by the W e b  fmify concerning &property line dispute with 
Todd and Tonia Green. It is also my understanding that you were going to scad me aletterregarding 
this matter some time ago. 
I am writing this letter now because I will be out of town from Tuesday, December 17,2002 until 
Friday, January 3,2003, and my clients wanted me to make contact with you prior to my leaving. 
Briefly, this dispute has arisen as follows. After purchasing their property that borders the Weitz 
property to the south, the Greens had it surveyed and had the survey lines marked by Ron Monson, a 
local licensed surveyor. The surveyed l i e  between our clients respective properties lies north of an 
old fence line. I believe that the old fence line consisted of three strands of barbed wire that 
meandered along the top of the ridge. It has not been maintained for many years, and it is difficult ro 
even see the old fence line in most places at this time. Apparently your clients claim that the old 
fence line is the boundary line between their property md tho Oreen's propem. 
My clients and I have discussed this matter at length with the Rogers, who owned the property prior 
to selling it to Todd and Tonia Green. The Rogers have informed us that the old fence line that has 
not been maintained for many years was constructed by Lester Rogers add Tom Rogers, thepreviotis 
owners of the Green property. This old fence was specifically built by the Rogers to keep the R o g e ~  
cattle that they raised at that time fenced in. It is clear to the Rogers that the old fence was 
constfllcted by them as a barrier fence, not a boundary line fence, and that the Rogers never 
considered the old fence as a boundary line fence. The Rogers family always knew where the actual 
boundary h e  between the properties wax located, and it is approximately where the new s w e y  line 
MAGYAR LAW FIRb 
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Ronald J. Zandeck 
December 16,2002 
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is located. It is my understanding that this actual boundary line is evidenced by several monuments 
that are still in evidence at this time. 
Todd e e e n  has had several conversations with you clients about the boundary line, and has 
informed them that he claims ownership of the disputed parcel of land. Your clients have recently 
been using a Cat on the property that my clients claim belongs to them Zhat lies between the old fence 
line and the surveyed line. 1 have contacted your office, and requested that you ask your clients to 
not disrupt any part of the disputed property, pa~ticularly by using heavy equipment on that property. 
Neither you nor your clients have given me or my clients any assurances &at such use and &amption 
will stop. 
As is obvious From the properly survey lines, the Greens are the titled owners of the property that lies 
between the old fence line and the survey line. On behalf of Todd and Tonia Green, I am informing 
you and your clients that your clients are trespassing upon property owned by Todd and ToniaGreen, 
The Greens demand that such trespassing cease and desist immediateIy. My clients intend to hold 
your clientsresponsible for any and all damages to the disputed property. It would seem to be most 
prudent for your clients to cease using heavy equipment on that property until this matter isresolved. 
I suggested to you some time ago that you and I meet with the Rogers' attorney, Bob Brower of 
Lewiston, md the smeyor, Ron Monson, in an efrort to resolve this matter. While I befieve it is a 
good idea for the clients to participate in a joint meeting, 1 think it would be best for just the 
attorneys to meet for an initial meeting. 
My clients would prefer to resolve this matter without the need for litigation. Please contact me after 
you have had an opportunity to review this matter with your clients, and after my return to my ofice 
on January 3,2003. 
This letter is written in an effort to resolve a disputed matter, and i s  not intended to be used for any 
purpose in litigation. 
Sincerely, 
m f i f i ~ a -  
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
c: Todd and Tonia Green 
Bob Brower, Attorney 
Ronald J. Landeck 
James L. Westberg* 
John C. Judge 
Charles L. Graham 
Trapper Stewart 
i i LANDEtr\, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHhd, P. A. 
Attorneys & CounseJors at Law 
A Professional Service Corporation Telephone: (2081883- 1505 
4 14 S. Jefferson Fax: (2081883.4593 
~ o s r  Office Box 9344 E-Mail: attorneys@moscow.com 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-01 17 "Licensed in Idaho and Washington 
June 19. 2003 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
ATTORNEY AT L&W 
P.O. BOX 8074 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
. . 
Re: Weitz/Green 
Dear Bob: 
This firm represents Gerald and Consuelo Weitz in 
connection with the disputed boundary issue raised by your 
clients Todd and Tonia Green. Dr. and Mrs. Weitz are successors 
in interest to Consuelo Weitz's grandfather, Fred J. Schoepflin, 
who acquired the NE 1/4 of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 
West B.M. by Warranty Deed recorded December 13, 1929, under 
Instrument No. 113310, records of Latah County, Idaho (the "NE 
1/4"). See Exhibit A. The NE 1/4 was deeded to Consuelo 
Weitz's parents, Howard and Constance Schoepflin, in 1967. See 
Exhibit B. ,The E 1/2 of the NE 1/4, adjacent to the Green's 
property in the E 1/2 SE 1/4 of said Section 8 (E 1/2 SE 1/4"), 
was deeded by Howard and Constance Schoepflin to Dr. and Mrs. 
Weitz in 1977. See Exhibit C. All Weitz/Schoepflin deeds to 
that portion of the NE 1/4 at issue have been legally described 
by division of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. 
As you noted in your initial letter to me, evidence of a 
fence is visible in the vicinity of the boundary and running the 
entire length between the E 1/2 NE 1/4 and E 1/2 SE 1/4. That 
fence has been in place since at least 1929, and, consistently 
from 1929 through 1972, the Schoepflins kept livestock on the 
E 1/2 NE 1/4 . A perimeter road paralleling the fence and within 
the disputed area has been used and maintained since 1967 first 
by Howard Schoepflin and then by the Weitzes. The road is an 
integral component of an existing private road system on 
Weitz/Schoepflin land that has been continuously used by 
Weitz/Schoepflin for hunting, hiking, motorcycling and 
snowmobiling. Firewood has been harvested from the disputed 
area every year during the Weitzes' ownership. The Rogers never 
protested any of these activities. 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
JUNE 19, 2003 
- 2 - 
In the 1950rs, Fred Schoepflin had the E 1/2 NE 1/4 
selectively logged to the fenceline by Russell Carlson. In 
1991, the Weitzes select cut logs in the E 1/2 NE 1/4 to the 
fenceline and not past. Neither the Rogers nor their 
predecessors in interest protested or disputed the Schoepflins' 
or WeitzesF logging operations in the disputed boundary area. 
The E.1/2 SE 1/4 has been logged twice since 1929 by the Rogers 
or their predecessors to almost clear cut standards to the 
fenceline and not past, the last such logging by the Rogers 
having occurred in the 1980' s . . Aeria.1 photos confirm this 
logging history. 
In November, 1963, Fred Schoepflin and his wife leased a 
site for a \radio receiving and sending" station to Merrill Hart 
for ten (10) years pursuant to a Lease Agreement recorded in 
Book 14, Page 389, Instrument No. 223359, records of Latah 
County, Idaho. See Exhibit D. Mr. Hart concurrently entered 
into an Agreement with Latah County and the City of Moscow to 
construct said station for operation by the Latah County 
Sheriff's Office and the Moscow Police Department, which 
Agreement was recorded in Book 14, Page 391, Instrument No. 
223360, records of Latah County, Idaho. See Exhibit E. A 
structure was then constructed to house and operate that 
station. That structure still exists and is located in the 
disputed area and northerly of the Weitz's perimeter road. The 
Rogers never disputed the Schoepflins' exercise of ownership of 
this area or the radio station use. 
Although there does not appear to be any evidence of the 
actual reason or circumsta~lce for the construction of the fence, 
it is obvious the fence was notsited for purposes of 
convenience as some sections of it traverse steep ground. Had 
the fence merely been placed as an accommodation to neighboring 
property owners to maintain livestock, it would have been placed 
on the relatively flat ridge line (andcloser to the actual 
survey line). The northeast and northwest corners of the 
Rogers' property have been defined by the existing fence-as the 
Rogers' north-south fences on the E 1/2 SE 1/4 intersect the . , 
existing east-west fence. In 1994, the Weitzes installeda blue 
gate and haywire in the easterly portion of the fenceline to 
keep intruders (mostly motorcycles) from trespassing. on. their. .?: 
property. 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
JUNE 19, 2003 
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Under Idaho law, the disputed area belongs to Dr. and Mrs. 
Weitz. This is so because a presumption in favor of boundary by 
agreement exists "where such right has been definitely defined 
by erection of a fence ... on the line followed by such adjoining 
landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such length of 
time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of 
the location." Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 521, , 960 P.2d 
742, 744 (1998); citing Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 365, 
262 P.2d 1006, 1110 (1953). Further, the long existence and 
recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any 
evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original 
location, stronalv suasests that the fence was located as a 
- - - - 
boundary by agreement. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 901, 950 
P.2d 1237, 1240 (1997). 
There is no evidence that the "true boundary" was known 
until the Greens surveyed the property in 2002. Thus the fence 
has served as the "boundary by agreementfT, implied by the 
surrounding circumstances and conduct of the affected property 
owners for a period in excess of 70 years. 
The Weitzes respectfully reject your suggestion that they 
are "trespassersN, as they have owned the disputed area for more 
than 25 years. They will continue to exercise all rights of 
ownership of the area as they have since 1977. They regret that 
the Greens were not informed or knowledgeable about the presence 
of the fenceline, the Weitzesr and their predecessors' historic 
use of the disputed property and the Rogers' and their 
predecessors' longstanding acquiescence to the fenceline as the 
boundary between the E 1/2 NE 1/4 and E 1/2 SE 1/4. However, 
the circumstances as they exist lead only to the conclusion that 
the area being disputed by the Greens belongs to the Weitzes. 
The Weitzes have obtained a surveyed legal description of 
the portions of the Greens' surveyed lots that lie North of the 
fenceline. That area totals 8.57 acres. To settle this matter 
without need of a declaratory action, the Weitzes will quitclaim 
any interest in real property lying southerly of the surveyed 
fenceline in exchange for receiving quitclaim(s) from the owners 
of the Greensi Tracts 1, 2 and 4 for all property lying 
northerly of the surveyed fenceline. 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
( -  
JUNE 19, 2003 
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We look forward to a prompt resolution. Thank you for your 
attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
RJL/maw 
c: Gerald E. and Consuelo Weitz 
07/28/03 10: 52 MRIN STREET PROF $ 2  MOSCOU ID 001 
( '  . i @ 
J 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM Esfablisl~od 1974 69~- 
Robcrt M. Magyar P~RZR Wc&t - Suite 5 
Attorney at Law 530 SO\I~IL nshilry SLFCC~ * POQI n m o e  isox 8074 . MOSCOW, Idaho 83843 
, . 'To1 (208) (182.i906 . 13sx (208) 882-1908 
Yin Fax: 2011-883-4393 
July 28,2003 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attonley at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, lD 83843 
Rc: Pn,pctrty T,ine Dispute 
Your Client: Weitz 
My Cliart: Green 
Dear Ron: 
APparc~ltly our clients 1 1 ~  h e n  COIIS(NC~~II~$ a fencu along the line that they olai~n is die property 
line between their property and the Green's developn~ent. This fence is being buil~ upod ]>rt)])w'ly 
tlmt is dccdcd to Grccns. 
My dicnls would like to at leirst attempi to resolve this dispute by Some type of resolution short ofa 
lawsuit. Ilowever, your clielils' actiods a1.0 ce~tainly not conducive to sctt~crncnl. 
Once again my clients ask that your clinlts cease such activity, at least rlntil such lirni: as Wc: can 
atccmpt to rcsolvc this matter by agreement. 
Sincerely, 
c: Todd and Tonia Green 
Bob Bmwer, Attorctcy 
Ronald J. Landeck 
James L. Westberg" 
John C. Judge 
Charles L. Graham 
Trapper Stewart 
i"' r' 
LAND, -,K, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRA: M, P.A. 
Attorneys & Counselors at Law 
A Professional Service Corporation Telephone: (2081883- 1505 
4 14 S. Jefferson Fax: (2081883-4593 
Post Office Box 9344 E-Mail: attornevs@moscow.corn 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0 1 17 "Licensed in Idaho and Washington 
May 13, 2004 
ANDREW M. SCHWAM 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
514 SOUTH POLK STREET # 6  
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 8074 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
Re: Weitz et al. v. Green et al., 
Latah County Case No. CV2004-000080 
During the aforementioned telephone call, Andy and I 
discussed some potential "ground rules" for use of the Disputed 
Property during this litigation. Since then, it has come to my 
attention that someone placed barriers on the perimeter road, 
whlch road originates on my clientsf property and traverses the 
Dlsputed Property. It is my understanding that someone also 
placed "no trespassing" signs in various places within the 
Disputed Property. We have assumed your clients either 
authorized or did these things. Dr. and Mrs. Weitz have lived 
on their property since 1977, have used the perimeter road on a 
consistent basis during that time and have never encountered 
obstructions or signs in the Disputed Area. We request 
informally that your clients remove the roadway obstructions and 
the recently placed signage. We know that they dispute the 
ownership of this property, but their present, belated actions 
serve no useful purpose at this juncture, rather they may lead 
to unnecessary legal proceedlngs. 
(' 
Andrew M. Schwam 
Robert M. Magyar 
May 13, 2004 
- 2 - 
My clients have agreed not to conduct any slash burning, 
bush or tree cutting and/or any other similar activities in the 
Disputed Property while we litigate this matter. My clients do 
want the right, to which we believe they are entitled either by 
ownership or by easement, to travel the perimeter road either on 
foot, by horse or by motorized vehicle. They will not cause any 
damage to the perimeter road and will maintain it in the same 
excellent condition they have for the past 27 plus years. 
My clients also want to enter into an agreement with your 
clients that experts and/or witnesses from both sides have a 
right of access to the Disputed Property for purposes of 
observation and preparation for trial of this matter. Any such 
access would occur with no damage to or alteration of the 
terrain. 
Your thoughts on the matter will be appreciated. I look 
forward to hearing from you. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A. 
RJL/maw 
c: Gerald E. and Consuelo J. Weitz 
Weitz & Sons, LLC 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
Attorneys & Counselors at  Law 
Ronald J. Landeck A Professional Service Corporation Telephone: /208/883- 1505 
James L. Westberg * 4 14 S. Jefferson Fax: (208)883-4593 
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PlaintiffslCounterdefendants (hereafter collectively "Weitz"), by and through their attorneys 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., respectfully submit this Memorandum in Opposition to 
the Application for Preliminary hjunction filed by DefendantsICounterplaintifi Green et a1 
(hereafter collectively "Greens"). The Cowt should deny the Greens' Application because they 
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have not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Counterclaim, nor have 
they establishedthat immediate irreparable harm will result if the Court denies their Application 
I. n\naaA;L OBmCTIONS 
Weitzs object to the factual allegations in Greens' Memorandum in Support of Application 
for Tempomy Restraining Ordw, and the 'Zxhibits" thereto, because the allegations and exhibits 
are without foundation for personal knowledge or authenticity, and do not cite to and are not 
supported by any affidavits or other evidence in the record The Court should disregard those 
allegations in deciding this matter 
Weifzs also object to the Affidavits of Steven R Shook and Todd A Green in their 
entireties The Affidavits do not provide foundation for personal knowledge, lack sufficient 
specificity regarding the time and place of the alleged acts contained therein, and lack sUmtSient 
specificity regarding the generalized acts alleged therein. The Affidavits are wholly insufficient to 
peimit the Court to rely upon them in making a decision The Affidavils therefore fkil to present 
admissible evidence, and the Weitzs move to strike the Affidavits in their entirety 
Finally, the Affidavits of Steven R Shook and Todd A Green fail to allege, or set forth any 
foundation for personal knowledge to allege, that the Weitzs in any way caused the alleged general 
types of damage set forth therein The affidavits fail to allege that any damages have occurred 
during the pende~lcy ofthis lawsuit The affidavits fail to allege any factual basis for finding that 
the alleged damages amount to irreparable harm The affidavits simply allege the affiants 'believe" 
future damages will occur This is not sufficient or reliable evidence upon which the Court may 
grant a preliminary injunction 
BRTEF TN RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PRELlNlHARY INJUNCTION - 2 
TI. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD 
At the most, the Greens only seek a preliminary injunction under subsections (I), (2), and 
(3)  of I.R.C.P. 65(e). 
Idabo Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e)(l)-(e)(3) set forth the basic requirements a party 
must prove when seeking a preli&ary injunction. The Idaho Courts have fxther deked the 
Greens' burden of proof, holding a preliminary injunction may be granted only when the party 
seeking it proves a substantial likelihood of success on the merits at hid and when irreparable 
harm is imminent. Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,518 (1984); Farm Seiv. v. Unites 
States Steel Corp., 90 Idaho 570,587 (1966). Although the subsections ofRule 65(e) do not all 
contain the phrases "substantial likelihood of success on the merits at trial" and "irreparable 
harm is imminent," these requirements truly do apply to all injunctions. The judicial gloss on 
preliminary injunctions, reflected in cases cited below, crosses the boundaries between those 
specific subsections in announcing that substatitid lilcelihood of success and irreparable ha& are 
required for all injunctions (and for temporary resh'aining orders, in some ofthe cases). This 
conclusion is supported by the historical approach to injunctions, which has always required 
these elements. E.g. Evans v. Distlict Couvt, 47 Idaho 267,270 (1929) ("injunction is granted 
only in extreme cases where the right is vely clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow 
from its refusal.") 
Proof of a "substantial likelihood ofsuccess" is "necessary to demonstrate that appellants 
are entitled to the relief they demanded" Id. "One who seeks an injunction has the burden of 
proving aright thereto." Harris, 106 Idaho at 518. The party seeking injunction must make "a 
showing of a clear right thereto." Fumz Seiv., 90 Idaho at 587. 
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The requisite showing of a substantial likelihood of success "cam~ot exist where complex 
issues of law or fact exist which are not fi-ee fi-om doubt " Eihrris, 106 Idaho at 518 
A preliminary injunction is granted "only in extreme cases where the right is very clear 
and it appears that irreparable injury will flow &om its refusal." Id. 
m. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON TEZE: m m i s  
AT TRIAL 
The Greens have shown no substantial likelihood of success on the merits of.their 
~ounterclaim. Although the Counterclaim is somewhat unclear, it appears the Greens allege 
claims for common law trespass, statutory trespass under Idaho Code section 6-202, and slander 
of title (pursuant to the Order Permitting DefendantsICounterplaintiffs to Amend Counterclaim): 
A. Analysis common to all of Greens' causes of action. 
A11 of the Greens' causes of adtion depend on a finding that the Weitzs are not entitled to 
have title to the disputed property quieted in them or otherwise have access to it. The Green's 
causes of action are likely to fail, and therefore have no substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits. 
The doctrine of boundary by agreement is well established and has long been recognized ' 
in Idaho, to "preclude a controversy that will involve rights that have been unquestioned for a 
generation." Wells v. Williarnson, 118 Idaho 37; 40 (1990); Bayhouse v. Urquidar, 17 Idaho 286, 
298 (1909). 
The elements of a boundary by agreement are: 1) an uncertain or disputed boundary; and 
2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. Wells, 118 Idaho 37,41; Dreher v. Powell, 120 
Idaho 715,717-718 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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Uncertain or disputed boundary: 
The Greens argue that, because some evidence of historical surveys allegedly existed 
near the boundaries at issue, no uncertainty or dispute existed.   ow ever, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has specifically rejected this argument: 
ignorance as to what is later deemed the true boundary constitutes the requisite 
uncertainty. 
. . . .  
[wlhether the correct boundary lux is ascertainable elsewhere, via surveys or 
subdivision plats, is irrelevant; the proper inquiry revolves about what the parties, 
at the time of their agreement, actually knew. 
Mowissq v. Halq, 124 Idaho 879,873 (1993). 
_ -The G-reen's Memorandum appears to rely heavily upon the fact that the deeds use 
section line descriptions. This is similarly irrelevanl where the parties did not have actual 
knowledge of the true positions of the section lines on the ground. GrzFeZ v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 
397,400 (2001). 
Agreement fixing the boundary: 
The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surrounding 
circumstances and conduct of the parties. Wells, 118 Idaho at 41. A long period of acquiescence 
by one party to another party's use of the disputed property is a factual basis %om which an 
agreement can be Liferred. Wells, 118 Idaho at 41. in this case, such an agreement between the 
Weitzs and Greens and their respective predecessors is more than infmed, it ispresmed 
Moreover, such an agreement is presumed to arise between neighbors: 
Where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence followed by 
such adjoining landowners treating the fence as fixing the boundary for such 
length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its 
location. 
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Dreher, 120 Idaho at 718 (emphasis added) (quoting Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359 
(1953)); accord Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 521,523,960 P.2d 742,744 (1998); citing 
Edgeller v. Jolnzston, 74 Idaho 359,365,262 P.2d 1006, 11 10 (1953). Further, the long . 
existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the 
mannev or circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located as 
a boundasy by agreement. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,901,950 P.2d 1237,1240 (1997). 
The Weitzs evidence to be admitted at trial will show that the actual location of the 
boundary was uncei-tain and that the constsuction of the fence circa 1929 and the suibsequent 
pattern of use of the respective properties is evidence of an implied agreement flowing &om the 
circumstances and conduct of the parties See Gnfel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397,34 P.3d 1080 
(2001). 
Oefendants take the position that a boundary by agreement is not justified because the 
fence has not been maintained. Such a predicate, however, is not necessary to fkd a boundary 
by agreement. The legal requirement is that there be a "long period of acquiescence by one paty 
to another party's use of the disputed property. . ." Grzflel at p. 400, citing Wells v. Williamson, 
118 Idaho 37 at 41,794 P.2d 626 at 630 (1990). 
Idaho cases do not impose a reqzcireinent that a fence be maintahed forever, rather the 
praecmption of boladary by agseement arises wi!h the ''10~s existence and recognition of a fence 
as abomidary." Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 521 at 523,960 P.2d 742 at 743 (1998) citing 
Edgellw v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953). In Edgeller, at the time 
the boundary dispute arose, the subject fence was "in a bad state of repair." Id. at 362. The court 
determined that the doctrine of boundary by qseement was nonetheless applicable "where such 
right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or other monument on the line followed 
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by adjoining land owners treating it as k i n g  the boundary for such length of time that neither 
ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location." Id at 365. 
In Gvyel, the boundary had been established by a fence that mlas latex removed as a result 
of fkming operations. The Gnffel Court found that the "mutual recognition of the f-ng lines 
and the occupation and cultivation by each party up to the lines" supported the District Court's 
hoIding that the farming lines establisl~ed a boundary by agreement. 
In the instant case, the old fence or evidence of the old fence is visible thughout  the 
course of the parties' cotmnon boundary and the parties have respected the old fenceline as the 
bounda~y for appl-oximately 75 years. The parties have occupied and logged (analogous to 
cultivating) the property up to the boundary line established by the old fence for that length of 
time Under these circumstances and conduct a boundary by agreement is implied. 
The Greens place reliance on the facts of Cox v. Clanton and argue the holding in this 
case should be the same as that case. However, Cox is distinguishable because the party seeking 
application of boundary by agreement in Cox "never treated the fence as the boundaiy to the 
property." Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495 (2002) (emphasis'added). In this case, all parties 
treated the fence line as the boundary for at least a generation. Hermann v. Woorlan, 107 Idaho 
916,920 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that where "there is no evidence presented as to who 
conshucted the fence or what knction the fence was originally to serve," and acquiescence has 
been shown, it is presumed the fence was constructed as a boundary) (citing BeneficiaILifeZins 
Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,241 (1954)) 
B. Additional analysis related to statutory trespass. 
Even if the Greens could establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of 
their c la i i  that the Weitzs allegedly trespassed on their property and allegedly removedtrees, 
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they have not alleged and cannot show the requisite inens rea to state a cause of action uuder 
Idaho Code section 6-202. "Although not stated in the statute, I.C. 5 6-202 applies only where 
the alleged trespass is shown to have been willful and intentional." Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 
124 Idaho 629,639 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that this rule is true even "where the defendant 
wrongfidly enters upon the plaintiffs property or cuts his trees, but the defendant's trespass is 
neither willful or intentional," but is only negligent); Earl tr firdice, 84 Idaho 542, 545 (1962). 
Greens have not alleged and cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the issue 
of willful or intentional trespass. 
IV. IRREPARABLE RARM 
Greens must show imminent irreparable harm. Farm Sew. v. Unites States Steel Covp., 
90 Idaho 570,587 (1966). In this case, the Plaintiffs c'annot show that irreparable harm will 
r d t  i?om tbis Court's r e h a 1  to issue a preliminary injunction. "It is dear that mere financial 
injury does not constitute irreparable harm if adequate compensatory relief will be available m 
the course of litigation." Lucasey Mfg COT. v. Anchor PndIntemtional, Inc, 698 P. -Supp. 
190, 192 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Samyson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 89-90,94 S. Ct. 937 (1974)). 
The following considerations demonstrate Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate irreparable hzum 
The decision on irreparable harm must be made in the context of the "status-quo" rule. In 
the particular case of real property matta ,  .an injunction is appropriate "to preserve the property in 
status quo pending final judgment." Farm Sew., 90 Idaho at 586. The status quo, as it has been 
for over 70 years, is that the Weitz and their predecessors have enjoyed h l l  use of the disputed 
property and exercised responsible stewardship over the disputed property, and all the parties and 
their predecessors have viewed the old fence line as the boundary. That is the status quo to be 
preserved, and if any injunction is to be entered, it should secure in the Weitzs the right to 
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continue using the property as they have foi- over a generation. 
The Weitzs have not and will not cause any damage to the disputed property. As they 
have agreed with the Greens, the Weitzs will not conduct any logging or firewood-cutting 
activity dufing the pendency ofthis lawsuit. They plan to continue entering the disputed 
property to monitor its status and maintain their stewardship ofthe 1x114 as they and their 
predecessors have done for a generation. They will continue to remove obstacles that 
occasionally appear in the access roads they use for these activities, in the least disruptive 
manner possible. No irreparable harm to the Greens has taken place or will take place. 
V. GREENS MUST POST A SIGNTFlCANT BOND 
1.R.C P. 65(c) requires that, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the Greens 
provide security "for the payment of such costs and damages including reasonable attorney's 
fees . . as may be incmed or suffered by any party who is Found to have been wrongfU1Iy 
enjoined or restrained." 
In this case, the bond must be for the total amount of attorney fees, costs, and damages 
the Weitzs anticipate they will incur through trial This is because I.R.C.P. 65(c) provides an 
independent basis for the award of attorney fees to a party wrongfilly enjoined, even if the 
injunction is not challenged at a separate pretrial proceeding and its wrongfulness is only 
discovered after trial. McAtee v. Faulknev Land & Livestock, 113 Idaho 393,399-400 (Ct. App. 
1987). Rule 65(c) allows the amount of the fees and costs awarded to include those incurred in 
going to trial "if legal services necessary to defend the merits of the case were identical to 
services perfoi~ned in dissolving a restraining order." Duwant v. Chvistenseiz, 117 Idaho 70,73 
(1 990). 
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As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in McAtee: 
Where the work performed to obtain dissolution of a restraining order or 
preliminary injunction is the same as that perfoimed to defend against a claim on 
its merits, there is no basis to segregate recoverable fees from nonrecoverable fees 
under Rule 65(c). Accordingly, we hold that the rule allows recovely of attorney 
fees without forcing the wrongfully restrained party somehow to distinguish 
among services that are t d y  indistinguishable. 
McAtee v. Fnulknev Land &Livestock, 113 Idaho 393,400 (Ct. App. 1987). In this ease, the 
Greens have asked for an evidentiary hearing, with live testimony, at which all the evidentiary 
issues embraced in the Complaint and Counterclaim must be addressed. They are asking to put 
the Weitzs.to their full proof. When, after trial, the Weitzs prevail and any preliminary 
injunction is dissolved, the work will be indistinguishable 
The Weitzs anticipate the total attorney fees, costs and damages, including expert witness 
costs, to contest the preliminary injunction and proceed through trial will total approximateIy 
$50,000 If the Court intends to enter an injunction, the Court should require the Greens to post 
a bond in that amount 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Co-nrt should deny the Greens' Application for a preliminary injunction, should order 
that the status quo be maintained by the Weitzs caring for and entering upon the disputed property 
as they have for a generation Alternatively, if the Court plans to grant the Greens' Application, it 
should require the Greens to post a bond in the amount of $50,000 
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DATED this 1 2 ~ ~  day of April, 2005. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE 
& GRAHAM, P.A. 
Atto eys for lfit Plaint~ffs-Counterdefendants 
I. hereby certify that on this 12" day of April, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR [ ]U.S.Mail 
MA-GYAR LAW FIRM [ ] Overnight Mail 
530 SOUTH ASBURY STREET, SUITE 2 [ IFAX 
P.O. BOX 8074 [ X] Hand Delivery 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
ANDREW M. SCEFWAM [ ] U.S. Mail 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM [ ] Overnight Mail 
514 SOUTH POLK S T E E T  #6 [ IFAX 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 [ XI Hand Delivery 
Ron d J. Landeck ? 
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MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar K1667 
530 South AS& St. - Suite 5 
j P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
A a d ~ w  Schwam #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
W THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI% 
STATE OF IDAHO. j[N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 
ADDENDUM TO 
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
v. 1 DEFENDANTS - COUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
1 APPLICATION FOR A 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) PRELIMWARY INJUNCTION 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and M A R Y  E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) ADDITIONAL CASE LAW 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
Defendants. 1 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
husband and wife, and DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE, ) 
husband and wife, 
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G E M D  E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
i J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
) 
Counterdefendants, ) 
Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (herein sometimes relerred to as Green) submit the following 
Addendum to their Memorandum in Support of their Application for a Preliminary Injunction 
against Plaintiffs - Counterdefer~da~~ts (herein sometimes referred to as Weitz), providing the 
following additional case law to the Court. 
Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492; 50 P.3d 987,2002. 
Kimball v. Turner, 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 196,; 933 P. 2d 303, 1999. 
Broadhead v. Hawley, 109 Idaho 952; 712 P. 2d 653,1985. 
Bryant v. Blevins, 9 Cal4"47: 884 P. 2d 1034, 1994. 
Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho 265; 281 P. 2d 483. 
Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397; 34 P. 3d 1080. 
In addition to the above cases, Defendants - Counterplaintiffs submit color copies of Exhibit 
Number 6 to their Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Iiljunctio1l(4 pages). 
DATED this 12 '~  day of April, 2005. 
/7m fiPyy-- 
Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney for Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (Green) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on this 12Ih day of April, 2005,I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR PRELlMINARY 
INJUNCTION to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ronald 3. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
n&h+ 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) US. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
01 Hand Delivery 
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137 Idaho 492; Cox v. Clanton; 50 P.3d 987 
. . , . . . . . page 492 .......... . . . . . .  -.: ...... , 
Michael G. COX and Jennifer Cox, husband and wife, Terry Maupin and Mindy Maupin, husband and 
wife, ~laintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, v. Peggy CLANTON, Thelma Anderson, and Teresa 
IOrusell, married women dealing with their sole and separate property, Defendants-Counterclaimants- 
Third Party Complainants-Respondents. v. Deelane Maupin, and Justin Maupin and Jane Doe Maupin, 
husband and wife, Third Party Defendants-Appellants. 
[Cite as Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 4921 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
Boise, May 2002 Term. .. 
No. 27020. 
July 2,2002. 
Neighbors filed quiet title action against title holders, alleging theories of boundary by agreement 
and boundary by acquiescence. The District Court, Seventh Judicial District, Jefferson County, Brent J. 
Moss, J., quieted title in title holders. Neighbors appealed. The Supreme Court, Kidwell, J., held that no 
express or implied agreement to treat barbed-wire fence as a boundary existed. 
Affirmed. 
Just Law Office, Idaho Falls, for appellants. Charles C. Just argued. 
Hopkins, Roden, Croclcett, Hansen & Hoopes PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Teresa L. Sturm 
argued. 
KIDWELL, Justice; 
The Coxes and the Maupins purchased property and made improvements upon land they believed 
they owned. A subsequent survey of the property revealed that the appellanls did not own the land; the 
respondents held title to the disputed property. The appellants filed a quiet title action, and the district 
court quieted title in the respondents. The appellants appeal. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The plaintiffs bought parcels of land in separate purchases from Merlin Sharp (Sharp). Terry and 
Mindy Maupin purchased land from Sharp in December of 1998; the Coxes' purchase occurred in 
February of 1999. Sharp had acquired the land from his parents in 1996, and his parents apparently had 
acquired it from Julius Carsten who owned it for approximately thirteen years. The plaintiffs were given 
recorded deeds to the property. 
The defendants received their property by a recorded deed on May 11, 1999, from their mother, Nina 
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i Anderson. Nina and her husband Warren owned the land since 1956, acquiring it from Martin Anderson. In 1967, Warren hastily erected a fence on their property to contain cattle. It is in substantially the same 
condition as it was then, consisting of evenly-spaced steel fence posts with three or four strands of 
barbed wire connecting them, and is still used lo contain cattle. After observing the property, the district 
court determined that the land on either side of the fence was "indistinguishable." 
The plaintiffs believed that the fence represented the boundary between the properties. Acting under 
that belief, they graded and graveled a road, bridged a canal, removed trees, and dug a trench in which 
power and cable lines were placed. These improvements were made in conjunction with the construction 
of two homes, one for Terry's brother, DeeLane Maupin, and one for DeeLane's son, Justin Maupin. 
Only after having the land surveyed did the plaintiffs realize that the fence did not represent the 
boundary line contained in the recorded deeds, and that the improvements had been made on land they 
did not own. 
The plaintiffs notified the defendants of the problem; prior to that, the defendants were unaware of 
any improvemelits on the land because they rented the land to ranchers. The parties were unable to reach 
a compromise on the approximately one-acre strip of land in dispute, and plaintiffs filed an action to 
quiet title. The defendants counterclaimed and filed a thirdparly complaint against DeeLane, Justin, and 
his family for trespass, conversion, and to quiet title. Both sides filed cross motions for summary 
judgment supported by briefs and affidavits. Plaintiffs argued that the boundary line should be the fence 
line, based on the theories of boundary by acquiescence, boundary by agreement, adverse possession, or 
estoppel. Defendants argued that the boundary lines in all of the recorded deeds should stand, and that 
the elements required for the above-mentioned theories were not established. Nina testified as to the 
circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence, stating that the fence was put up hastily to contain 
cattle. She stated that she and her family had used the land outside the fenced land and had not treated it 
as a boundary to the property. She further stated that there was never an agreement or acquiescence on 
her part with former neighboring predecessors in interest to change the boundary lines provided in the 
recorded deeds. 
On August 8,2000, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The 
court found no evidence in the record of an agreement or acquiescence between the parties or their 
predecessors in interest to treat the fence as a common boundary. The court found that the plaintiffs had 
not established the required elements of the theory of boundary by agreement or boundary by 
acquiescence. Appellants filed this timely appeal on October 20,2000. 
STAlaTDARPP OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is ilo genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When reviewing an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard used by the district court originally ruling on 
the motion." Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living Sew., 136 Idaho 835, 838,41 P.3d 263,266 (2002) 
(citing S. GrifJin Constr., Inc. v. City oflewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). Where 
the facts are undisputed and the district court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, "summary 
judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Id. 
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ANALYSIS 
A. The District Court Did Not E r r  By Finding That Appellants Had Not Established Boundary 
By Agreement Or Boundary By Acquiescence. 
Appellants contend that the district court erred by quieting title in the respondents. Their position is 
based on the premise that the theories of boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence are 
different, but related theories. Although Idaho case law treats the two theories interchangeably, 
appellants respectfully assert that the two theories should be separate, as they each have different 
necessary elements. The appellants cite to treatises and cases from other jurisdictions to support their 
position that acquiescence should not be considered an element of boundary by agreement. The 
appellants urge this Court to recognize boundary by acquiescence as a separate theory because public 
policy has caused a shift away from the necessity of an agreement and towards more equitable concepts 
such as good faith and fair dealing. Appellants argue they have established boundary by acquiescence 
based on the facts that the fence had been erected in 1967 and had not been moved since that time, and 
that the appellants and their predecessors in interest had all believed the fence to be the boundary. 
Additionally, appellants contend that they have also met the requirements for boundary by agreement 
under current Idaho case law. 
"In Idaho, the phrase 'boundary by acquiescence' is often used interchangeably with 'boundary by 
agreement,' although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine." Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 
397,400,34 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2001) (citing Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,950 P.2d 1237 (1997)). 
"To prove boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundaiy and a subsequent 
agreement fixing the boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the 
surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties." Id. (citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41, 
794 P.2d 626,630 (1990); EdgelZer v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006 (1953)). "[Tlhe long 
existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or 
circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located as a boundary by 
agreement." Cameron, 130 Idaho at 901,950 P.2d at 1240 (citing Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Wakamatsu, 
75 Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830,835 (1954)). "Acquiescence is merely regarded as competent evidence 
of the agreement." Griffel, 136 Idaho at 400,34 P.3d at 1083 (citing Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 
117,268 P.2d 351 (1954)). "[AJn agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or implied, is 
essential to a claim of boundary by acquiescence." Id. at 401,34 P.3d at 1084 (citation omitted). 
In the present case, the district court found that, prior to the survey, none of the parties or their 
predecessors in interest knew the exact location of the boundary lines. Although the first element 
necessary to prove boundary by agreement was met, the district court found that there was no evidence 
in ihe record to support the appellants' contention that the fence line constituted a subsequent agreement 
or acquiescence by the parties or,that there was an absence of evidence regarding the circumstances of 
the fence's original location. In fact, the opposite was true-a previous owner, Nina, provided evidence of 
the circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence, which demonstrated that the fence was hastiIy 
put up to contain cattle. Her testimony showed that the purpose of the fence was not to establish a 
boundary between the properties. She stated that no agreement existed between the Anderson family and 
the neighboring landowners to treat the fence line as the boundary. 
Appellants urge this Court to adopt the theory of boundary by acquiescence as a separate theory that 
does not require the element of an agreement. However, Idaho case law demonstrates that an agreement, 
either express or implied, must exist to establish a boundary by agreement or acquiescence. Although 
the actual boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the existence of an express or 
implied agreement to treat the fence as the boundary. Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the 
time they were malcing the improvements, the fence was still being used to contain cattle; appellants 
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knew this because they damaged the fence while working, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified that 
her family used the land outside the fence to access recreation areas and that her family never treated the 
fence as the bowdary to the property. Affidavits from predecessors in interest submitted by the 
appellants also do not reveal any express or implied agreement to treat the fence as a boundary. 
The district court found that the appellants had not established that an express or implied agreement 
existed or that the parties or their predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence representing the 
boundary between the properties. We affirm the district court's decision. 
B. The Parties Are Not Entitled To Attorney Pees On Appeal Pursuant To LC.ss 12-120(3) or 
12-121. 
All of the parties have requested attorney fees on appeal. The appellants have requested attorney fees 
on appeal pursuant to I.C. s 12-121. The respondents have requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
LC. 12-120(3) or 12-121. 
. 
An award under I.C. s 12-120(3) is justified only if a "commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the lawsuit." Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 
345, 349 (1990). In Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,663,962 P.2d 1041, 
1047 (1998), this Court declined to award attorney fees under LC. s 12-120(3). Sun Valley Hot Springs 
Ranch, Inc. involved a dispute over ownership of real property, and this Court held that it did not "fall 
within the meaning of a commercial transaction ...." Id. This case mirrors Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, 
Inc. Therefore, attorney fees on appeal are not awarded to the respondents under s 12-120(3). 
An award of attorney fees under LC. s 12-121 is proper only when the case was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Northwest Bec-Corp. v. Home Living Sewice, 136 Idaho 835, 842, 
41 P.3d 263,270 (2002) (citing Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,630,903 P.2d 1321, 1327 
(1995)). The appellants' argument was based on their good-faith belief that the fence line represented the 
boundary line between the properties. Their position that boundary by agreement and by acquiescence 
are two separate, yet related, doctrines was supported by case law and treatises. This Court is not left 
with the abiding belief that the appellants pursued their claim frivolously or without foundation. 
Therefore, attorney fees on appeal are not awarded to the respondents under I.C. s 12-121. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants have not established the required elements of boundary by agreement. This Court 
affirms the decision of the district court quieting title in the respondents. No attorney fees on appeal are 
awarded. Costs to respondents. 
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SCHROEDER, WALTERS and EISMANN concur. 
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CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants challenged decision of the District Court of Lincoln 
County (Wyoming) denying them title to six of seven acres they sought via adverse possession. 
OVERVIEW: Appellants erected their house near a fence, which appellants wrongly believed 
marked the southern boundary o f  their land. Upon learning of error, appellants filed quiet title 
action against appellees, seeking decree that appellants had acquired title to disputed land via 
adverse possession or, alternatively, via doctrine of recognition and acquiescence. Trial court 
denied bulk of appellants' claim, granting appellants title to only one of seven acres they 
sought; an appeal followed. On appeal, state supreme court affirmed, reasoning that (a) fence 
was one o f  convenience rather than putative property boundary, as parties regularly 
disregarded fence, and thus could not be relied upon in an adverse possession claim; and (b) 
mere fact that appellants were entitled to one acre on which their house now resided was not  
dispositlve as to remaining six acres, since house constituted hostile possession whereas joint 
use of other six acres did not. 
OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed; appellants could not claim title to  the disputed six acres, as 
fence on property was for convenience only, neither side in dispute treating it as a boundary 
between the properties. 
CORE TERMS: fence, adverse possession, convenience, express agreement, acquiescence, parcel, 
acre, disputed property, hostile, tract, actual notice, disputed, permissive, adversely, boundary line, 
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OPXNXON: [*304] LEHMAN, Chief Justice. 
The descendants of Rawsel Turner (Rawsel) are quarreling over 7.3 acres of family ground. Although 
the 7.3 acre parcel was homesteaded by Rawsel's son. Deloss Turner, it is enclosed within a fence 
erected by Rawsel. Rawsel's successon in interest sought to quiet title in the property by adverse 
possession or, in the alternative, asserted that the property boundary had been altered by recognition 
and acquiescence. The district court rejected both theories, finding that the fence was not a boundary 
fence, but one of convenience. Because we conclude that the district court's finding is not clearly 
erroneous, we affirm. 
ISSUES 
Appellants present four issues for our review: 
1. Whether the Court committed error in granting the Plaintiffs only part of the disputed 
property. 
2. Whether the [ * *2 ]  Court committed error in finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the 
requirements to establish a boundary by implied acquiescence. 
3. Whether the Court committed error in finding that the Plaintiffs did not fulfiil the 
requirements for adverse possession. 
4. Whether the Court committed error in finding that the fence in question was a fence of 
convenience. 
Appellees accept the first three issues as stated by the appellants, but rephrase the fourth issue in 
this manner: 
Whether the trial court committed error in finding "that the facts and circumstances of 
this case are not equivalent to an express agreement to make the fence the boundary 
line." 
FACTS 
I n  1915, Rawsel Turner received a United States patent to 78 acres in Lincoln County near Bedford. 
Sometime between 1915 and 1920, Rawsel erected a fence in the vicinity of the southern boundary 
of his property. Actually, the fence was located beyond the southern boundary of Rawsel's land, and 
it enclosed approximately 7.3 acres of land which was then owned by the United States Forest 
Service. I n  1929, Rawsel's son. Deloss Turner, received a patent to  the Forest Service land 
immediately south of Rawsel's. [**3] Since this time, the fence has been maintained in the same 
location. 
Over the years, the Rawsel and Deloss properties were passed down among the Turners. Rawsel's 
land was eventually conveyed to his son Clifford Turner. Clifford and his wife Ruth have, in turn, 
passed it on to their children. In  1983, Clifford and Ruth deeded an acre of land in the southwest 
corner of their property to their daughter Carol Lucy [*SO51 Downes. Believing the fence to 
constitute the southern boundary. Mrs. Downes and her husband placed their home on the now 
disputed property. The appellants in this case, Beverly Kimball (Clifford and Ruth Turner's oldest 
daughter) and her husband George are fee owners of a majority of the parcel homesteaded by 
Rawsel. 
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I n  the meantime, Deloss' land was also passed down through the generations. The appellees, Lowell 
Turner (Deloss' son) and his wife Opal currently own most o f  the land homesteaded by Deloss. When 
Lowell and Opal decided to convey parcels to their children for them to build on, a survey was 
required. At this time, around 1992, the surveyor noticed the fence was not located on the property 
boundary. Other surveys followed, and the parties eventually learned that [**4] the fence enclosed 
7.391 acres of largely undeveloped land located within Lowell and Opal Turner's property description. 
The property in question is partially forested and rises steeply to the east. 
When Lowell and his son Kory Turner began erecting a fence on the true property line, the Kimballs 
and Carol Downes instituted this action. They first requested, and were granted, a restraining order. 
At the same time, the Kimballs and Downes sought to quiet title to the disputed 7.3 acres, claiming 
the property by adverse possession. I n  the alternative, they ciairned that the fence had altered the 
boundary under the doctrine of recognition and acquiescence. After a bench trial, the district court 
rejected both theories as they relate to the Kimballs, flnding that the fence constitutes a fence of 
convenience. However, the district court ruled in favor of Downes and quieted title to one acre of the 
disputed parcel in her. The remainder of the disputed property was quieted in Lowell and Opal Turner, 
the appellees. The Kimballs timely appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a fence is a boundary fence or merely one of convenience is a question of fact. Hilla.rd v. 
Marsha/!, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). [ * * 5 ]  This court will not set aside a district court's 
findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the 
evidence. Id.; Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 301 (Wyo, 1983); S tansbu .~  v. Heiduck, 961 
P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 1998). When reviewing the record, we keep in  mind the following principles: 
The judge who presided at the trial heard and saw the witnesses. He is in the best 
position to determine questions of credibility and weigh and judge the evidence, both 
. expert and non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is a firmly established and oft-stated rule that 
we must accept the evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of consideration 
entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in confiict therewith, and give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably 
be drawn from it. 
Hiliard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1260 (quoting S.owerw@ v. Niels.on, 671 P12d at 301). We review a 
district court's conclusions of law de novo. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d at 978. 
DISCUSSION 
Adverse [**GI Possession 
To establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous possession of another's property which is hostile and under claim of right or color of title. 
Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2.d at 979; Hillard v. .Marsh.afl, 888 P.2d at 1258; Rutar Farms..& 
Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982). Possession must be for the statutory 
period, ten years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 3 1-3-103 (Lexis 1999); Hi1l.a.i-d v. Marshall, 888 P,2d at1258; 
Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 132.3 (&yo, 3988). Where there is no clear 
showing to the contrary, a person who has occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner 
plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse 
possession; and the burden shifts to the opposing party to explain such possession. Hillard.,~.. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1259; Meyer .v. Eilis, 411 P.2d 338, 342 (.!%!yo: 196.6); City of R.o.ck..S~r~ngsv.. 
Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494,517, 273 P.908, 915-1.6 [Q36] (1929). However, if a claimant's [ * * 7 ]  use 
of the property is shown to be permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse possession. Hiliafd v 203- 
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Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1259; Mryer v. ENIS, 411 P.2d at 344. 
I n  some circumstances, enclosing land in a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" of an adverse 
claimant. Meyerv. Nlis, 411 P.?d at 343; Doenz v. Garber, 665..P,2.d..93~2 .,. 936 (Vfy.0. 1.983).;. ~ ! ! J - L C  
V. ..Marsh.all, 888 P.2d at 1259. However, a fence kept simply for convenience has no effect upon the 
true boundary between tracts of land. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d at 297; Hillard v. Marshall, 888 
P.2d at 1260. This is so because a fence of convenience creates a permissive use, and a permissive 
user 
cannot change his possession into adverse title no matter how long possession may be 
continued, in the absence of a clear, positive and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of 
the title of the true owner brought home to the latter's knowledge; there must be either 
actual notice of the hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility so manifest and 
notorious that actual notice will be presumed in order [*US] to change a permissive or 
otherwise non-hostile possession into one that is hostile. 
Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1261 (quoting Stewart v. Childress, 269 Aia. 87, 111 So. 2d.8, 13 (e!a., ~959) ) .  
After a bench trial, the district court found that the fence erected by Rawsei was a fence of 
convenience and ruled that the Kimballs had not established their claim for adverse possession. n l  I n  
making its ruling, the district court could have followed either of two routes. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 
P,Zd at 1260: First, it could have concluded that the Kimbails had not made a prima facie case of 
adverse possession because the convenience fence was an explanatory circumstance to the contrary; 
or, second, it could have found that the Kimballs had made out a prima facie case but concluded that 
the evidence that the fence was one of convenience rebutted the presumption of adverse possession. 
Although the record does not reveal which of these means the trial court employed to arrive at its 
decision, it does not matter. Under either scenario, the district court's decision would stand; if the 
evidence that the fence was one of convenience is sufficient [**9] to establish that fact in the first 
place, then i t i s  sufficient to rebut the presumption. .Hilla.rd.v. .Mzrshall, 888 4,2d at 1260, Thus, the 
question for this court is whether the district court's finding of a convenience fence is clearly 
erroneous. We conclude it is not. 
n l  Because adverse possession cannot be acquired against the government, we are only concerned 
with circumstances that followed Deioss Turner's acquisition of his property from the United States 
Forest Service. Porter v. Carstensen, 40 Wyo. 156, 160, 274 P. 1072, 1073 (1929). 
The district court summarized its findings in this fashion: 
The physical appearance of the fence . . . clearly demonstrates that it could not have 
been constructed as a boundary fence. To call the structure a fence is generous. It 
consists of 3 wires meandering between trees, bushes, and fence posts in an irregular 
fashion. I t  appears from the physical appearance that someone walked in the east-west 
direction stringing barbwire from [**lo] tree to tree, placing fence posts when trees or 
bushes were not available. The irregular course of the fence clearly indicates that it was 
not constructed on a section line, a quarter section line, or any other line of a U.S. 
governmental subdivision parcel. Even to a casual observer, it is obvious that whoever 204 
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built the fence never intended to strictly follow the straight line oemarcation of a U.S. 
Government subdivision description. Clearly, the fence was constructed by Rawsel as a 
convenient way of separating his homestead from the public domain. The Court is not 
able to find and conclude that Rawsel constructed the fence as a boundary. 
Besides these findings, which are supported by photographs and testimony, the district court's 
decision is buttressed by testimony from Lowell Turner. Lowell, who has been around the Turner land 
all his life, provided insight Into how Rawsel and Deloss viewed the fence. Lowell testified that Rawsel 
and Deloss never treated the fence as a boundary fence. Instead, it was simply used to separate 
Rawsel's and Deloss' cattle. I f  cows [*307] escaped, the owner would simply retrieve them. 
Even after Rawsel and Deloss had passed the property on, both the [**ll] north and south Turners 
went back and forth freely on the now disputed property. None of the Turners asked permission to 
use the property because the land was seen as "family ground." Lowell also testified that his father, 
Deloss, had always said the fence was "ofi," meaning not on the property line. One of Lowell's sons, 
Kory Turner, testified that he had also been told all his life that the fence was off. Besides the manner 
in which the fence was constructed, the manner in which the Turners treated the fence and the now 
disputed property supports the district court's finding that the fence was not intended to serve as a 
boundary fence. See Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209 Mont. 177, ,679.P.2.d 787, .790..(Mont. 1984,).! 
The Kimballs next contend that the district court's judgment is inconsistent because the district court 
quieted title in Downes, who had built a home on one acre of the disputed property, but not in the 
Kimballs. Relying on Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc,, 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981), the 
Kimballs argue that the facts that supported the finding of adverse possession for Downes mandate a 
finding o f  adverse possession for the entire disputed parcel. We disagree. [**a21 
We have previously rejected the ~imbal ls '  all-or-nothing view of adverse possession. A similar 
argument was before this court in Hillard v. Marshall. There we wrote: 
Hillard argues that Kranenberg v, Mea,dowbrookCo&eL.Inc~, 623 P.Zd 1196.SWyo1-1.981) 
establishes the,rule that adverse possession is an all-or-nothing proposition. He asserts 
that since the possession of the nine-acre tract arose out of the same set of 
circumstances as the fourteen-acre tract, by adversely possessing one he necessarily had 
to have adversely possessed the other. 
I n  Kranenberg, the adverse claimant had built a portion of his home on the defendant's 
land. A contiguous tract of that land was also used by the claimant as a yard, including 
the placement of a swing set, a sandbox, a barbecue and a root cellar. Kranenberg, 623 
P.2d a t  1197-98. The district court found that the claimant had adversely possessed the 
portion around the house but not that portion which was utilized as a yard. Kranenberg, 
at 1196. We reversed, holding that the continuous possession of the entire portion of the 
property for the same purpose, residential use, was sufficient to show [**I31 adverse 
possession. Since the defendant had failed to demonstrate a permissive use, we 
concluded that the claimant had adversely possessed the entire tract. Kranenberg, 623 
P.2d a t  1199-1200. 
Kranenberg is distinguishable from this case. Here the land claimed is neither contiguous 
nor was used for the same purposes. Hillard used the fourteen-acre tract mainly for 
farming, while the nine-acre tract was exclusively used for grazing purposes. Further, the 
fact that the two parcels are physically separate could mean there are different reasons 
for them being fenced in, as the trial court found to be the case here. Although the tracts 
were created at the same time, their non-contiguous nature and the different uses on 
each requires the adverse claimant to prove his case for each tract individually. Hillard 
failed to do that. Kranenberg is not applicable. 
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H~llard v. Marshal, 888 P.2d at 1261. 
Here, as in Hillard v. Marshall, the two parcels have not been used for the same purposes. Since 
Downes moved her home onto the property in 1983, the acre quieted in her has been used for 
residential purposes. I n  fact, Downes' property is separated [**I41 from the rest of the disputed 
parcel by a fence erected to prevent cattle from grazing on her land. The fencing and piacement of 
structures upon land belonging to another can give rise to a claim for adverse possession. Sate v. 
Moore, 356 P,Zd 141, 146 (Wyo.. 1960). Meanwhile, the balance of the disputed parcel has been used 
mainly for pasturage and recreational purposes, consistent with the historical, permissive use of the 
family ground. 
I n  addition, by moving her home onto the property, Downes acted in a manner that changed the use 
of the property from permissive to hostile. Where, as in Downes' [*308] case, a parties' 
predecessor in interest held the disputed property by permission and not hostilely, a claim of adverse 
possession must fail. Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 805 (Wyo. 1986); Johnson v. Szumowlcz, 6 3  
Wyo. 211, 2.30, 179 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1.947). However, a permissive user may change his possession 
into adverse title with a clear, positive, and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the title of the 
true owner brought home to the latter's knowledge. Hifl.arp'.v. .Marsha//, 888 P.2d at  12.61; Mi!ieer..v. 
StovaN, 717 P.2d at 805. [**IS] "There must be either actual notice of the hostile claim or.acts or 
declarations o f  hostility so manifest and notorious that actual notice will be presumed in order to  
change a permissive or otherwise non-hostile possession into one that is hostile." HiIlard ~/,..M_arshall, 
888.P.Zd a t  1261, Here, although the southern Turners knew the fence was "off," they did not know 
how far off. Despite this, Downes' home was located close enough to the fence that the southern 
Turners were on actual notice that she was building on the now disputed property. Indeed, Lowell 
Turner admitted he was aware that Downes had moved her home on the land. By placing a home on 
the property. Downes had unfurled her flag in such a manner that the Turner appellees were on 
actual notice of her hostile possession. Thus, whenshe moved a home onto the property in 1983, 
Downes changed possession from permissive to hostile. 
Finally, besides finding that Downes had adversely possessed the acre she claimed, the district court 
also relied on an estoppel theory. Because the Turner appellees stood by and did nothing while 
Downes built on the property, the district court ruled that they were estopped from 1**16] 
asserting ownership to Downes' parcel. We conclude that the circumstances of Downes' claim for 
adverse possession are sufficiently different from those surrounding Kimball's claim that separate 
treatment is warranted. The district court did not err in ruling in favor of Downes but against the 
Kimballs. 
Recognition and Acquiescence 
The Kimballs also rely on the doctrine of recognition and acquiescence to argue that the fence has 
altered the boundary. This court, per Justice Blume, first described this doctrine in Carstensen v. 
Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 500-502, 236 P. 517, 520-21 (1925): 
It is well settled that parties may make an express parol agreement as to a boundary 
line. But, to have a basis for consideration, it must be in dispute or uncertain and not 
readily ascertainable, and, to take it out of the statute of frauds, it must be followed up 
by occupancy by the parties in accordance with such agreement, up to the line agreed on. 
It would seem that the elements of mistake involved, both In estoppel as well as adverse 
possession, are eliminated in a case when parties deliberately enter into an agreement 
under such conditions, in the absence of special [**17] circumstances which would 
relieve a party from a mistake, because want of knowledge of the true boundary, and 
uncertainty thereof, is made the very basis of the agreement. The doctrine of recognition 
and acquiescence would seem to be based primarily, though not solely, upon the same 
principles as an express agreement. . . . However. . . . an agreement to fix an uncertain 20 6 
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or disputed boundary need'not be express, but may be implied, and may be shown by the 
conduct of the parties. 
. . . The existence of a division fence does not alone show the requisite facts. It 
may be kept up only for the convenience of the parties. But we think we may safely 
say that when there is recognition and acquiescence of the parties in a boundary line, 
uncertain or in dispute in the first instance, for a period equal at least to the prescriptive 
period, under facts and circumstances which should be considered equivalent to an 
express agreement, and the land on each side of the line is occupied by the respective 
parties as their land, no good reason exists why the parties should not be bound to the 
same extent as though such express agreement had been made and carried out, 
particularly [**IS] when facts exist which would make any other holding inequitable. 
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) 
The Kimballs complain that the district court improperly applied the doctrine of recognition [*309] 
and acquiescence by requiring the Kimballs to prove an express agreement that the fence would be 
considered the boundary. They correctly point out that such an agreement need not be express, but 
may be implied from the parties' conduct. Moreover, "long practical acquiescence is regarded as the 
equivalent of an agreement." Carstensen v. Brown,. 32 Wyo, a t  501, 236 PI af 521. 
We disagree with the Kimball's assertion that the district court denied this claim solely because there 
was no expiess agreement. While the district court recognized that no express agreement was 
reached, it also concluded that "the facts and circumstances of this case are not equivalent to an 
express agreement to make the fence the boundary line." For the following reasons, we interpret this 
language to be a finding that there was no implied agreement that the fence be a boundary. First, 
this finding by the district court was preceded by a paragraph in which the district court found no 
express [**I91 agreement that the fence be a boundary. I f  the district court had, as the Kimballs 
claim, required them to prove an express agreement, nothing further need have been said. However, 
the court went on to  make a finding that the facts and circumstances of the case were not the 
equivalent of an express agreement. I n  making this finding, the district court tracked language found 
in Carstensen v. Brown that discusses implied agreements. It is clear that the district court made a 
finding that no implied agreement existed; we, therefore, reject the Kimballs' claim that the district 
court required them to prove an express agreement. 
I n  any event, the district court's decision is supported by more than one ground. I n  ruling on this 
issue, the district court also relied on its previous finding that the fence was not a boundary fence, 
but a fence of convenience. As Carstensen v. Brown teaches, "the existence of a division fence does 
not alone show the requisite facts. I t  may be kept up only for the convenience of the parties." 32 
WY.~.. a t  5.01-502, 236 P! at 521; Johnson v: Szumowicz,.63.\?(.~~,.211, 229-30, 179 P.2d 1012,.1,058 
(1947). This was the case here, [**20] and the district court appropriately denied the Kimball's 
claim based on this ground. State v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo, 432,438-39, 19 P.2d 955, 957. (1.933), 
Finally, Carstensen v. Brown indicates that the equities of the case play a role in determining a claim 
of boundary by recognition and acquiescence. 32 Wyo, at 502,.236 PC a t  521. On this issue, the 
district court wrote: 
There is nothing inequitable about ruling that [the Kimballs] are to retain the raw, 
unimproved, undeveloped property contained within their property description; and that 
[the appellees] are to retain the same kind of property contained within their description. 
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We cannot disagree. The decision of the district court on this issue is affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
"There is a critical distinction between a fence which establishes a boundary line, and a fence that 
merely separates one side o f  the fence from the other. The former is a monument as well as a fence, 
while the latter is merely a fence." Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209 Mont. 177, 679 P.2d 787, 790 (Mont. 
1984). In this case, the district court's finding that the fence constitutes a fence of 
convenience [**21] is not clearly erroneous. This finding precludes both the adverse possession 
claim as well as the claim that the boundary had been altered by recognition and acquiescence. The 
decision of the district court is affirmed. 
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Lynn BROADHEAD and Judy Broadhead, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Terry HAWLEY and 
Sheila S. Hawley, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents 
No. 15452 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
109 Idaho 952; 712 P.2d 653; 1985 Ida. App. LEXIS 705 
August 16, 1985 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***I] 
Rehearing Denied December 31, 1985. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bingham County. Honorable H. Reynold George,'District Judge. 
Appeal from the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' request for quiet title to certain property, and from 
the court's award of clear title to the disputed property to defendants. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff property owner sought review of a decision of the District 
Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bingham County, which found in 
favor of defendant property owner in plaintiffs action seeking to quiet title to a stripe of land 
running along the parties' property. 
OVERVIEW: The original owner divided the property into two parcels. When plaintiff's parcel 
was sold to a predecessor in interest such predecessor put up a fence running along a row of 
trees and bushes. The predecessor used part of the strip was used as a play area and part as a 
garden. I n  addition, the predecessor gave a right to use a driveway, which occupied part of the 
strip, to the predecessors of defendant's land. Defendant, after discovering that the fence was 
not boundary line removed it and erected a new one. Plaintiff's objected to this construction. 
On appeal, the court found that the trial court correctly found that no case of adverse 
possession had been shown because plaintiff had not paid taxes on the strip. I n  addition, 
plaintiff failed to show that the old fence line had been ~e t t led  as the boundary by agreement 
or acquiescence. The court found that neither an actual dispute nor a spoken agreement in 
resolution to the dispute was necessary to the creation of a boundary by acquiescence. 
However no acquiescence existed because the evidence did not establish any agreement 
between the parties' predecessors with regard to establishing a new boundary. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court's decision. 
CORE TERMS: feet, parcel, acquiescence, deed, adverse possession, oral agreement, driveway, 
fence, foot strip, measured, foot, boundary line, predecessor, legal description, picket fence, legal 
title, possessed, conveyed, row, disputed, true boundary line, southern boundary, chain of title, south 
boundary, real property, corresponded, constructed, measurement, coterminous, purchasing 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 4 S ~ Q W  HLeadn.o.&.s 
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' COUNSEL: Dean Williams, B la~~ foo t ,  for plaintiffs-appellants. 
Stephen 3. Blaser, Blackfoot, for defendants-respondents. 
JUDGES: Huntley, Bistline and Towles, Acting 31. Huntley, Acting C.J., and Bistline, I., Acting J., 
concur. 
OPINIONBY: TOWLES 
OPINION: [*952] [**653] Lynn and Judy Broadhead (Broadhead) brought this action seeking 
quiet title to a strip of land approximately 10 feet wide, running along the south boundary of their 
property and the north boundary of property belonging to Terry and Sheila Hawley (Hawley). 
Broadhead alleged in his complaint that he had acquired title to this 10-foot strip by adverse 
possession. Following a trial before the court, Judge George held that Broadhead had not met his 
burden of proving his right to the property under any of the doctrines that would [*953] [***2] 
[**654] arguably apply, including adverse possession, agreed title, and title by acquiescence. We 
affirm. 
Broadhead and Hawiey own adjacent lots in Blackfoot, Idaho. By this lawsuit, Broadhead seeks to 
settle the boundary between those two properties, not according to their deed descriptions, but along 
a line which Broadhead asserts has been recognized as the boundary for some 20 years. 
The two properties in question were both under the ownership of one Parkinson from 1951 to 1964. 
When Parkinson received his deeds, the parcel now belonging to Broadhead measured 100 feet by 
400 feet, according to its deeded legal description, When Parkinson reconveyed the north parcel to 
Broadhead's predecessor in 1964, Parkinson altered the legal description, taking off the southern ten 
feet and adding i t  to the parcel now belonging to Hawley. Therefore, the parcel which is now 
Broadhead's became a 90 foot by 400 foot lot. 
Broadhead purchased his lot and house in December 1977 from Alan and Evelyn Herbst. Broadhead 
contends, and Alan Herbst testified, that, at the time Broadhead purchased the property, Herbst 
pointed out to Broadhead what Herbst understood to be the south boundary. This [***3] boundary 
was represented by Herbst to be marked by an old, rundown picket fence, 30 to 40 feet in length, 
running along a row of old trees and bushes at the south end of the parcel. The southern boundary is 
400 feet long. The deed from Herbst to Broadhead conveyed a piece of property 90 feet by 400 feet, 
but neither Herbst nor Broadhead measured the property or had it surveyed at the time Broadhead 
purchased the property. I f  Broadhead is granted title to the 10 feet at issue here, his parcel will 
measure 100 feet by 400 feet. 
Chris Martin, who owned Broadhead's parcel from 1964 to 1975 before selling it to Herbst, testified 
that, when he purchased the property, he measured and marked the property lines himself, without 
benefit of a survey, by using what he thought were survey stakes already on the property. Martin 
testified that he was never really sure where the north line was, but he assumed that the southern 
boundary was where stakes had been placed, along the line that roughly coincided with the row of 
trees. Martin installed the picket fence and proceeded to cultivate and maintain the grass within the 
10-foot strip here in issue, to the point of the fence, throughout his [***4] I1 years' residence 
there. Part of that 10-foot strip later served as a play area for the children of renters living in 
Broadhead's house. The renters kept that area cleared out and planted a garden there. 
I n  about 1966, one Peterson owned the then-vacant lot which now belongs to Hawley, and Peterson 
constructed a house on his property. I n  about 1967, when Peterson desired to sell his property, he 
had trouble finding a buyer, because his property lacked a way of ingress and egress to and from the 
garage. Peterson himself had been sharing a driveway with Martin, which driveway took in at least 
part of the 10-foot strip here in question. Martin gave the purchaser a right to use the driveway, but 
he testified that he refused to grant an easement that would be binding on future owners of either 
property. The document reflecting such agreement was titled as an easement, but it constituted a 
personal agreement between the parties for common use of the driveway lying between their 
respective properties. Later owners of the Hawley property did use the driveway, without objection 
from Broadhead or Broadhead's predecessors. 210 
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Hawley purchased his home south of Broadhead's property i n  [***5] August 1980. At the time he 
viewed the lot and considered purchasing it, Hawley measured the front footage to  see what property 
he  would be buying. However, he had trouble making his own measurements comport with those 
which the property description purported to include. Specifically, his measurement did not come out  
with enough front footage, i f  he accepted Mr. Broadhead's claim, which Broadhead had expressed to  
Hawley, that Broadhead owned the full driveway. Therefore, as a condition to purchasing the 
property, Hawley required the realtor to [*954] [**655] provide a professional survey, which 
was done. The result o f  such survey showed that Hawley's property lines, measured according to the 
description in his deed, took in the 10 feet here in dispute on the north side of his property. I f  one 
followed the survey, then the Hawiey property and those properties on either side o f  Hawley 
corresponded to their respective deeds. Having taken this precaution of assuring that his square 
footage corresponded to the property description in his deed, Hawley purchased the property. Later, 
he removed the old fence and constructed a new picket fence Four feet inside the survey line, 
[***GI leaving this four-foot allowance to avoid interference with the children's play area in 
Broadhead's yard. Broadhead objected to the construction o f  the fence, and this lawsuit ensued. 
The legal descriptions to  the parties' properties in  question are written in metes and bounds. The 
parties stipulated that Broadhead and Hawley have each paid taxes on their lots as assessed by the 
county assessor's office. The county assessor testified that Broadhead's lot was assessed according to  
its deed description, which covered a lot 90 feet by 400 feet. 
In analyzing the merits o f  Broadhead's claims, we begin by noting that the property in question is 
within the legal description of Hawley's deed and that Broadhead has never been conveyed written 
tit le to the 10-foot strip o f  property he now claims. I.,C,.§.&206, in  the following language, gives a 
presumption that ownership of property lies in the person establishing legal, or written, title to it: 
"In every action for the recovery o f  real property, or the possession thereof, a person 
establishing a legal title to the property is presumed to have been possessed thereof 
within the time required by law, and the occupation o f  the [***7] property by another 
person $ deemed to have been under and in subordination to the iegai title, unless it 
appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for 
five (5) years before the commencement o f  the action." (Emphasis added.) 
The requirements of adverse possession are in turn delineated in I.C. 5 5-210 as follows: 
"For the purpose o f  constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not 
founded upon a written instrument, judgment or  decree, land is deemed to have been 
possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or  improved. 
Provided, however, that in  no case shall adverse possession be considered established 
under the provisions of any section of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has 
been occupied and claimed for the period of five (5) years continuously, and the party or 
persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paidaN the taxes, state, county or 
municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to  
law." (Emphasis added.) 
Since Broadhead had not  paid [***8] taxes on the disputed parcel, the trial court correctly found 
that no case of adverse possession had been shown. Broadhead therefore attempts to come wlthi 211 
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' one of the exceptions or qualifications to the doctrine of adverse posseision. See generally, .T~metL 
v. Davis 102 Idaho _- 527 633 P.Zd_,592-(L981), Broadhead argues that the locationof th: b.ound,~$y.in:. 
question has been settled to be along the old fence line by agreement or by acquiescence. We find, ' 
as did the trial court, that that doctrine is inapplicable here. 
The doctrine of agreed boundary or boundary by acquiescence was explained in Trappert v. .D.avis, 
102 Idaho 527, 531,633 P.2d.5?2,596,  (1981), quoting Downlngv. Boehringer, 8 2  Idaho 52, 56, 
349 P.2d 306, 308 (1960), as follows: 
"Where the location of a true boundary line between coterminous owners is known to 
either of the parties, or is not uncertain, and is not in dispute, an oral [*955] 
[**656] agreement between them purporting to establish another line as the boundary 
between their properties constitutes an attempt to convey real property in violation of the 
statute of frauds . . . and is invalid. But, where the location of the true [***9] boundary 
line is unknown to either of the parties, and is uncertain or in dispute, such coterminous 
owners may orally agree upon a boundary line. When such an agreement is executed and 
actual possession is taken under it, the parties and those claiming under them are bound 
thereby. I n  such circumstances, an agreement fixing the boundary line is not regarded as 
a conveyance of any land from one to the other, but merely the iocation of the respective 
existing estates and the common boundary of each of the parties." 
Some question has been raised, among the courts treating the doctrine of boundary by agreement or 
acquiescence, as to whether a necessary element in the application of that doctrine is that there be 
an initial dispute between the parties. See Norwood v. Stevens, 10.4 Idaho 44, 47,. 655 P . 2 d  938, 941 
(Idaho App.1982) ("Where agreements have derived from ignorance or mistake, they nevertheless 
appear to have been sustained when accompanied by long acquiescence, construction of a fence or 
other monument, and possession up to the recognized line"), and cases cited therein. Therefore, the 
lower court's conclusion, that there was no dispute as to any common boundary line [***lo] 
between the properties here involved, might not in itself answer the question of whether a boundary 
by acquiescence has been established. The trial judge commented at the end of trial: 
"[Als far as I 'm concerned, it is fundamental that there must be an oral agreement to 
have any use to the parties, and the only time you can have an oral agreement is where 
there's uncertainty and where there's dispute . . . [Flirst of all, a lot of testimony was as 
to people in the same chain of title, that they would say -- they'd go out and point out 
what the boundary line was. 'This was the boundary line.' It was pointed out. It was 
pointed out, that was said several times. Any time you are talking about people in the 
same chain of title, there's no chance for an oral agreement there. The only time an oral 
agreement means anything is when it's between neighbors who five next to each other 
and where there's a property line that may be in dispute. 
". . . I listened to Mr. Martin closely, and Mr. Martin said any number of times that there 
was never any dispute. There was never any problem. So, as far as I 'm concerned, there 
was never an oral agreement between the parties here [***ll] where the boundary 
was, even uncertain or in dispute. There's not evidence in this case." 
The basis of the trial court's decision in favor of Hawley, then, was the lack of both a dispute and an 
oral agreement between the parties. We do not agree that either an actual dispute or a spoken 
I agreement in resolution of that dispute is necessary to the creation of a boundary by acquiescence. While we disagree with the lower court's rationale, we hold that the trial judge reached the correc 212 
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' result in this case. No boundaryby acquiescence exists on these facts, first, because if such a 
boundary existed prior to 1951, when Parkinson got the parcels, then such boundary was destroyed 
when Parkinson conveyed a 90 foot by 400 foot parcel to Broadhead's predecessors in 1964, while 
resewing an additional 10 feet for the southern parcel; and second, because the evidence does not 
establish any agreement, either oral or implied in conduct, between the parties after 1964. Indeed,' 
the evidence is contraryto a boundary by acquiescence. There was no longer any fence or shrub row 
on the bulk of the 400 foot border, and the eaves of the Hawley house hang some two feet into the 
disputed strip. [***I21 
Where the trial court reaches the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason, we will affirm under the 
correct rationale. Aodre. Y. Morrow, 106 Idaho .455,..680P,2d..1355./1984); Southern I.daho.Res!t~.,v.. 
[*956] [**657] Larry]. Hellhake, etc., 102 Idaho 613,636 P.2d 168 (1981). 
The decision of the trial judge is therefore affirmed. Costs to respondent Hawley. No attorney's fees 
on appeal. 
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E. JACKSON BRYANT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. REED F. BLEVINS et al., Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 5034604. 
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
9 Cal. 4th 47; 884 P.2d 1034; 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 86; 1994 Cal. LEXIS 6334; 94 Cal. Daily Op. Service 
9592; 94 Daily Journal DAR 17796 
December 19, 1994, Decided 
PRIOR HISTORY: Superior Court of Sacramento County, No. CV512339, A. Richard Backus, 
Judge. 
DISPOSITION: The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Because, in view of its disposition 
of the agreed-boundary issue, that court did not reach plaintiffs' other challenges to the judgment of 
the trial court, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to address plaintiffs' 
remaining contentions. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs sought review of a decision of the Superior Court of 
Sacramento County, (California) which concluded that, under the agreed boundary doctrine, 
defendants should be awarded title to a disputed area up to the claimed boundary fence. 
OVERVIEW: Plaintiffs and defendants disputed their mutual property line, and on appeal, 
asked whether a court should apply the agreed boundary doctrine to resolve a boundary 
dispute where available legal records provided a reasonable basis for fixing the boundary, and 
the party relying upon the doctrine failed to establish uncertainty as to the location of the true 
boundary led to an agreement at an agreed upon location. The appellate court held that the 
lower court adopted an unduly expansive interpretation of the agreed boundary doctrine. 
Further, it held that the doctrine was not applicable where there was no evidence that prior 
owners of adjoining parcels of real property entered into an agreement to resolve a boundary 
dispute, and where available legal records provided a reasonable basis for fixing the boundary. 
Thus, the lower court erred in upholding the application of the agreed boundary doctrine where 
defendants failed to establish the uncertainty and agreement required in order to establish an 
agreed boundary. Therefore, the judgment was reversed. 
OUTCOME: Where the lower court applied the agreed boundary doctrine, the appellate court 
reversed, holding that when available legal records provided a reasonable basis for fixing a 
boundary, and the party relying upon the doctrine failed to establish uncertainty as to the 
location of the true boundary, such application of the doctrine was inappropriate. 
CORE TERMS: fence, landowner, agreed-boundary, deed, true boundary, barrier, surveyor, 
coterminous, parcel, adjacent, agreed boundary, common boundary, acquiescence, disputed, corner, 
legal description, strip of land, barbed wire, erected, acre, built, measurement, predecessor, fixing, 
surveying, ownership, one-half, separating, monument, boundary dispute 
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COUNSEL: 
Adamo & Nevarez and John B. Adamo for Piaintiffs and Appellants. 
Pamela Nelson for Defendants and Respondents. 
JUDGES: Opinion by George, J., with Lucas, C. J., Arabian, Baxter and Werdegar, I]., concurring 
Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk, J . ,  with Kennard, J., concurring. 
OPINIONBY: GEORGE, J 
OPINION: [*491 [**I0351 [***87] 
When coterminous landowners are uncertain as to the true location of their common boundary, they 
may establish that boundary by agreement, pursuant to a legal theory commonly referred to as the 
"agreedboundary" doctrine. This case presents the question whether a court should [*50] apply 
that doctrine to resolve a boundary dispute where available legal records provide a reasonable basis 
for fixing the boundary and the party relying upon the doctrine fails to establish that uncertainty as to 
the location of the true boundary led to an agreement between the landowners to create a boundary 
at an agreed-upon location. We hold that the doctrine is inapplicable under these circumstances. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which affirmed the trial court's finding 
that the doctrine applied to this case. 
Piaintiffs E. Jackson and Theressa Bryant and defendants Reed and Jean Bievins own adjoining 
parcels of real property in Herald, located in a rural portion of southern Sacramento County, east of 
Gait. The parceis resulted from a division of "Lot 57," a 10.88-acre lot contained within a l-square- 
mile tract of land that was divided in 1909 into 64 parceis, each approximately 10 acres in size. Lot 
57, the largest lot within the subdivision, is configured as shown in the following diagram (which is 
not drawn to scale): 
[**I0361 [***88] [SEE DIAGRAM IN  ORIGINAL] 
The original owners of Lot 57, Sheldon and Melda Brandenburger, also were the developers and 
subdividers of the entire 64-lot subdivision. The subdivision was surveyed in 1909 and was recorded 
in 1910. The parties to the present dispute do not dispute the accuracy of the 1909 survey. At the 
[*51] time the Brandenburgers created the subdivision, they conveyed the west one-half of Lot 57 
to the Haak family, plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, and retained the east one-half for themselves. 
n l  In 1965, the Brandenburgers conveyed the "East one-half" of Lot 57 to Aldridge and Patricia 
Reynolds who, in turn, conveyed the property to defendants 12 years later, in 1977. Plaintiffs 
acquired title to the west one-half of Lot 57 in 1986. 
n l  Although the deed evidencing the Brandenburgers' conveyance of the west half of Lot 57 to the 
Haaks is not contained in the record, and therefore its exact language has not been adduced, the 
parties do not dispute that the Haaks received the west one-half of the parcel. Nor is there any 
dispute as to the accuracy of subsequent deeds, which are contained in the record and refer to the 
"west hal f"  of Lot 57. 
Defendants testified they were familiar with the property for many years prior to purchasing it. Mrs. 
Blevins, who had lived in the area for more than 50 years, recalled having seen the property many 215 
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times while riding a covered wadon with her family riding-group in the 1950's and 1960's. She 
recalled from as early as the 1950's seeing barbed wire perimeter fencing in the area, although the 
particular barbed wire fence dividing Lot 57 apparently was erected by the Reynoldses at some point 
after they acquired the east half of Lot 57 in 1965. After defendants acquired the property in 1977 
from the Reynoldses, who had informed defendants that the barbed wire fence marked the boundary 
line, defendants replaced the fence with a sturdier, pipe panel fence erected at the same location. 
Shortly after purchasing the west one-half of Lot 57, plaintiffs, in the course of laying out a fence line 
upon the perimeter of their parcel, discovered a discrepancy between the approximately 5.3 acres to 
which they believed they were entitled (based upon a description on the tax assessor's map depicting 
Lot 57 as 10.63 acres in size, and divided along a line running between the midpoints of the lot's 
north and south borders) and the area actually enclosed by the fence, which appeared to be 
approximately 4.9 acres in size. Defendants were unable to explain the discrepancy. Plaintiffs hired a 
surveyor, Monty Seibel, the owner of a local surveying [**I0371 [***89] business, to identify 
the true boundaries of the property. 
Upon surveying Lot 57, Seibel discovered that the fence erected by defendants, at the same location 
as the previous barbed wire fence, was not located on the true boundary between the eastern and 
western halves of the property. I n  reaching this conclusion, Seibel verified his survey measurements 
against those set forth on the 1909 subdivision map, finding no significant discrepancies. Employing 
what he testified was the standard method for locating a property boundary where there has been a 
subdivision, Seibel identified the location of the boundary separating the parties' parcels [*521 by 
dividing Lot 57 into portions of equal area by means of a line drawn parallel to the outside boundary 
of the first parcel conveyed, that is, a line drawn parallel to the western edge of the west one-half of 
Lot 57. Defendants did not dispute Seibel's methodology in conducting his survey (which Seibel 
recorded, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 8762) or its accuracy, and, in fact, 
stipulated to the admission in evidence of the survey at trial. As illustrated in the diagram, this survey 
fixed the true boundary separating the west and east halves of Lot 57 at a line east of the fence 
defendants had erected--approximately 11 feet east on the south border, widening to approximately 
42 feet east at  the north border. 
Seibel's survey thus identified a strip of land, comprising approximately 0.4 acres, bordered on the % 
east by the true boundary separating the parties' parcels, and on the west by the fence constructed 
by defendants. The rightful ownership of this strip of land, contested by the parties, is the subject of 
the present proceedings. When the Reynoldses owned the east portion of Lot 57, they used this land 
as the site for a septic tank and leach field, in order to service a recreational vehicle parked there. 
After acquiring title from the Reynoldses, the defendants made similar use of the land, employing it 
for the additional purposes of siting a horse corral and pasture, a storage trailer, and a woodlot. 
Defendants regularly trimmed the eucalyptus trees to which the barbed wire fence had been 
attached, and maintained the property so as to reduce the risk of fire. 
After making unsuccessful attempts to persuade defendants to move the location of the fence that 
divided Lot 57, plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the disputed strip of land, to quiet title, for 
trespass, and for damages. Defendants cross-complained for declaratory relief to establish the 
boundaries, to quiet title, for a prescriptive easement, and for damages and fees. After a court trial 
on the parties' respective claims, the trial court, among other findings, tentatively found no evidence 
to support application of the agreed-boundary doctrine to the facts of the present case, stating, at 
the conclusion of closing arguments: "[I] don't believe that there has been any testimony ... to 
indicate there is any sort of dispute that arose when the persons got together and made an agreed 
fence." Ultimately, however, despite the absence of such evidence, the trial court found that an 
uncertainty existed as to the location of the true boundary line, and that an agreement to fix the 
boundary at the fence also existed, so as to support application of the agreed-boundary doctrine, 
based upon the long-standing acceptance of, and acquiescence In, the location of the fence. As a 
consequence, the trial court concluded that, under the agreed-boundary doctrine, defendants should 
be awarded title to the disputed area up to the claimed boundary fence. The Court of Appeal affirmed 
as to this issue and, in view of that disposition, [*533 concluded it was unnecessary to reach 
plaintiffs' remaining challenges to the trial court's findings that defendants had acquired title to a 
portion of the disputed area based upon a theory of adverse possession, and that defendants were 
entitled to a prescriptive easement as to the balance of the disputed area. Plaintiffs thereafter sou 6 
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review from this court. 
T(la) Plaintiffs' contention that the disputed area belongs to them is premised upon the 
uncontroverted survey performed by Monty Seibel in 1987, which, as noted, was not at  variance with 
either the original subdivision map drawn in 1909, when Lot 57 was drawn and subdivided, or with 
the undisputed deed [**I0381 [***go] descriptions of the respective parcels, each of which 
refers to the ownership of one-half of Lot 57. Plaintiffs further contend that, in the present era of 
sophisticated surveying techniques and ready access to legal descriptions of real property aided by 
computer networks and other modern technology, the justification for the agreed-boundary doctrine, 
upon which the Court of Appeal relied in concluding the disputed area belonged to defendants, has 
withered and all but disappeared. Plaintiffs argue that the Court of Appeal's expansive application of 
the doctrine undermines the significance of legal descriptions and encourages litigation and that, 
therefore, as a matter of policy, the agreed-boundary doctrine should not apply when the true 
boundary is objectively certain--that is, when a reliable legal description of the true boundary exists. 
Accordinalv, they urcle this court to narrow the application of the doctrine to only those cases in 
which "legei recordsfaii to settle a boundary dispite." ( Mesnick v. Caton (1986) 183 Cal.AppS3d 
1248, 1256 [228 Cal.Rptr. 7791.) 
In  response, defendants contend the disputed area rightfully belongs to them, noting that the barbed 
wire fence separating the parcels had stood for several years without controversy as the apparent 
boundary between the west and east "halves" of Lot 57. Defendants contend the Court of Appeal 
correctly held it was reasonable, in view of the long-standing presence of the fence, to infer that the 
parties' predecessors in interest were uncertain as to the location of the true boundary separating the 
parcels, and agreed to rely upon the fence as the boundary. Thus, defendants contend, the Court of 
Appeal properly applied the agreed-boundary doctrine. 
As we shall explain, we reject defendants' contentions. I n  our view, the Court of Appeal adopted an 
unduly expansive interpretation of the agreed-boundary doctrine and improperly rejected the analysis 
set forth in other, well-reasoned Court of Appeal decisions that have held the doctrine is not properly 
applicable in cases, such as this one, in which there is no evidence [*543 that prior owners of 
adjoining parcels of real property entered into an agreement to resolve a boundary dispute and where 
available legal records provided a reasonable basis for fixing the boundary. I n  the present case, 
because defendants, while relying upon the agreed-boundary doctrine, failed to demonstrate that an 
uncertainty as to the true boundary line led the prior coterminous owners to agree to fix the 
boundary separating the parties' respective parcels of real property at the location of the barbed wire 
fence, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the application of the agreed- 
boundary doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the condlusion we reach in this case, we decline to limit application of the agreed- 
boundary doctrine to instances in which existing legal records are inadequate to settle a boundary 
dispute. As previous cases have explained, such an inflexible rule would risk destabilizing long- 
standing agreements--made in good faith by coterminous property owners in order to resolve 
uncertainty as to the location of their common boundaries--that might, for any one of several 
reasons, be at variance with legal property descriptions or survey results. Instead, we reaffirm the 
vitality of the requirements necessary to establish the applicability of the agreed-boundary doctrine, 
set forth in Ernie v. Ti-inity Lutheran Church (1958) 5 1  Cal?.Zd ,702 [336.9,2.d.5251. (See also MrlrtIr! v. 
(Lopes (1946) 28 Cal.2d 618, 624 El70 P.2d 8811 [discussing the policy in favor of according stability 
to boundary agreements adopted in good faith by coterminous landowners and acquiesced in for a 
period longer than the statutory period of limitations for adverse possession].) 
The agreed-boundary doctrine constitutes a firmly established exception to the general rule that 
accords determinative legal effect to the description of land contained in a deed. One early case thus 
explains the basis for the agreed-boundary doctrine: "[Tlhe rule has been established that when such 
[coterminous] owners, being uncertain of the true position of the [common boundary described in 
their respective deeds], agree upon its true location, mark it upon the ground, or build up to it, 2 $7 
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occupy on each side up to the [**lo391 ;[***91] thus fixeo and acquiesce in such location 
for a period equal to the statute of limitations, or under such circumstances that substantial loss 
would be caused by a change of its position, such line becomes; in law, the true line called for by the 
respective descriptions, regardless of the accuracy of the agreed location, as it may appear by 
subsequent measurements.... [PI ... [PI The object of the rule is to secure repose, to prevent strife 
and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable ... I f  a measurement is 
made and the line agreed on and acquiesced in as [*55] required by this rule, i t  is binding on and 
applicable to all parties to the agreement and their successors by subsequent deeds." ( Yo.~ng.v. 
Blakeman (1908) 153 Cai. 477, 481-482 [95 P. 8881; see also Mello v. We.aver (1950) 36 Cal.2d 456, 
459-460 1224 P.2d 6911; Martin v. Lopes, supra, 28 .Ca!..2d at pp,. .6?2:627; Hannah v. Pog.ue(1.944) 
23 Cal.2d 849, 856-857 [147 P.2d 5721; 5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) Adjoining 
Landowners, 5 14.1, pp. 304-308.) 
T(3) Although the agreed-boundary doctrine is well established in California, our case law has 
recognized that the doctrine properly may be invoked only under carefully specified circumstances. As 
this court stated in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, 707: "The requirements of 
proof necessary to establish a title by agreed boundary are well settled by the decisions in this state. 
[Citations.] The doctrine requires that there be [I] an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, [2] an 
agreement between the coterminous owners fixing the iine, and [3] acceptance and acquiescence in 
the iine so fixed for a period equal to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that 
substantial loss would be caused by a change of its position." (Ibid.) 
In  the years since we reiterated in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church; supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, the 
requirements of the agreed-boundary doctrine, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have held that 
the doctrine should not be applied broadly to resolve boundary disputes where there is no evidence 
that the neighboring owners entered into an agreement to resolve a boundary dispute and where the 
true boundary is ascertainable from the legal description set forth in an existing deed or survey. (See, 
e.g., Armitage v. Decker (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 887, 902-904 [267 Cai,Rptr. 3993; M.esnick v. Caton, 
supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1256-1258; Finley v. Yuba County WaterDist. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 
691, 698-701 L1.60 CalpRptrL423],) The common theme of these decisions is a deference to the 
sanctity of true and accurate legal descriptions and a concomitant reluctance to allow such' 
descriptions to be invalidated by implication, through reliance upon unreliable boundaries created by 
fences or foliage, or by other inexact means of demarcation. 
T(lb) I n  the present case, because defendants claimed title to the disputed strip of land under the 
agreed-boundary doctrine, they had the burden of proving each element necessary to establish the 
agreed boundary, including an agreement between the coterminous landowners to fix their common 
boundary at an agreed-upon line. Plaintiffs contend defendants failed to meet their burden of proving 
the existence of such an agreement. The Court of [*56] Appeal rejected this contention and, in 
doing so, declined to follow the reasoning set forth in a recent decision rendered by another court in 
Armitage v. Decker, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 887. As we shall explain, we conclude the Court of Appeal 
in the present case erred in rejecting the analysis set forth in Armitage. 
Armitage v. Decker, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 887, like the case before us, involved coterminous 
landowners whose lots were separated by an old fence. I n  Armitage, the plaintiff's survey, based 
upon the legal description of the plaintiff's lot set forth in the deed, revealed that the placement of 
the fence reduced the size of the defendant's parcel by departing from the true boundary between 
the parties' properties. Claiming ownership of the disputed strip of land on an adverse possession 
theory, the plaintiff contended he was entitled to the land under the agreed-boundary doctrine. 
[**1040] [***92] The trial court, rejecting the plaintiff's contention that his land extended to 
the fence, entered judgment for the defendant. The Court of Appeal affirmed, observing that, 
although the elements of uncertainty as to the true boundary and agreement to fix a boundary may 
be inferred from acceptance of a fence as a boundary for many years, the plaintiff was not entitled to 
prevail, because "proof of acquiescence in the existence of a fence without evidence of an agreement 
to take the fence as a boundary is not sufficient to establish an agreed boundary." ( Id., at p. 900.) 
Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish his case, because he "offered no direct proof that the fence had 
been built to resolve adjoining owners' uncertainty as to the boundary between their lands ... [PI .2 18 
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Absent proof of acceptance of tne fence as a boundary by owners on aoth sides, there was no basis 
for an inference of uncertainty and agreement." ( Id., at p. 901.) 
The court in Armitage, like the court in a similar case, Mesnick v. Caton, supra, 183 Caj.App.3d 1248, 
observed that strong policy justifications counsel against an expansive application of the agreed- 
boundary doctrine when a legal description of the true boundary exists: "The doctrine of agreed 
boundaries arose as a means to settle disputes over boundaries at a time when surveys were 
notoriously inaccurate and the monuments and landmarks they described often could not be found in 
later years. [Citations.] Given the difficulties of fixing boundaries according to the old surveys, courts 
properly recognized boundary lines which had served for lengthy periods of time as a practical 
boundary. [Citation.] The purpose of the doctrine of agreed boundaries is ' "to secure repose and 
prevent litigation." ' [Citations.] The doctrine is based on a policy of giving stability to agreements 
adjusting a disputed boundary ' ':as a method adopted in good faith by the parties themselves to 
settle the controversy, and because it is the most satisfactory way whereby a true boundary line may 
be determined, and tends [*57] to prevent litigation." ' [Citations.] [PI I n  more recent times, 
however, accurate surveys are possible and verifiable recorded deeds are the rule ... As recognized in 
Mesnick, to allow the docirine of agreed boundaries to supersede recorded legal descriptions of the 
property where, as here, they are fully consistent, would not only destroy the significance of recorded 
instruments but would foster litigation rather than preventing it. [Citation.] While the doctrine of 
agreed boundaries has never been intended to be a means of divesting an unconsenting landowner of 
his property [citation], this is precisely its effect when used to overcome long-standing accurate legal 
descriptions of property." ( Armitage v. Declcer, supra,. 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 903.) 
I n  our view, the Court of Appeal in the present case incorrectly dismissed the sound logic set forth in 
Armitage. Although in certain circumstances the long-term acceptance of a fence as a boundary, in 
conjunction with the other pertinent factors we identified in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church, supra, 
51 Cai.2d 702, properly may support an inference that the coterminous landowners agreed to rely 
upon the fence in fixing an uncertain boundary, we believe the Court of Appeal erred in concluding 
that such an inference is warranted in the present case. 
A comparison of the facts of the case before us with those underlying Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran 
Church, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, is instructive. Ernie involved a property dispute over the ownership of 
a strip of land, slightly less than one foot wide and one hundred forty feet in length. I n  1925, the 
defendant's predecessor in interest (like the defendant, a church), purchased a parcel of land 
adjoining the property owned by plaintiff's predecessor in interest. Shortly after having a survey 
made of the property, the defendant's predecessor constructed a rectory and a cement walkway (with 
a fence embedded in it) upon the strip of land in question. These improvements remained in place for 
more than 26 years without objection from the adjoining owner, the plaintiff's predecessor. A t  some 
point after purchasing the lot adjacent to the defendant's property, the plaintiff commissioned a new 
survey of the land, based upon the descriptions set forth in the recorded deeds, and, when that 
survey indicated the disputed land fell within [**1041] [***93] the description contained in the 
plaintiff's deed, the plaintiff sued to establish her ownership of that strip. On these facts, the court in 
Ernie held: "It may be inferred that there was an uncertainty as to the true [boundary] at the time 
the structures were erected [presumably because the defendant's predecessor had a survey 
conducted immediately prior to construction of the rectory, walkway and fence], which uncertainty 
was settled by practical location on the ground at that time and was agreed to by the then 
coterminous owners." (51  Cal.2d at p. 708.) Accordingly, the court in Ernie held that the defendant 
[*58] properly held title to  the disputed strip of land under the agreed-boundary doctrine. 
I n  the present case, by contrast, there is no evidence that the original barbed wire fence dividing Lot 
57 was erected to resolve uncertainty as to the location of the property boundary that separated the 
west and east halves of the original lot. The record is silent as to when, or why, the fence was built. 
Although the presence of the fence since at least 1977 suggests a lengthy acquiescence to its 
existence (on the part of plaintiffs' predecessors in interest), that circumstance alone did not nullify 
Ernie's other requirements--namely, that there be an uncertainty as to the location of the true 
boundary when the fence was erected, and an agreement between the neighboring property owners 
to employ the location of the fence as the means of establishing the boundary. (51 Cai.2d at p. 707.) 
I n  the present case, there is no evidence to support the existence of either one of these 
prerequisites. As the court in Armitage explained, when existing legal records provide a basis for 2 kg 
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fixing the boundary, there is no justification for inferring, without add~rionai evidence, that the prior 
owners were uncertain as to the iocation of the true boundary or that they agreed to fix their 
common boundary at the iocation of a fence. (218 Cai.App.3d at pp. 901-903.) In  view of the 
significant policy considerations set forth in Armitage, the agreed-boundary doctrine should not be 
invoked under the circumstances of the present case to trump the boundary established by the legal 
records. ( Id. at pp. 902-903.) 
We are aware of certain judicial authority, emanating from other jurisdictions, supporting the 
proposition that a conveyance of the "west ha l f "  and "east half" of real property does not necessarily 
signify that a mathematically equal division has been created, and that therefore such terminology 
may create an "uncertainty" as to the location of the common boundary of the parcels. Yet these 
decisions are patently distinguishable from the present case. (See Brewery. Schammerh,om..~958) 
183 Kan, 739 [332 P.2d 526,5281 [rejecting an equal mathematical division of 163.69835 acres, 
where one parcel was described as the "south half" but the previously deeded north parcel was 
referred to not as the "north half," but as "the North 80 acres precisely"]; People v. Ha// (1904) 43 
Misc. 117 [88 N.Y.S. 276, 2791 ["The words 'east half '  and 'west hal f '  in a deed, while naturally 
importing.equal division, may lose that effect when it appears that a t  the time some fixed line or 
known boundary or monument divides the premises somewhere near the center ...." (Itaiics 
added.)].) I n  contrast to  the parties in the cited decisions, defendants in the present case failed to 
present any evidence [*59] suggesting that, at the time Lot 57 was subdivided (or at any point 
thereafter), anything other than an equal division was intended. To the contrary, the uncontroverted 
testimony of plaintiffs' surveyor was that, in view of the general, unqualified language set forth in the 
legal descriptions of the properties, the subdivision of the original lot created "west" and "east" halves 
of equal area. n2 
n2 Monty Seibel's survey revealed Lot 57 to be 10.88 acres in size; as noted above, the assessor's 
map indicated the lot was 10.63 acres in size. This discrepancy fails to establish that prior owners 
were uncertain as to the location of their common boundary, or that they agreed to rely upon the 
barbed wire fence to identify that boundary. Seibel opined that the discrepancy resulted simply from 
the assessor's not possessing sufficient information as to the location of the true boundary, thus 
causing the assessor to draw a north-south line at the center of Lot 57 as a matter of "convenience" 
for assessment purposes. An employee of the county tax assessor's office, who testified on behalf of 
plaintiffs, in substance confirmed this view. Therefore, the discrepancy between Seibel's survey and 
the county tax assessor's information has no bearing upon defendants' contention that the fence 
dividing Lot 57 constitutes the actual boundary between the west and east halves of the lot. 
[**I0421 [***94] As noted previously, the record contains absolutely no evidence supporting 
the premise that the barbed wire fence was erected to resolve uncertainty on the part of the parties' 
predecessors in interest as to the true location of the boundary separating the properties. As others 
aptly have observed, barriers are built for many reasons, n3 only one of which is to act as a visible 
boundary between parcels of real property; other considerations include aesthetics, the controi of 
livestock, and the need to constrain young children from wandering too far from a residence. (See 
generally, Staniford v. Trombly (1919) 181 Cai. 372, 375 [186 P. 5991 [because fence had been built 
to controi cattle, and not as an agreed boundary, the court rejected the defendant's claim to 
ownership of land based upon the agreed-boundary doctrine]; D.oo!ey.S..H.grdw.are Mart v..Trigg 
(1969) 270 Cai.App.2d 337, 339-341 [75 Cal.Rptr. 745j [where parties testified that a fence located 
one foot from their common boundary had been erected to comply with a local ordinance and did not 
result from an agreement to fix an uncertain boundary, the agreed-boundary doctrine did not apply]; 
see also Mesnick v. Caton, supra, 183 Cai.App.3d at p. 1258; Finley v. Yuba County ,WaterD&t., 
supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at pp, 700:701..) Moreover, the precise placement of a fence may be influenced 
by a multitude of factors, only one of which is the location of one's property line; other considerations 
220 
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include the suitability of the te,r;in to accept the fence, the presence or nearby landscaping, the skiii 
of the builder, and even the subsequent movement of the fence through disrepair, pressure exerted 
by livestock, or loss of lateral and subjacent support. 
n3 See Frost, Mending Wail (1914) ("Before I built a wail I ' d  ask to know/What I was walling in or 
walling out."). 
,- 
+(4) Thus, a fence--which, in Emnie.vc Trinity Lutheran ,Cbu~.ch, SuF?ra,.51 CallZd a t  r?ag.e..7.&?, we 
observed "might in and of [itself] be of an uncertain, [*60] temporary or equivocal natureu--is not 
the type of "substantial structure[]" from which an agreement to accept an agreed boundary 
reasonably may be inferred in the absence of evidence that uncertainty on the part of the property 
owners led to their agreement to rely upon the fence as evidence of their common boundary. T(lc) 
On the record before us, we conclude that defendants, as the parties invoking the agreed-boundary 
doctrine as the basis for their claim of title to the disputed strip of land, have not met their burden of 
proof under the test we set forth in Ernie. 
Were we to hold that, in the absence of the explicit requirements set forth in Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran 
Church, supra,.51 Cal:2d. 702, dilapidated--and perhaps meandering--fences constitute a sufficient 
basis for displacing the legal descriptions set forth in recorded deeds, we would be taking a significant 
step backward toward the days of unrecorded agreements and frontier justice, thereby injecting 
added uncertainty into this area of the law and spawning much needless litigation. The expansive 
interpretation of the agreed-boundary doctrine embraced by the Court of Appeal, and urged by the 
defendants here, clearly would add unnecessary expense and stress to the prospect of real property 
ownership in California. By contrast, our affirmation of the doctrine as a narrow theory that, in the 
absence of compliance with the requirements set forth in Ernie. .v.....Trini&-Luthe~afl. .Gh.u~ch,....stlpra,...iil 
Cal.Zd at page.707, may not be relied upon to supersede legal descriptions set forth in deeds, will 
encourage coterminous landowners to resolve their disputes not by erecting imperfect barriers, 
"drawing.lines in the sand," or hauling neighbors into court, but by resorting to title searches, deed 
descriptions, and other objectively certain methods that afford the parties a superior opportunity to 
reach an amicable, noniitigious resolution of their disputes. 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject the Court of Appeal's application of the agreed-boundary 
[**lo431 [ * * *95 ]  doctrine to the factsof this case. I n  our view, an unduly broad application of 
the doctrine tacitly encourages a lack of due diligence on the part of property owners by tempting 
them not to.consult legal descriptions in an effort to reach amicable resolution of their disputes, and 
instead induces property owners to resort to the courts to resolve their boundary disputes. We should 
not promote such a potentially litigious alternative. Guided by the principles set forth in Ernie, and 
mindful of the objectively certain legal description of defendants' property and the absence of any 
evidence suggesting that uncertainty as to the true boundary led to the creation of a "fence-made" 
agreed boundary, we approve the reasoning set forth in Armitag.e v. Decker, supra, 21% CaitApp.3d 
887, and hold that defendants have failed to establish the "uncertainty" and "agreement" required in 
order to establish an agreed boundary. [*61] 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. Because, in view of its disposition of the agreed- 
boundary issue, that court did not reach plaintiffs' other challenges to the judgment of the trial court, 
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to address plaintiffs' remaining 
contentions. 
Lucas, C. I., Arabian, J., Baxter, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred. 
DISSENTBY: MOSK, I. 221 
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DISSENT: MOSK, J. 
I dissent. 
The majority concede that the agreed-boundary doctrine applies whether or not there is an available 
legal document--such as a deed or map--that purports to describe the location of the "true" 
boundary. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 53-54.) However, they then in effect create two different standards 
of proof: if a legal description is available, the party asserting the agreed boundary must present 
direct evidence "that the prior owners were uncertain as to the location of the true boundary [and] 
that they agreed to fix their common boundary at the location of a fence." (Maj. opn., ante, p. 58.) I f  
no legal description is available, the rule that has been recognized and applied in California 
throughout most of this century--regardless of whether a legal description is available--still applies, 
namely, that direct evidence of uncertainty and agreement is not necessary because "The court may 
infer that there was an agreement between the coterminous owners ensuing from uncertainty or a 
dispute, from the long-standing acceptance of a fence as a boundary between their lands." ( EaLe-y, 
Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 Cal.2d 702, 708 [336 P.2d 5251 (Ernie); Mello v. Weaver (1950) 
36 Cal.2d 456, 460 1224 P.2d 6911; Hannah v. Pogue (1944) 23 Cal.2d 849, 856 [147 P.2d 5721 
[citing earlier cases].) I see no reason for this bifurcated standard of proof; I would continue to apply 
the well-settled inference of uncertainty and agreement whether or not a legal description is 
available. 
The fundamental issue in this case is which type of boundaries are entitled to more respect under the 
law: the boundaries to which the adjacent landowners have themselves agreed, or the boundaries 
assertediy described in legal documents. The agreed-boundary doctrine is intended to give the former 
priority over the latter. "The object of the [agreed-boundary doctrine] is to secure repose, to prevent 
strife and disputes concerning boundaries, and make titles permanent and stable" by giving legal 
effect to  boundaries that adjacent landowners have designated by building some physical barrier-- 
[*62] such as a fence--and leaving that physical barrier in place for many years. ( Young v. 
Blakeman (1908) 153 Cal, 477, 482 195 P. 8881; see also Mello v.. Weaver, supra, 36 Ca!.?d45_6, 
4.59-460; Martin v. Copes(l946) 28 Ca!,?_r! 618,622-627 [170.P,zd. 8811; &.nnh v,.P~gu~,~.sup_r~? 
23 Cal.2d 849, 856-857; Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist. (1979) 99 CaJ.App.3d 691, 699 [lhO 
Cal.Rptr, 4231.) The doctrine is premised on the belief that the expectations and understandings of 
adjacent landowners regarding the location of their boundary are vitally important and that courts 
should defer C**1044] [***96] to these expectations and understandings whenever possible; it 
does not contemplate that courts should disregard landowners' expectations merely because there is 
some legal document that purports to place the boundary in some other location. The agreed- 
boundary doctrine thus reflects the notion expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes over a century ago 
that "The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual 
feelings and demands of the community, ..." (Holmes, The Common Law (1881) at p. 41.) 
The majority's holding guarantees that a contrary result will occur. By requiring direct evidence of 
uncertainty and agreement in cases in which some document purports to describe the true boundary, 
the majority are ensuring that in most cases an agreed boundary will not prevail. Often it will be 
virtually impossible to prove that the individuals who built a physical barrier did so expressly to 
resolve a dispute about the location of their common boundary; indeed, as in this case, it will often 
be uncertain who actually constructed the physical barrier, much less whether i t  was built to resolve a 
dispute regarding the location of a boundary. (See Backman, The Law o f  Practical Location o f  
Boundaries and the Need foran Adverse Possession Remedy (1986) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957, 964-965 
[direct evidence of agreement is often unavailable because most agreements are oral and the original 
owners may no longer be in possession, may not remember the agreement, or may not admit they 
made it].) The majority's holding therefore does much more than modify the subtleties of the 
standards of proof; it ensures that in most cases deeds and maps will be given priority over 
agreements long accepted between adjacent landowners. For this reason, in cases in which a legal 
description is available, the majority's newly created rule turns on its head the central policy 
underlying the agreed-boundary doctrine, i.e., that agreements between adjacent landowners are 
entitled to deference. 222 
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The majority also put too much faith in iegai descriptions. The mere fact that a deed or map contains 
a legally adequate written or pictorial description of a boundary does not mean that an actual physical 
boundary assertedly laid out in accordance with that description will so accurately reflect the "true" 
[*63] boundary that courts should give it priority over the agreed boundary. The degree to which a 
physical boundary assertedly laid out in accordance with an abstract written or pictorial description in 
a deed or map reflects the true boundary depends a great deal on the individual who actually marks 
the physical boundary on the land. Even if this task is performed by a surveyor, both courts and 
experts in the fieid acknowledge that the resulting physical boundary may not accurateiy reflect the 
true boundary. 
Surveying is a profession that depends to a great extent on the skill of the surveyor. (Robiilard, Clark 
on Surveying and Boundaries (6th ed. 1992) p. 23; Brown, Boundary Control and Legal Principles (3d 
ed. 1986) p. I.) To perform a legally reliable survey, the surveyor must be skilled in "the science of 
land measurements, ... the laws and customs that define the boundaries of real property, and ... the 
art of evaluating the evidence needed to prove the location of a boundary." (Brown, Boundary Control 
and Legal Principles, op. cit, supra, at p. 1; see Killian V. Hill (1990) 32 Ark.App. 25 [795 S..W.Zd 
369, 3701 ["Surveying has been described both as an art ... and as a science, ..."I.) The surveyor's 
task is particularly difficult if important landmarks or corner monuments have been "lost" or 
"obliterated" with the passage of time. (See Maplesden v. United States (9th Cir. 1985) 764 F.2d 
1290, 1291-1292 [noting the distinction between "lost" and "obliterated" corner markers and 
illustrating the difficulties posed by each]; Vinygrd v...l/aught (1985) 13% Il!..App3d 6 4 1  19.2 I!!,Dc, 
888; 485 N.E.2d 11311 [illustrating difficulty of procedures for reestablishing obliterated corners]; 
Milligan v. Milligan (Me. 1993) 624 A.2d 474 [although deed was not ambiguous, surveys conflicted 
because ,of missing monument]; Robillard, Clark on Surveying and Boundaries, op. clt. supra, at pp. 
490-578 [discussing at length the complex techniques used to locate missing landmarks and corner 
monuments]; Brown, Boundary Control and Legai Principles, op. c i t  supra, at p. 372 [to locate lost 
monuments a surveyor may need to "interview[] [**lo451 [***97] former landowners or 
parties who have ... knowledge [of the location of the landmarks], interview[] other surveyors, or' 
examin[e] public records"].) 
Even i f  the surveyor is diligent, he may nevertheless fail to find the correct location of a landmark or 
corner. (See A!bre.cht v. U , S .  (10th Cir! 1987) 831 F.2d 196, 199 [sufficient evidence to support 
finding that surveyor incorrectly marked "meander corners" and "meander lines"]; Hansen v! Stewart 
(Utah. 1988) 761 P12d -1.4, 18-21 (dis. opn. of Howe,Associate C. I.) [illustrating the complexity and 
uncertainty of the techniques used to locate corners].) For example, one expert cites an instance in 
which 12 different surveyors located a corner at a particular spot, and only after the 13th surveyor 
used a metal detector to locate the original corner monument [*64] was it discovered that the 
corner was in fact some 70 feet away, (Brown, Boundary Control and Legal Principles, op. cit. supra, 
at p. 372.) According to this commentator, such incidents have occurred in every state. (Ibid.) I n  
addition, as we have noted, the exact physical locations of a boundary may be uncertain even if the 
true locations of the landmarks and corners are known. (See Young v.. Blakemgn, supra, 153Cal. 
477, 480-481 [When boundary is located a specific distance from a fixed object, "Experience shows 
that ... measurements [of that distance], made at various times by different persons with different 
instruments, will usually vary somewhat ... I f  the position of the line always remain[s] to be 
ascertained by measurement alone, the result [is1 that it [is not] a fixed boundary, but [is] subject to 
change with every new measurement. Such uncertainty and instability in the title to land [is] 
intolerable."].) 
I n  light of the complexity of the rules of surveying, the skill necessary to apply them correctly, and 
the possibility that different surveyors will reach different conclusions about the location of a 
boundary even if there is a precise description of its location in a deed or map, it is impractical to 
disregard adjacent landowners' long-standing agreements regarding the physical location of the 
boundary merely because such a document is available. Also, if the boundaries set by surveyors were 
to be given priority over those agreed to by the landowners, courts and perhaps juries could often be 
compelled to determine which of two or more conflicting surveys was the most accurate. Both courts 
and juries have been forced to settle such disputes in the past, and experience reveals it is no easy 
task. (See, e.g., F!.f?l.ey v. . Yuba County Water Dist., supra,.99 Ca!.App.!.3d 691, 6 9 ;  Link v.. C C ! ~  
Investment Co. (1962) 199 Cai.App12d 180, 182 [18 Cal.Rptr. 44.11; Hansen v. Stewart, sup.fa, 76 223 
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P.2d 14, 15 [jury trial devoted sdleiy to identifying the physical location of a single corner].) 
The majority state that their holding is meant to "reaffirm the vitality" (maj. opn., ante, p. 54) of our 
hoiding in Ernie, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, 707, that a party asserting an agreed boundary must prove 
that there was " [ I ]  an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, [2] an agreement between the 
coterminous owners fixing the line, and [3] acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a 
period equal to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that substantial loss wouid be 
caused by a change of its position." Curiously, however, the majority do so by limiting the application 
of our statement in Ernie that "The court may infer that there was an agreement between the 
coterminous owners ensuing from uncertainty or a dispute, from the long-standing acceptance of a 
fence as a boundary between [*651 their lands." (Ernie, s-uera, 51 Cai.,?d 702,208; see also Me!Q 
v. Weaver, supra, 36 Cai.2d 456, 460; Hannah v. Pogue, supra,23 Cai.2d 849, 856 [citing earlier 
cases].) 
I too wouid reaffirm our holding in Ernie; however, I would reaffirm it in its entirety, including the 
inferences of uncertainty and agreement. These inferences were sound when we announced our 
decision in Ernie in 1959, and they remain sound to this day, whether or not a legal description is 
available. When an individual erects a physical barrier in approximately the same location as the 
boundary between his property and that [**I0461 [***98] of his neighbor, one of three matters 
is likely to occur. First, the adjacent landowner may determine that the physical barrier is actually on 
his own property. Second, the adjacent landowner may erroneously believe that the physical barrier 
accurately represents the true boundary between the two parcels. Third, the adjacent landowner may 
not be sure where the true boundary is, but may believe that it is in approximately the same place as 
the physical barrier. 
I n  the first scenario, the adjacent landowner wouid almost certainly demand that the barrier be 
removed; therefore, there would be no acquiescence. I n  the second and third scenarios, the adjacent 
landowner probably would allow the physical barrier to remain; therefore, there would be 
acquiescence. Accordingly, if there has been long-term acquiescence in the presence of a physical 
barrier, it is reasonable to infer that, at the time it was built, either the second or third scenario 
occurred. Under either the second or third scenario, there is sufficient uncertainty regarding the true 
physical location of the boundary to satisfy the first element of Ernie. (See Nusbickei v. Stevens 
Ranch Co. (1921) 187 Cal. 15, 19 [200 P. 6511 (Nusbickel) ["The word 'uncertainty' ... convey[s] the 
idea that at the time of the location of the division line neither of the coterminous owners knew the 
true position of the line on the ground" and the requirement is satisfied if the landowners believe they 
know where the physical boundary is but are mistaken.]; Kunza v. Gaskell(1979) 91  CaI,App,Sd ZOL, 
209 [ I54  Cal.Rptr. 1011 ["it has been consistently held that a 'dispute or controversy is not essential' 
to the required 'uncertainty' "I; see also Ernie, supra, 51 Cal.2d 702, 708 ["The line may be founded 
on a mistake."], citing Nusbjcke!, supra, 187 Cal. 15, 19.) 
Similarly, in the first scenario there would be no express or implied agreement between the 
landowners that the physical barrier represented the true physical boundary between the parcels, and 
the second element of Ernie would notbe satisfied. However, if the second and thirdscenarios occur 
and the adjacent landowner allows the physical barrier to remain, i t  is reasonable to infer that he has 
agreed, either expressly or impliedly, that it represents [*66] the true boundary, thereby satisfying 
the second element of Ernie. (See Kraemer v. Suer io r  Oil .Cox (1966) 240 Ca!.,App,Zd 642, 65L L49 
Cal.Rptr. 8,691 ["It is not necessary that the agreement between the parties be an express one. It 
may be inferred or implied from their conduct, ..."I.) 
Of course, the evidentiary force of these inferences will vary depending on the facts of each case. For 
example, they would be entitled to less weight if the physical barrier was a substantial distance from 
the true boundary given the size of the parcels. They may also be entitled to less weight if there is 
evidence that the physical barrier was built for some purpose other than to mark a boundary. (See 
maj. opn., ante, p. 59 [suggesting that a physical barrier may be erected for "aesthetics, the control 
of livestock, and the need to constrain young children from wandering too far from a residence," and 
its location may be influenced by "the suitability of the terrain to accept the fence, the presence of 
nearby landscaping, the skill of the builder, and even the subsequent movement of the fence thro 2!?4 
LA4- . / / . - - . - - .  1-v : -  ---/~-@-=rrh/~.etrie~i~? m=h~hfdhm25930adb32ed6flfl838a46~& fmtstrZFUL ... 4/12/2005 
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I 
disrepair, pressure exerted by ,,vestock, or loss of lateral or subjacent support"].) Finally, these 
inferences may be less persuasive i f  the material used to build the physical barrier is not of a type 
likely to be used to mark a boundary. However, unless there is contrary evidence sufficient to 
outweigh the evidentiary force of these inferences, they must prevail. 
The majority suggest that an "expansive interpretation of the agreed-boundary doctrine ... clearly 
would add unnecessary expense and stress to the prospect of real property ownership in California ... 
[and would] encourage coterminous landowners to resolve their disputes ... by erecting imperfect 
barriers, 'drawing lines in the sand,' or haul~ng neighbors into court, [and not] by resorting to title 
searches, deed descriptions, and other objectively certain methods that afford the parties a superior 
opportunity to reach amicable, nonlitigious resolution of their disputes." (Maj. [***99] C**f0471 
opn., ante, p. 60) The majority also conclude that such an interpretation would "tacitly encourage[] a 
lack of due diligence on the part of property owners by tempting them not to consult legal 
descriptions in an effort to reach amicable resolution of their disputes, and instead [would] induce[] 
property owners to resort to the courts to resolve their boundary disputes." (Maj. opn., ante, p, 60, 
italics in original.) 
I do not believe that the reading of Ernie proposed in part I1 of this dissent would produce the results 
described by the majority. I f  a dispute arises between adjacent landowners regarding the location of 
their common boundary, they could take one of two steps. First, as the majority seem to suggest, 
[ *67]  they could hire a surveyor--or, more likely, each could hire his own surveyor--to determine 
the "true" location of the boundary based on the descriptions in their respective deeds. I f  the 
surveyors agree on the location of the boundary, the dispute would be resolved. As discussed in part 
I of this dissent, however, each surveyor may reach a different conclusion and neither survey may be 
accurate. The landowners would then either have to litigate the matter--in which case they would 
incur substantial legal expenses and the courts would be required to determine which survey is 
accurate--or reach a settlement, which the landowners could have done in the first place. I n  either 
case, the landowners would have incurred the expense of hiring a surveyor to locate the true physical 
boundary. 
Second, the landowners could simply agree to build some physical barrier in a location that reflects a 
compromise between their respective understandings regarding the physical location of the true 
boundary. A broad reading of the Ernie requirements facilitates such informal dispute resolution by 
ensuring that the landowners' agreement will be given legal effect even though there is no direct 
evidence that a dispute and settlement occurred. Under such a rule, the landowners would incur only 
the expense of building the physical barrier, which may serve a variety of other useful purposes, and 
would not be forced to  incur the additional expense--in the form of legal costs--of making a record of 
their dispute and agreement so that they or their successors in interest could sustain their burden of 
proof in court many years in the future. I n  addition, the landowners' successors in interest would not 
suffer prejudice because, even without documentation of the dispute and resolution, the presence of 
a physical barrier would put them on notice of the location of the agreed boundary. 
Far from encouraging a "lack of due diligence" or a resort to "frontier justice," the second approach, 
which the broader reading of Ernie facilitates, thus allows adjacent landowners to resolve their 
disputes easily without resort to attorneys, to surveyors, or to the courts, and ensures that their 
mutual understanding regarding the location of their boundary, as evidenced by their long-term 
acquiescence in a physical barrier, will be respected and given legal effect. 
I n  this case, i t  is undisputed that the physical barrier between plaintiffs' and defendants' property 
stood in the same location for many years in excess of the applicable statute of limitations, thereby 
satisfying Ernie's long-term acquiescence requirement. It was therefore reasonable to infer the two 
remaining Ernie requirements--uncertainty and agreement. Notwithstanding [ *68]  any contrary 
evidence in the record, the inference of agreement and uncertainty arising from the parties' long- 
term acquiescence is sufficient to support the judgment. (See Hannah v: Pogue, s.u~ra ,  . 23CQ!.2d 
849, 856-857 [inference of agreement and uncertainty arising from long-term acquiescence suffic 22 5 
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to support judgment]; see generally, Cm.~fccd. v ..S~.gIhern RacificCo, (;9?5)..3.~.a!?],~d.tt2~,..419[.4~ 
?: 2d_.1831...). 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
Kennard, J., concurred. 
Get.a Document - by Citation - 76 I '  '10 265 Page 1 o f  7 
I 76 Idaho 265, *; 281 P.2d 483, **; 
1955 Ida. LEXIS 266, *** 
Marion SMITH and Amel Smith, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E. W. LONG and Grace 
Long, husband and wife, Robert I. Long, a single man; John E. Long and Phyllis Long, husband and 
wife, Defendants-Respondents 
No. 8189 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
76 Idaho 265; 281 P.2d 483; 1955 Ida. LEXIS 266 
March 17, 1955 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff landowners challenged a judgment of the trial court 
(Idaho), which entered judgment in favor of defendant adverse possessors in the landowners' 
suit seeking to quiet title to certain land. 
OVERVIEW: I n  an earlier appeal of an action between the same parties, the court held that 
neither party had established title. The landowner then commenced the instant action, again 
seeking to quiet title. The trial court found in favor of the adverse possessors. On appeal, the 
court reversed and remanded, holding that: (1) because the action was brought within five 
years of the time that the adverse possession commenced, the adverse possessors' claims 
were interrupted; (2) the original general land office survey meandered the main channel and 
not the east or minor channel; it followed that the meander line was not the west boundary of 
the landowners' property, and their patentee predecessor acquired title to the ordinary high- 
water line along the east bank of the main channel; (3) because the landowners by mesne 
conveyances had acquired that title, and the adverse possession had not matured, the 
landowners were entitled to a degree quieting their title as against the claims of the adverse 
possessors; (4) the landowners' suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; and (5) the 
adverse possessors were entitled to compensation for any permanent improvements made in 
good faith. 
OUTCOME: The trial court's order was reversed, and the case was remanded with directions to 
enter judgment quieting the landowners' title; to find what i f  any permanent improvements 
were made on the property by the adverse possessors; to determine the amount, if any, in 
which the value of the property had been enhanced thereby; and to enter judgment for that 
amount for the adverse possessors, secured by a lien upon the land involved. 
CORE TERMS: channel, island, main channel, meander line, river, surveyed, adverse possession, 
stream, acre, permanent, predecessor, water, deed, east bank, plat, remainder, patentee, 
stockholders, high-water, occupancy, lying, statehood, accretion, riparian, seisin, decree, general 
land office, original survey, previous action, water line 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes o Show Headnotes 
COUNSEL: [***I] 
Donart & Donart, Weiser, for appellants. 
The westerly boundary of Lots Two (2), Three (3) and Four (4) of Section Seventeen (17), Township 
Ten (10) North of Range Five (5) West of Boise Meridian is the high water mark of Snake River and 
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not the meander line shown or, ihe map filed by the United States Sur,eyor General. Johnsen v,  
Hurst, LO.Idaho3CJ-8 ,.. ZZP, -784;. J~h~~~~.~..?.~h.~.~.~,..l4I_d_ah_0.5fi.L,..9.5~P~._499,.~_Z4 L.R.A.,N.S., 1240; 
Stroup v. Matthews, 44 Idaho 134, 255 P. 406; Unitedstates v. Lane, 260 U.S. 662, 43 S.Ct. 236 at 
page 237, 67 L.Ed. 448; State v. Imlah,.l35 Or. 66, 294 P. 1046at page 1048.; Hardin v. orda_n,, 
140 U.S. 371, at page 381, 11 S.Ct. 808, 35 L.Ed. 428; United States v. Otley, D.C., 34 F.Supp.182. 
On dissolution of a corporation in the absence of statute, legal title to the property owned by the 
corporation passes by operation of law to the stockholders who are the beneficial owners ofthe 
corporation and who take as tenants in common. 19 C.J.S., Corporations, tj 1730, p. 1489; Pontiac 
TrustCo. v. Newell, 266 Mich, 490, 254NIW:. 178.af.p.ag.e..L81; Marsh Wood Frodk.cts Co, v. Babcock 
&Wi!cox.Co.., 207 Wis. 20.9, 2.40 N.W,.39? a t  page 399; Cat e... C.o~P.or&lOn of the [!**?I Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 at page 47, 10 S.Ct. 792, 34 LI.Ed. 478; 
Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 65 S.W. 171; Stearns Coal &Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle,, ti GIG, 221 
F. 590. 
A Quit Claim Deed to realty as effectually transfers title as any other form of conveyance. 26 C.J.S., 
Deeds, tj 118, p. 415; Biaggi v. Rarnont, 189 Cal. 675, 209 P. 892 at page 895. 
Ryan & Ryan, Weiser, Dunlap & Dunlap, Caldwell, for respondents. 
I n  a former action between the same parties and involving the same land, it was judicially and finally 
determined that Maryatt Island is an island in Snake River, surrounded on all sides by definite, 
constantly flowing channels of said river, and therefore that question is now res judicata. Smith v. 
Long, 73 Idaho 309, 251 P.29 206; Marshall v, Underwood, 38,Idaho 464,221 P. 1105. 
No title to an island in a navigable stream passes to patentee of the United States by the sale of 
border lots. Cal!ahan v. Price, 26 Idah~.745,146.P, 732;. Youniev! Sheek, 44 Idaho 76.7, 260 P.419, 
The respondents having filed their cross-complaint in March of 1953, and by virtue of their proof of 
adverse possession for a period of more [***3] than five years, are entitled to a decree quieting 
title in them against the appellants, subject only to the paramount title of the United States. Crandall 
v. Goss, 30 Idaho 661, 167 P. 1025; 5 6-401 Idaho Code. 
JUDGES: Taylor, Chief Justice. Keeton, Porter and Smith, JJ., and Sutphen, D. I., concur. 
OPIMIQNBY: TAYLOR 
OPINION: CX267] [**484] I n  a previous action between these same parties, each seeking to 
quiet title to the [*268] same land involved in this action, the court found and decreed that neither 
party had established title. Referring to the claim of the defendants (respondents here) in the 
previous action, the court found: 
"That every since the 1st day of May, 1947, defendants and cross-complainants have 
been and now are in the sole and exclusive, quiet, peaceful, open and notorious 
possession and occupancy of said real property" and "have paid all taxes which have been 
levied'and assessed against said real property." 
"* * * that none of the parties to this action, or their predecessors in interest, protected 
said lands by substantial enclosure or cultivation and improved the same until the 1st day 
of May, 1947; * * *" 
The defendants in that action appealed, [***4] and this court affirmed the decree. Smith v.. .Lo_ng, 
73 Idaho 309,. 2.51..~.;ld..2.06 I n  the former action defendants made two claims to the land; one by 
.. . . . 
adverse possession, and the other by accretion. The court found that no part of the land was 228 
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[**485] the result of accret~bil. Even if it were, their right to it as su.;h would in turn depend upon 
their right by adverse possession to the adjacent land to which the accretion was claimed to have 
attached. Adverse possession was, therefore, the foundation of defendants' claim, and it was 
necessary for them to prove that such possession continued over a period of five years. 55 5-207 and 
5-210 I.C. Such possession was put in issue by the pleadings and was actually litigated and 
determined as indicated by the findings above quoted. It was, therefore, conclusively settled as to the 
parties and their privies that deFendants' adverse possession commenced May 1, 1947. Jensenv. 
Berry & Ball Co., 37 Idaho 394, 2.16 P. 1033; Marsha!! .v.Underwood, 38-Idaho 464, 221 P1 1105; 
Giuffre v. Lauriceila, 25 Ca1.App. 422, 143 P. 1061; Bijou Irr. Dist, v. Weidon Valley Ditch Co., 67 
Colo. 336, 184 P. 382; Dugan. v: Wilms, 93 Oki. 8.9,.219. P:  651; Bowman [***5] v. Parks,.166 Iewa 
403, 147 N.W. 850; Pontiac MuS, C~un ty  F l r e  LlghtningIns. C.0, v .  St?eihi.e.y, 279 I t ! .  118, .116N,E,  
644; Linton v. Omaha Wholesale Produce Market House Co., 8 Cir., 218 F. 331; United States v. 
Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262; 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.) 5 670. 
The date of the commencement of this action does not regularly appear from the record, the clerk 
having omitted from the transcript the date of the filing of the complaint. However, it was 
acknowledged March 29, 1952, and defendants' demurrer was filed April 16, 1952, and in a written 
stipulation between counsel the filing date is referred to as the 1st day of April, 1952. Accepting this 
as the correct date, it follows that this action was commenced thirty days before the expiration of the 
five year period of adverse possession, which otherwise would have matured and perfected [*269] 
defendants' title. However complete and perfect defendants' title by adverse possession at the end of 
the five year perlod on May 1, 1952, may be as to others, as to the plaintiffs the perlod of adverse 
possession was interrupted by the filing of the complaint herein, and their rights as against [***6J 
the plaintiffs must be determined as of April 1, 1952. Westphai v. Arn.oux, 51 Cal.App. 532,197 P, 
3.9 5. 
Thus, the paramount question is the validity of the title now for the first time asserted by the 
plaintiffs in this action. I n  both actions the plaintiffs asserted title on the theory that the land in 
dispute lies between the government meander iine of the Snake River and the high-water mark. They 
were defeated in the first action because the conveyances, under which they ciaimed title, described 
and were limited to specifically numbered lots in a subdivision known as the Sunnyside Orchard Tract. 
This subdivision, apparently created and recorded in 1909, was laid out, over and upon original 
government Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17, Township 10 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian, 
and other property. The lots created by the subdivision do not purport to extend beyond the water 
iine of the east, or nearest, channel of the Snake River. Hence, it was held that under such 
conveyances, plaintiffs acquired no title to the land involved herein, which lies west of the east 
channel of the river and upon an island between the east channel and the main channel. 
At the time of [ * * *T I  the creation of the Sunnyside Orchard Tract or subdivision, the Sunnyside 
Orchard Company, a corporation, was the owner of government Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17. But 
the plat did not purport to cover and no sale had ever been made by that company of any land lying 
on the Island beyond the east channel of the river. 
I n  December, 1917, the charter of the Sunnyside Orchard Company was forfeited by the state. At 
that time its entire stock was owned by George M. Waterhouse, August Brockman and A. A. Record. 
Subsequently to the trial of the prior action, the plaintiffs obtained quitclaim deeds from all of the 
heirs of all three of the above-named stockholders (deceased). These deeds describe and purport to 
convey to  the plaintiffs all of that portion of Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17, lying between the west 
boundary line of the platted lots of the Sunnyside Orchard Tract and the high-water mark of the main 
channel of the [**486] Snake River. Founding their claim upon these deeds the plaintiffs 
commenced this action to quiet title to that part of the island, lying in Section 17, as a part of the 
original government Lot 4. 
Upon dissolution of a corporation, the corporate property [***8] vests in its stockholders, subject to 
the liabilities of the corporation. Taylor v. Interstateinvestment .[*2701 Co,, 75 Wash ... 49.0, -3.51, 
240; Service &Wright Lbr. Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., 81 Or.32, 149 P. 531, 152 P. 262,..158...P,, 
175; Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 65 S.W. 171; Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392; Po-ntiacTrust C.o,.v. Newe!l, 266 Mich.490, 254 N.WI 17.8.; Ste%r.us 
Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, 6 Cir., 221 F. 590; Late Corporation of The Church of Jesus C%'% 
Geba Document - by Citation - 76 I ~ q o  265 Page 4 o f  7 
of Latter Daysaints v..U.nited siates, 136 U.5 1, 10 S,Ct. 792, 34 L . ~ u .  478; 19 C.J.S., 
Corporations, 5 1730b. The quitclaim deeds from the heirs of the stockholders, who died seized of the 
property of the Sunnyside Orchard Company, are effective to convey to the plaintiffs whatever title 
those stockholders and their heirs held in the land involved. Bia.ggi.v.Ramont, 189Cal. 675, 
892; Buller v. Buller, 62 Cal.App.2d 694, 145 P.2d 653; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, 3 118. Cf. Crane v. Fr.ench, 
39 Cal.App.2d 642, 104 P.2d 53 (deed by former officers and directors). 
The ultimate question then is, whether the respective owners in the chain of title to the l***93 
original government Lot 4, in Section 17, held title to that portion of the island opposite that lot and 
across the minor or east channei of the river. 
The general rules applicable here were stated in Johnson v. Hurst, 10 Idaho 308, at page 318, 77 P. 
784, 788, as follows: 
"It is conceded as the general rule of law that the meander line run in surveying public 
lands bordering upon a navigable river is not a line of boundary, but one designed merely 
to point out the sinuosity of the bank of the stream, and as a means only of ascertaining 
the quantity of land in the fraction that is to be paid for by the purchaser; and that the 
water course, and not the meander line as actually run on the land, becomes the true 
boundary line." See authorities there cited. 
And, after reviewing a number of cases, Justice Ailshie further said: 
"In no case called to our attention, where the court has refused to allow the grantee's 
true boundary line to extend to the main stream or water line, has it appeared that the 
strip or tract of land claimed was within the section that contained the fractional lots 
patented; nor does it appear in any of those cases that the lands were returned 
as [***I01 surveyed on all sides of the tract claimed. I n  other words, wherever it has 
appeared from the notes and official plats that all the lands within the legal subdivision as 
directed to be surveyed by the United States statutes has been returned as surveyed and 
the remainder of those subdivisions is shown to be the waters of a navigable stream, the 
courts have uniformly held that the grantee to lots or fractional subdivisions abutting on 
the meander line takes title to the stream." 3,ohnsopv: [T2Zt'g.. H-urg, 10 ISlah?.308,.at 
page 323, 77 P. 784, 790. 
I n  the Johnson-Hurst case, an exception was claimed to the general rule that where the quantity of 
land lying between the meander line and the water line, was equal to or greater than that contained 
in the original fraction or lot, then the rule is not applicable. This objection was overruled and in that 
case an area, between the meander line and the stream greater than that embraced within the 
original lots, was held to belong to the owner of such lots. I n  the case before us the disputed strip, 
being around sixteen acres, is less in quantity than the original Lot 4, containing 46 acres. 
I n  Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561, [***ll] 95 P. 499, 502, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 1240, the rules 
applied in Johnson v. Hurst, supra, were followed and applied to the effect that a 25 acre island, lying 
between the north and south channels on the Snake River, was held to be the property of the owner 
of the abutting lots on the north side of the river. The south channel was found to be the [**487] 
main channel. I n  the north channel there was a "small neck of land extending from the island" to the 
north bank. The water of the river could get around this "neck or tongue at ordinary high water". The 
record indicated that the government did not consider the island of sufficient importance to reserve it 
from the grant of lots on the north bank, no intention to make such a reservation appearing from the 
230 
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record. 
The same rule was followed by the court in Moss & Brother v. Ramey, 14 Idaho 598, 95 P. 513, and 
in Lattig v. Scott, 17.Idaho.5.Q6, 107 P. 47. On appeal the latter case was reversed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Scott v,.Lattig., 2.27 U..St 229,.33 S L t .  242,244, 57 L,Ed. 4903 On the 
collateral issue as to the ownership of the bed of navigable streams, the Supreme Court held that 
under federal law the riparian [***I21 owner's title stops at the stream, and, upon admission of the 
state to the Union, the federal government's title to the bed of such streams passed to the state. 
After statehood, the right of the riparian owner in such underwater land would depend upon the law 
of the state. 
As to the question we are presently concerned with, the Supreme Court of the United States held the 
island involved in the Scott-Lattig case, although on the riparian owner's side of the main channel, 
was "fast dry land"; that it was in existence and in substantially the same condition at the time of the 
original survey in 1868, and at the time of statehood in 1890. It was not mentioned in the field notes 
or plat of the original survey. The meander line of that survey was run along the east bank of the 
east channel. The island was, therefore, completely omitted from the original survey, as to which the 
court said: "The error in omitting it from the survey did not devest the United States of the title, or 
interpose any obstacle to surveying it at a later time." The island in that case comprised r*272] 
138.15 acres, and was considered of sufficient importance to justify a survey. Scott settled on the 
island [***I31 in 1904, and upon his application it was surveyed by the general land office in 1906 
and his homestead entry was approved. 
Following the reversal of Lattig v. Scott, the case of Moss & Brother v. Ramey again came before this 
court, and, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, was remanded to the 
trial court for the trial and determination of the question as.to whether or not the island there 
involved was of such character that title thereto had not passed from the government. Moss& 
Brother v. Ramey, 25 Idaho 1, 1.36 P. 608. 
The question was again presented to the court in Ca!!.a.ha.n.vl._Prl~,..2h.Ldaho 745,146 P.732, I n  that 
case the court expressly reversed Johnson v. Hurst, Lattig v.. Scott, Johnson v: John~on, and Ulbright 
v, Baslingt.on, 20 Idaho 539, 119 P. 292, 294, insofar as they held that the patentee from the 
government acquired title to the thread of the stream, and held instead that such title extends no 
farther than the natural high-water line. That case involved an island in the Salmon River. To the 
west flowed the main channel and on the east the minor channel. Both carried water throughout the 
season and the island appeared to be permanent [***I41 and in the same general condition as 
when the lands on each side were surveyed. The appellants claimed the island as a part of their 
government lots on the east bank of the river. This bank was surveyed in 1880, and the survey did 
not indicate the existence of the island. The island contained forty to fifty acres. It was held that it 
was unsurveyed public domain and did not pass to the patentees on the east bank. 
I n  Younle v. Sheek, 44 Idaho 767, 260 P. 419, this court held that the patentee of lots bordering on 
the west meander line of the Snake River held title to the west bank of the permanent channel, 
although between that channel and the meander line there was a so-called channel which was filled 
with water in the late spring and early summer and dry the remainder of the year. There the land 
involved was not considered an island because it was subject to flooding each year, and that was the 
condition at statehood. The court quoted and followed the language of Johnson v. Hurst which we 
have last above set out. 
[**488] Here the east or minor channel, though a permanent channel, in the sense that water 
flows therein throughout the season, is a small channel by comparison [***I51 with the main 
channel farther west. However, due to its permanent character, the land lying between it and the 
main channel is properly regarded as an island, and the trial court in effect so found. 
For the purpose of clarity, we have attached three maps which we have designated as exhibits 1, 2 
and 3. 
[*273] Exhibit 1 is a composite, prepared from exhibits in evidence, intended to show the relation 
of the channels of the river to the government survey, sections, lots and the meander line. 2 3 1 
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[SEE MAP IN ORIGINAL] 
[*274] [**489] Exhibit 2 is a photostatic copy of the pertinent part of the original government 
plat approved by the surveyor general April 19, 1870. 
[SEE MAP IN ORIGINAL] 
[*275] [**490] Exhibit 3 is a reproduction of an aerial photograph showing the relative 
importance of the channels of the river and the location and size of the island, the southern tip of 
which is in issue. 
[SEE MAP IN ORIGINAL] 
[*276] However, there is a vital distinction to be noted between this case and Callahan v. Pri.ce., 
supra, and the previous cases therein overruled. I n  those cases the islands involved were not 
surveyed, but were apparently ignored by the [***Z6] surveyor and the meander lines run along 
the bank of the channel bordering the riparian claimants' property. I n  this case all of the island was 
surveyed, except a small portion on the south end thereof, aggregating 22.64 acres. Approximately 
six acres of this unsurveyed portion was decreed to the defendants as a [**49P] part of Lot 1 in 
Section 8. The remainder, approximately 16 acres, lies in Section 17 opposite plaintiffs' Lot 4. I t  
appears that the surveyor who made the survey for the general land office in 1870, meandered the 
main channel of the river, except that when he came to the minor east channel he followed that 
channel through Lot 4 to the section line between Sections 8 and 17 and then crossed the minor 
channel in a northwesterly direction back to the east bank of the main channel, thus cutting off and 
excluding the southern tip of the island. The photostatic copy of the o'riginal plat of that survey (see 
attached exhibit 2) does not show the existence or course of the east or minor channel, and shows 
the area, occupied by the land here involved, to be in the Snake River. I n  other words, the surveyor 
returned all of the land in Sections 8 and 17 on the east side [***I71 of the main channel as 
surveyed, and shows all of the remainder of the subdivisions therein to be the waters of the river. 
The trial court in both the previous action and in this action found that the original general land office 
survey meandered the main channel and not the east or minorchannel. Such being the facts, it 
follows that the meander line is not the west boundary of plaintiffs' property, and that their patentee 
predecessor acquired title to the ordinary high-water line along the east bank of the main channel. 
St_mu~ v: Matfh.e.w.s,..4.4.I_dah,~ .134,..25.5.P,..406; SLa'Fev,.lm!ah, 125 .0 r~  .6.6,..294.P, 1046.;. !J.nLt& 
States v. Otley, 9 Cir., 127 F.? 988; Hardin vJordan, 140 US. 371, 11 S,Ct. 808, 35 L.Ed, 428; 
U.niLed States v. Lane, 260 U.5, 662, 43S..Ct, 236, 67 L.E.d.? 448, Plaintiffs by mesne conveyances 
have acquired that title. Defendants' title by adverse possession not having matured at the time this 
action commenced, plaintiffs are entitled to a decree quieting their title as against the claims of the 
defendants. 
Defendants plead the bar of the statutes of limitation. $5 5-203, 5-204, and 5-205 I.C. Section 5-205 
I.C., requires action to be commenced within five years [***18] of the accrual of a right of entry. 
Assuming this section applicable, plaintiffs' action was commenced a month after they acquired their 
title, and less than five years after the entry made by defendants. Sections 5-203 and 5-204 I.C. 
require plaintiffs or their predecessors to have been "seized or possessed" of the property within five 
years of the commencement of the action. Defendants contend, since neither plaintiffs nor [*2771 
their predecessors have had actual possession or occupancy within that time, their cause is barred. 
"The requirement of seisin or possession is met when it  is established that the plaintiff 
was'pos~hsed of legai title;and this seisin can be destroyed only by establishing the fact 
that a title by adverse possession was acquired by the defendant." 16 Cal.Jur., Limitation 
of Actions, 5 43. 
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W_estp^h.aLvV Amou.x,~L.Cd..Ap.p.~..53.2 ,.. L97 P.,:395;. Peop!eelSWat~~.C_~.,. v Bqromeo,.3_l.C.aL~~~17Q,. 
160 P. 574; McKelvey v. Rodriquez, 57 Cal.App.2d 214, 134 P.2d 870; Wiikerson v. Thomas, 121 
Cal.App.2d 479, 263 P.2d 678. 
This rule is expressed in 5 5-206 I.C., and was applied by this court in Saivis v. Lawyer, 73. Idaho 
469,. 253.P.2d 589. See also [***I91 B.0.wwer.v .Ko!!m.e.yer,.31 Idaho 712, IZ5.Pk.96P; TruckeeRlver 
General E!ectric.Co. v. Anderson, ?Q.Ca!.App., 526,.181..P. 293; Ak!ey. vz..B.~sstt, 189 ca!! 6.25, 2.0.9.P. 
576; Comstock v. Finn, 13.Cai.App.2.d15,1, 56 P.2d 957; Bprden v. Boyvin, 55 Cal..App,2d 432, 130 
P2d.718; and, for definition of "seized" or "seisin", Fmntalnv, L.ew/~tan.Nat,. Ban.k,...ll.l.da?_q453,....8? 
P, 505; Crandall. v.. Goss, 30. Td.ah.o.661, ,167.P?..1025; C.ha.l?ln. Lbr,..Co, v, .Pay,..10_6..Co!._o, 194,103 
P.Zd: 14; Smith v. Williamson, 306 Ky. 467, 208 S.W.2d 503; Williams v. Swango, 365 111. 549, 7 
N.E ,2d  306; 79 C.J.S. page 1024. 
It appears from the record that defendants' claim was initiated in good faith, and that they and their 
predecessors occupied the property adversely to the owners under color or claim of title, from May I, 
1947. Under such circumstances, if during such occupancy they, in good faith, made valuable, 
permanent improvements upon [**492] the property, they would be entitled to compensation 
therefor. 42 C.J.S., Improvements, 5 7. 
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to,enter judgment 
quieting plaintiffs' title; to find what if any permanent improvements were made [***20] on the 
property by the defendants and their predecessors during their occupancy from May 1, 1947; to 
determine the amount, if any, in which the value of the property has been enhanced thereby; and to 
enter judgment for that amount for defendants against plaintiffs, secured by a lien upon the land 
involved. The trial court may in its discretion receive further evidence as to the fact of, and increased 
value due to, improvements, and permit amendment of defendants' pleadings to conform thereto. 
Costs to appellants. 
KEETON, PORTER and SMITH, JJ., and SUTPHEN, D. 3., concur. 
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PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Fremont County. Honorable Brent J. Moss, District Judge. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: I n  a boundary dispute case that arose when defendants' 
prepurchase survey demonstrated that plaintiffs' farming lines encroached on the parcel that 
defendants had purchased from third party defendants, defendants appealed an order of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court, Fremont County, Idaho, which determined the location of the 
boundary by applying the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
OVERVIEW: Defendants purchased approximately 40 acres of land from third party 
defendants. Prior to completing the purchase, defendants had the property surveyed. 
Defendants began to set fence posts along the boundaries identified in the survey. One of the 
plaintiffs, a farm, disputed the location of the fence as the boundary and tore out the fence 
posts to access land it had been farming for some time. The farm sued defendants, claiming a 
right to the land up to and including the farming lines which extended beyond defendants' 
proposed fence-line. Another landowner, who also disputed his common boundary with 
defendants as shown by the survey, joined as a plaintiff in the suit. The instant court was 
satisfied that adjoining landowners had tacitly accepted the farming lines as visible evidence of 
their dividing lines for a long period of time. From the mutual recognition of the farming lines 
and the occupation and cultivation by each party up to the lines, the trial court properly found 
acquiescence from which it implied an agreement between the parties. Thus, there were ample 
facts to sustain the trial court's decision holding the farming lines to be the boundary by 
acquiescence. 
OUTCOME: The instant court affirmed the decision of the trial court granting boundary by 
acquiescence to plaintiffs. However, the instant court vacated the order on summary judgment 
in favor of defendants requiring third party defendants to reimburse defendants for a loss of 
property, which had not been clearly proven. The instantcourt declined to award attorney fees, 
but it awarded costs to plaintiffs. 
CORE TERMS: farming, acquiescence, fence, parcel, disputed, farmed, adjoining landowners, 
summary judgment, common boundary, reimburse, surveyed, deed, fixing, trees, competent 
evidence, quiet title, acres, feet, visible evidence, operation of law, boundary line, erection, dividing, 
revises, avail, substantially changed, adverse possession, express agreement, reasonable value, 
sufficient basis 
Get a Document - by Citation - 136 ' 'qho 397 
~ e x , s ' ~ e x i s ( ~ )  Headnotes a Show Headnotes 
COUNSEL: Smith & Hancock, Rexburg, for appellants. Jesse D. Hancock argued. 
McGrath Meacham Smith & Seamons, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Bryan D. Smith argued 
JUDGES: WALTERS, Justice. Chief lustice TROUT and Justices SCHROEDER, KIDWELL and EISMANN, 
CONCUR. 
OPINIONBY: WALTERS 
OPINION: [*398] [**I0811 
WALTERS, Justice 
This case involves a boundary dispute, which arose when defendants David and Gogie 
Reynolds' (Reynolds) prepurchase survey demonstrated that plaintiffs' farming lines encroached on 
the parcel that Reynolds had purchased from Roy and Trudy Stegelmeier. The district court 
determined the location of the boundary by applying the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. We 
affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
I n  1976, Stegelmeier entered into an agreement of sale with W.L. and Virginia Hargis to purchase 
several tracts of land in Fremont County, Idaho, including [***2J a parcel described as the N1/2 of 
the SE1/4, Section 24, Township 8 North, Range 44 E.B.M. The following year, Stegelmeier cleared 
the land of trees and began farming, which he continued until sometime in 1991 when he placed 
[*399]1 [**lo821 the land in CRP (Crop Rotation Program). I n  1995, Stegelmeier sold 
approximately forty acres of said parcel to Reynolds. 
Prior to completing the purchase, Reynolds had the property surveyed. The description derived from 
the survey was noted on the deed from Stegelmeier to Reynolds as the NW1/4 of the SW1/4, Section 
24, Township 8 North, Range East, Boise Meridian, Fremont County, Idaho. The surveyed parcel was 
bounded on the west by property owned by Harshbarger Farms, fnc. (Harshbarger), that had been 
farmed by Clifford and Alyce Harshbarger since 1943, and on the north by property which was owned 
and being farmed by Lloyd Griffel, who had purchased his land from Robert R. Litton. Reynolds began 
to set fence posts in 1996 along the boundaries identified in the survey. 
Harshbarger disputed the location of the fence as the boundary and tore out the fence posts to access 
land it had been farming for some time. Harshbarger brought suit against Reynolds, claiming [***33 
a right to the land up to and including the farming lines which extended beyond Reynolds' proposed 
fenceline. Griffel, who also disputed his common boundary with Reynolds as shown by the survey, 
joined as a plaintiff in the suit to adjudicate the northern and westerly boundaries of the 
Stegelmeier/Reynolds parcel. 
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the boundaries between their properties and Reynolds' 
property had been established for more than twenty years by both farming lines and fencing lines, 
and that these lines claimed by the plaintiffs were visible and obvious, although they had never been 
surveyed. The plaintiffs asserted title to the disputed premises defined by the farming lines as they 
existed in 1999 under theories of adverse possession and boundary by agreement and/or 
acquiescence. The plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining Reynolds from erecting 
the fence on the disputed boundary that would impede the plaintiffs from conducting their usual fall 
field farming work. 
Reynolds filed a third-party complaint against Stegelmeier, alleging breach of the parties' real estate 
agreement and warranty deed and misrepresentation. Subsequent to Reynolds' [***4] summary 
judgment motion, which the district court granted, n l  Stegelmeier agreed to defend all of the 
remaining claims against Reynolds in the action. By the time the matter went to trial, the plainti? 35 
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had abandoned their adverse pussession claims and proceeded only on their claims of boundary by 
agreement or acquiescence. 
n l  On summary judgment, the district court held that Stegelmeier must reimburse Reynolds for the 
reasonable value of property lost in the event the plaintiffs prevail on their claims. The district court 
also held Stegelmeier liable to Reynolds for reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending 
against the plaintiffs' claims. 
The district court, in its memorandum decision, found that the adjoining owners did not know the 
exact location of the common boundary lines prior to the survey but that all parties had acquiesced in 
the farming lines as boundaries for many years. Relying on the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, the 
district court found that the farming lines had not substantially [ * * *5 ]  changed for at least twenty 
years, thus providing a sufficient basis to establish an agreed boundary with certainty. The district 
court, however, allowed compensation for a deviation of seven feet in the farming lines, pursuant to 
the expert's testimony. The district court entered judgment establishing the boundary lines applicable 
only to the property actually farmed and not modifying "any boundary otherwise described by deed 
that is currently located within existing patches of trees referred to above." The district court fixed 
the boundaries as follows: 
(1) between the Griffel/Reynolds parcel at a point seven feet north of and parallel to the 
farming line existing during the 1999 farming year, and extending from the eastern 
boundary of the Reynolds parcel to the farming line against the trees on the west, and 
(2) between the Harshbarger/Reynolds parcel at a point seven feet west of and parallel to 
the farming line as it existed during the 1999 farming year; that boundary extends north 
and south to the farming lines against the patches of trees located on the north and south 
end thereof as reflected in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1,2, and 3. 
Stegelmeier, the third-party defendant, [ * * *6 ]  filed a timely appeal from the judgment and from 
the district court's order denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. On appeal, he argues 
that the district court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence, that the boundaries fixed 
by the district court are arbitrary, ambiguous, and not substantiated by the evidence, and that the 
plaintiffs' failed to sustain their burden of proof of acquiescence in the farming lines as the boundaries 
because the location of the farming lines From 1978 to 1999 was not shown with certainty. 
DISCUSSION 
I n  Idaho, the phrase "boundary by acquiescence" is often used interchangeably with "boundary by 
agreement," although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine. Cameron v. Neal, 130 ldaho 
898, 950,950 P.2d 1237 P.2d (1981), (citing Wells v. ~Wiliiam.son, 118 id ah^ 37, 40, 794 P.2d.626, 
629 (1990)). To prove boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and 
a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be 
implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. Id. at 41, 794 P,2d at ,630; 
Edgeller v. Johnston, 74  1daho 359, 262 P.2d 1006 (1953) [***71 
There is no dispute that the true boundaries between the plaintiffs' and the defendant's property were 
unknown. The parties' deeds, which were admitted as exhibits, describe the boundaries in terms of 
the section lines of Section 24 of the government survey, but none of the adjoining owners knew the 
true position of the lines on the ground. Stegelmeier testified that he had never had any discussions 
as to the location of the boundaries with the adjoining landowners, and until he could afford a survey, 
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he farmed his property up to tr,riexisting farming lines. Further testimony of the parties established 
that there was no express agreement regarding the plaintiffs' common boundaries with Stegelmeier. 
Only when Reynolds set the fence posts along the boundaries that he had surveyed in 1995 did the 
parties learn the location of the true boundaries and the plaintiffs' encroachment onto the 
Reynolds/Stegelmeier property. 
On the element of agreement, Cliff Harshbarger testified that from as far back as 1943, he had 
farmed up to a fence line, which he contended marked the boundary that he continued to obey. Lloyd 
Griffel also testified to the existence of a fence line, which he asserted divided [***81 his property 
from Stegelmeier's property, and up to which he had farmed even after the fence got caught in the 
disk and was removed. However, the plaintiffs offered no evidence as to when the fences were 
erected, by whom, and for what purpose. They also presented no evidence that Stegelmeier's 
predecessor had agreed to treat either fence line as the boundary. Furthermore, because the fences 
were no longer in existence when Stegelmeier purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely on the old 
fence lines to prove an agreement but must meet their burden of proof with other evidence. 
Where no express agreement is shown, the agreed upon boundary "must therefore be determined 
from the conduct of the parties, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." O~al1,ey v. 
Jones, 46 Idaho 137, 140, 266 P, 797, 798 (1928). A long period of acquiescence by one party to 
another party's use of the disputed property provides a factual basis from which an agreement can be 
inferred. Wells, 118 Idaho a t  41,794 P.2d at 630.: Acquiescence is merely regarded as competent 
evidence of the agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117, 268 P?Zd 351 (1954). [***9] 
The record discloses that Stegelmeier never confronted Harshbarger and Griffel with objections as to 
the location of their farming lines. No dispute existed until just prior to the commencement of this 
action in which the plaintiffs sought to claim rights to the property defined by the farming lines. From 
this evidence, the district court concluded that the parties had acquiesced in treating the farming 
lines as their boundary over many years, based upon a finding that the farming lines had remained 
substantially unchanged since 1978. Stegelmeier challenges this finding and that the disputed parcel 
contains 5.62 acres, claiming that the findings are not supported by the evidence. [*401] 
[**lo841 
The plaintiffs' expert, Val Schultz, a cadastral surveyor, testified as to his interpretation of aerial 
photos of the disputed area taken in 1978, 1987, and 1992, which he compared to the actual location 
of the farming lines and identifiable features that he was able to observe on the ground in 1999 just 
before trial. He identified a berm and an area marked by a three-foot difference in elevation, which 
showed the lines that the adjoining landowners adhered to during the years that they farmed the 
property. [***lo] His expert opinion was that the farming lines of Harshbarger and Griffel had not 
substantially changed for more than twenty years, and that opinion was admitted without contest. 
Accordingly, we uphold the district court's finding as to the certainty and permanence of the farming 
lines in this case. We conclude that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the finding 
that the farming lines had remained substantially unchanged since 1978. 
Schultz, however, did not measure the farming lines in relation to the surveyed boundary lines, nor 
did' the 1995 survey admitted into evidence on the stipulation of the parties precisely locate the 
farming lines. The description provided by the district court defining the boundary by acquiescence 
was not derived from a survey illustrating the location of the farming iines. Unlike the metes and 
bounds description in Lindgren v. Maytin, 130 Idsho 854,949 P,&l 1061 (1997), which was held to be 
supported by the record and deemed admitted because it was not denied in the responsive pleading, 
the description constructed by the district court in this case is without a sufficient basis in the 
evidence. Therefore, we cannot sustain [***ll] the district court's finding that the disputed parcel 
is 5.62 acres. 
Next, Stegelmeier argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in establishing boundary by 
acquiescence, arguing that there was a failure of proof of an agreement. As earlier noted in this 
opinion, an agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or implied, is essential to a claim of 
boundary by acquiescence. See Edgeiier v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 365, 262 P.2d at 1010. An agreement 
can be "implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties, including erection of a 
fence or other demarcation, possession of the property up to the fence, and a period of 237 
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acquiescence." Morrissey vl. ~;i!&, 124 Idaho 870, 8.65 ?,2d ,961 (1995); accord Fdg.eliec, 74 X.a.h.o-aL 
365, 262 P.2d a t . l Q l  (such an agreement may be presumed to arise between adjoining landowners 
where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or other monument on the iine 
foilowed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such-length of time that 
neither should be allowed to deny the correctness of its location). We are satisfied here 
that [***I21 the adjoining landowners tacitly accepted the farming lines as visible evidence of their 
dividing lines for a long period of time. From the mutual recognition of the farming lines and the 
occupation and cultivation by each party up to the lines, the district court properly found 
acquiescence from which it implied an agreement between the parties. There are ample facts, 
therefore, to sustain the action of the district court holding the farming lines to be the boundary by 
acquiescence. 
We affirm the district court's order granting the plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence. Our decision, 
however, does not avail the plaintiffs of quiet title that they also sought in their complaint but only 
revises the parties' common boundary by operation of law. See Morrissey, 124 Idaho at 873,865 
P.2dat 964 (oral agreement fixing boundary iine between co-terminous owners where true boundary 
is unknown, uncertain or in dispute is not regarded as a conveyance but merely the location of the 
respective existing estates and the common boundary of each of the parties); Edgeller, 74 Idaho. at 
366, 262 P.2d at 1010 (holding that a finding, supported by substantial competent [***I31 
evidence, of an agreed boundary line has the effect of extending or diminishing the limits of the 
respective deeds to include and exclude the parcel of land in dispute). 
Our decision does put into question the district court's order on Reynolds' summary judgment holding 
that Stegeimeier shall reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable vaiue of any property lost in the event 
the plaintiffs prevail in their claims. Stegelmeier makes the argument on appeal that he [*402] 
[**1085J should not be held to have conveyed to Reynolds less than the property described in the 
warranty deed, making him liable for breach of the warranty of title; and he asserts that boundary by 
acquiescence undermines the integrity of legal descriptions in all deeds. Until such time as the 
plaintiffs successfully obtain quiet title in the disputed area that is bounded in part by the newly- 
established boundary by acquiescence but as yet undefined, we are unable to measure the amount of 
property that Reynolds has been deprived of and the extent of any liability for said loss that 
Stegelmeier is responsible for. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the summary judgment 
ordering Stegelmeier to reimburse Reynolds because it has not been [***14] shown that Reynolds 
has suffered a compensable loss. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court granting boundary by acquiescence to the plaintiffs is hereby 
affirmed. However, we vacate the order on summary judgment in favor of Reynolds requiring 
Stegelmeier to reimburse Reynolds for a loss of property, which has not been clearly proven. We do 
not award fees in that we cannot say that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Mini& v. Gem %ate Devel.opers, Inc., 99 ldaho 911, 918, 591 
P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). Costs are awarded to the respondents Harshbarger and Griffel. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SCHROEDER, KIDWELL and EISMANN, CONCUR. 
I n  an opinion released today, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court 
granting the plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence, based upon the parties' long standing tacit 
acceptance of the farming lines as visible evidence of the parties' dividing lines. The Court's decision, 
which revises the parties' common boundary by operation of law, however, does not avail the plaintiff 
of quiet title that they also sought in their complaint. 
The Court [***I51 also vacated that portion of the summary judgment ordering Stegelmeier to 
reimburse Reynolds because it has not yet been shown that Reynolds has suffered a compensable 
loss. 
The Court declined to award attorney fees under I.C. fj 12-121, but awarded costs to respondents 
Harshbarger and Griffel. 
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Douglas fir stump showing derelict fence remnant (yellow 
arrows pointing to wire). The single strand of wire on this 
stump is the ~ n l y  remaining remnant of  fence within 30 feet 
of either side of stump. 
(. 
Photograph taken August 2003, facing east, o n  Green property. 
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